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ABSTRACTS

GEOGRAPHIC DIFFUSION AND THE TRANSFORMATION OF THE POSTCOMMUNIST WORLD

By JEFFREY S. KOPSTEIN and DAVID A. REILLY

Since the collapse of communism the states of postcommunist Europe and Asia have defined for themselves, and have had defined for them, two primary tasks: the construction of viable market economies and the establishment of working institutions of representative democracy. The variation in political and economic outcomes in the postcommunist space makes it, without question, the most diverse "region" in the world. What explains the variation? All of the big winners of postcommunism share the trait of being geographically close to the former border of the noncommunist world. Even controlling for cultural differences, historical legacies, and paths of extrication, the spatial effect remains consistent and strong across the universe of postcommunist cases. This suggests the spatially dependent nature of the diffusion of norms, resources, and institutions that are necessary to the construction of political democracies and market economies in the postcommunist era. The authors develop and adduce evidence for the spatial dependence hypothesis, test it against rival hypotheses, and illustrate the relationships at work through three theoretically important case studies.

PARTISAN GOVERNMENTS, THE INTERNATIONAL ECONOMY, AND MACROECONOMIC POLITICS IN ADVANCED NATIONS, 1960–93

By CARLES BOIX

This article examines the impact of parties, domestic institutions, and the international economy on the conduct of monetary and fiscal policies using time-series cross-section data from nineteen OECD countries for the years between 1960 and the mid-1990s. The results are as follows. Partisan governments have affected, alone and in interaction with the organization of labor markets, the pattern of macroeconomic management. Still, their impact has varied over time, partly as a function of economic conditions but fundamentally as a function of the degree of financial liberalization and the exchange-rate system in place. After following broadly similar macroeconomic policies in the 1960s, OECD governments pursued divergent monetary and fiscal policies in response to the economic slowdown of the 1970s. Even when they initially adopted countercyclical measures, conservative governments quickly favored tight monetary policies and strove to achieve fiscal discipline. By contrast, taking advantage of generalized capital controls and floating exchange rates, socialist cabinets embraced demand management policies in a systematic fashion—mostly through budget deficits in corporatist countries and through both loose monetary and loose fiscal measures in noncorporatist settings. As financial liberalization progressed in the early 1980s, partisan- and institution-led differences in macroeconomic policies waned across countries.

THE EVOLVING ARMS CONTROL AGENDA

IMPLICATIONS OF THE ROLE OF NGOS IN BANNING ANTIPERSONNEL LANDMINES

By KENNETH R. RUTHERFORD

This article examines the role NGOs have played in placing and controlling the landmine-ban issue on the international arms control agenda, which eventually changed state behavior toward landmines. It develops a framework for agenda setting to examine how and why NGOs were successful in this role. More importantly, the article also examines how NGOs were able to generate state action toward the support of the Ottawa Treaty banning antipersonnel landmines, which marked the first time a weapon in widespread use has been banned. The article makes two interrelated arguments. First, NGOs initiated the landmine ban by placing it on the international arms control agenda, which gained intense media and public attention for the cause. The NGOs

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accomplished their goal by utilizing cognitive attribution strategies to educate the public about the minimal military utility of landmines and the humanitarian problems they pose. Second, NGOs changed states' perception toward the legality and use of landmines once the issue was on the agenda by highlighting the horrible effects and disproportionate consequences of landmine use, playing leadership games with influential individuals and states, and claiming that anti-ban states were using incoherent arguments. In comparison, NGOs have not been included in the agenda-setting processes of most other major arms control and disarmament treaties, which typically are negotiated at the behest of major powers. These arguments address the broader question of agency in world politics by showing potential conditions of how NGOs can instigate governments to address issues in a way that may culminate in international law.

Not with One Voice

AN EXPLANATION OF INTRAGROUP VARIATION IN NATIONALIST SENTIMENT

By DMITRY GORENBURG

Support for nationalism among minorities in multiethnic countries has received a great deal of scholarly attention in recent years. Few of these studies, however, have delved into the social bases of support for nationalism within a particular ethnic group. Scholars who study nationalism usually assume that support for nationalism among the members of an ethnic group is either randomly distributed or identical for all members of the group. Both assumptions are implausible. This article seeks to show that support for nationalism among members of an ethnic group is neither constant nor random. Furthermore, it argues that the extent to which members of social subgroups within the ethnic group come to support nationalism is predictable and is based on a particular sequence of mobilization. This sequence depends on the extent to which members of each subgroup possess a sense of common collective identity and on the strength of their social ties with those who are at the forefront of the mobilization effort. Both of these factors in turn depend largely on the extent to which state institutions promote ethnic identification among the minority population and create links that increase the density of intragroup social ties. Ethnic institutions are thus the key factor in explaining the sequence by which social groups within an ethnic minority population come to support nationalism.

Post-Postcommunism

TRANSITION, COMPARISON, AND THE END OF "EASTERN EUROPE"

By CHARLES KING

A decade after the end of European and Eurasian communism the once acrimonious debates between "area studies" and "the discipline" have largely subsided. Access to archives, survey data, and political elites has allowed east European countries to be treated as normal arenas of research. Recent work by both younger and established scholars has made serious contributions not only to the understanding of postcommunism but also to broader research questions about the political economy of reform, federalism, transitional justice, and nationalism and interethnic relations. The key issue for students of postcommunism is explaining the highly variable paths that east European and Eurasian states have taken since 1989. Compared with the relative homogeneity of outcomes in earlier transitions in southern Europe and Latin America—extrication from previous regimes followed by long periods of consolidation—the record in the east looks profoundly more varied: a handful of successful transitions and easy consolidations, several incomplete transitions, a few transitions followed by reversion to authoritarian politics, even some transitions that never really began at all. The works under review point scholars toward the study of the institutional legacies of state socialism: the "subversive institutions" of the communist state, the institutional dimensions of ethnic solidarity and mobilization, and the emerging patterns of interinstitutional bargaining in the first years of postcommunism.

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GEOGRAPHIC DIFFUSION AND THE TRANSFORMATION OF THE POSTCOMMUNIST WORLD

By JEFFREY S. KOPSTEIN AND DAVID A. REILLY*

I. THE PUZZLE

SINCE the collapse of communism the states of postcommunist Europe and Asia have defined for themselves, and have had defined for them, two primary tasks: the construction of viable market economies and the establishment of working institutions of representative democracy. A decade later specialists on Eastern Europe have one salient fact to report: some countries have it easier than others. A handful of countries (Poland, Hungary, the Czech Republic, Slovenia, and perhaps the Baltic States and Slovakia) have made significant progress in marketization and democratization. A much longer list (Albania, Croatia, Bulgaria, Macedonia, Romania, Yugoslavia, and the former non-Baltic Soviet republics) has made far less progress. Indeed, by 1995 it was already possible to see the contours of at least two very different (and stable) postcommunist outcomes, one increasingly "Western" and the other decidedly not. The variation in outcomes in the postcommunist space makes it, without question, the most diverse region in the world.

Such diversity in outcomes cries out for explanation. How did countries that began the postcommunist journey from similar starting points end up so far from each other? This article offers an explanation, develops and adduces evidence for it, and tests it against competing accounts. One obvious explanation that comes to mind is proximity to the West. All of the big winners of postcommunism share the trait of being geographically close to the former border of the noncommunist world. This suggests the spatially dependent nature of the diffusion of

* The authors thank Sheri Berman, Valerie Bunce, Christian Davenport, Michael Doyle, Debra Javeline, Herbert Kitschelt, Kate McNamara, Anna Seleny, Jason Wittenberg, and participants in seminars at the University of Colorado at Boulder, Harvard University, Princeton University, and the University of Toronto for comments on earlier drafts of this article. Jeffrey Kopstein acknowledges the Center of International Studies at Princeton University for its material support in the conduct of research for this project.

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norms, resources, and institutions that are necessary to the construction of political democracies and market economies in the postcommunist era. In what follows we use the entire universe of postcommunist cases to test this geographic or spatial-dependence explanation against competing hypotheses. We then explore the spatial-dependence hypothesis and its implications more deeply and make a preliminary attempt to identify the causal channels through which the approach works. We maintain that most alternative explanations have ignored, to their detriment, the role of geographic position on the Eurasian landmass and the spatial diffusion of influence, institutions, norms, and expectations across borders in accounting for variations in political and economic outcomes. While we do not argue that ours is the only possible explanation, we do insist that such a perspective provides a powerful lens through which to view postcommunist developments.

Before proceeding to the analysis, it should be noted that there is a long tradition to the enterprise of explaining variation in economic and political outcomes in the region—ranging from such classics in the field of East European studies as R.W. Seton-Watson's *Racial Problems in Hungary*, to Hugh Seton-Watson's *Eastern Europe between the Wars*, to the modern-day work of Gerschenkron and Janos.[1] Furthermore, study of the spatial diffusion of norms and "culture" on the European continent is also not unknown in the field. As keen students of their own borderlands, German East Europeanists coined the term *Kulturgefälle*, or cultural gradient, to describe and explain the changes that were visible across the European continent as one traveled to the economically and politically backward regions east of the Elbe and in the Danubian Basin.[2]

Whereas students of the nineteenth century and the communist era often find themselves either in the statistical dark ages or (especially in the communist era) in a statistical house of mirrors, students of postcommunism enjoy the advantages of the era in which they live. Postcommunist states seeking to gain favor with international financial institutions, the United Nations, and powerful Western governments now regularly issue financial, economic, and political data and permit

[1] R.W. Seton-Watson, *Racial Problems in Hungary* (New York: H. Fertig, 1908); Hugh Seton-Watson, *Eastern Europe between the Wars, 1918–1941* (Hamden, Conn.: Archon Books, 1945); Alexander Gerschenkron, *Economic Backwardness in Historical Perspective* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1962), 5–30; Andrew C. Janos, "The Politics of Backwardness in Continental Europe, 1780–1945," *World Politics* 41 (April 1989); idem, *East Central Europe in the Modern World: The Small States of the Borderlands from Pre- to Post-Communism* (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 2000).

[2] Michael Burleigh, *Germany Turns Eastwards: A Study of Ostforschung in the Third Reich* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988)

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verification of the data by outside observers. We are able to use the data to draw comparisons for the entire universe of postcommunist cases and make inferences about the same kinds of questions that have occupied the minds of East Europeanists for almost a century. What we do not do in this article is to question the data more deeply in order to see whether they measure the kinds of things that should be measured. The advantage of such a study, however, is that it may provide us with clues as to which cases are really worth delving into in more detail, which ones are the outliers that need to be explained, and which of them may provide useful lessons to social scientists. We turn briefly to these cases below.

The dependent variables in this article are the variety of postcommunist political and economic outcomes, defined as more or less democratic and more or less reformed, respectively. To establish a range of measurable values for political and economic success, we utilize a range of scores in the Polity IV data set, the World Development Report, and the CIA factbook, and we use the Economic Freedom measures from Dow Jones and the Heritage Foundation.

Competing Explanations

The literature on the diverging trajectories of postcommunist states and economies is dominated by variations on a single theme: temporal path dependence.[3] One finds, however, various kinds of path-dependent explanations. Institutional path dependence stresses the consequences of initial institutional choices. In particular, Linz and Stepan maintain that while parliamentary systems tend to produce stable and consensus-driven democracies, presidential systems produce unstable, conflict-driven, and semiauthoritarian democracies.[4] And a number of scholars have advanced a related proposition about the creation of market economies. The logic runs as follows: countries that quickly adopted secure property rights and independent central banks, liberalized their prices and tariffs, privatized their state-owned property, and balanced their budgets succeeded in laying the path to rapid market-oriented growth.[5] By contrast,

[3] In the literature on the subject path dependence implies two elements: multiple possible equilibria and critical junctures forestalling certain paths of development due to increasing returns and sunk costs.

[4] Juan J. Linz and Alfred Stepan, *Problems of Democratic Transition and Consolidation: Southern Europe, South America, and Post-Communist Europe* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1996); Alfred Stepan and Cindy Skach, "Constitutional Frameworks and Democratic Consolidation: Parliamentarianism versus Presidentialism," *World Politics* 46 (October 1993); Juan Linz and Arturo Valenzuela, eds., *The Failure of Presidential Democracy* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1994).

[5] David Lipton and Jeffrey Sachs, *Privatization in Eastern Europe: The Case of Poland*, Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, no. 2 (1990); Joel S. Hellman, "Winners Take All: The Politics of Partial Reform in Postcommunist Transitions," *World Politics* 50 (January 1998).

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countries that delayed this process, for whatever reason, allowed rent seekers and oligarchs to entrench themselves in power and resist further reform. The result was a stable, if bad, equilibrium of a semireformed, semicommunist economy.

The utility of the path-dependency literature lies in its account of why countries that are successful democratic reformers and those that are successful marketizers seem to be one and the same. Genuine democracy permits the distributional beneficiaries of the old system (the rent seekers) to be removed from power. By contrast, semiauthoritarian democracy, as in Russia, benefited the rent seekers, who could use existing institutions to ensure the continuity of their power.

The problem with this literature is that, on the whole, it does not include within its theoretical ambit an explanation for why some countries could choose the right policies and institutions and why others could not. As useful as it is, therefore, it calls out for a deeper causal analysis. Two scholars in particular, Steven Fish and Herbert Kitschelt, have put forward well thought out temporal path-dependent explanations for variation in political and economic outcomes. In a multivariate statistical study of economic reforms using the universe of postcommunist cases, Fish has convincingly argued that the crucial variable in explaining good versus bad equilibria is the outcome of the first postcommunist elections.[6] This critical-juncture theory maintains that the quick displacement of communists or their successor parties permitted rapid reform and staved off a return to power of rent-seeking coalitions. When pitted against competing explanations such as religious traditions, institutional choice, and preexisting levels of economic development in a multivariate equation, the inaugural elections come up as the only statistically significant explanation. Again, the logic here is one of temporal path dependence, leaving one inevitably to ask why the noncommunists won more decisively in some countries than in others.

Kitschelt asks a different but related question: why have some countries managed to lock in high levels of political and civic freedoms while others lag behind?[7] In accounting for the variation in postcommunist political regimes, Kitschelt begins by criticizing, on various statistical and methodological grounds, what he calls the "tournament of

[6] Fish, "The Determinants of Economic Reform in the Post-Communist World," *East European Politics and Societies* 12, no. 2 (1999).

[7] Kitschelt, "Accounting for Outcomes of Post-Communist Regime Change: Causal Depth or Shallowness in Rival Explanations?" (Paper presented at the annual meeting of the American Political Science Association, Atlanta, 1999).

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variables" of the sort engaged in by Fish. Kitschelt's most important point is that the different variables at work in Fish's argument reside at different conceptual distances from what they are trying to explain. Such a research design accords the variables most "proximate" to the outcome the better chance of being the winner in the "tournament" and therefore biases the test from the outset. Kitschelt argues that this objection suggests the need for "deeper" explanations and that there is no justification for privileging more proximate or "shallow" explanations in a statistical tournament. His alternative is a series of causal chains (backed up with a series of bivariate correlations) that link one set of more general or deeper explanations to more proximate ones. Ultimately, however, Kitschelt's explanation too is temporally path dependent (he argues specifically against spatial dependence)—the key variable being the precommunist and communist legacies of bureaucratic rectitude. States with a precommunist tradition of the rule of law (Czechoslovakia and the GDR) carried this tradition into the communist period, and thus in the postcommunist era they had a better chance of setting up liberal states that could respect and defend all kinds of rights. The critical juncture in Kitschelt's scheme is therefore much more distant from the outcomes he is trying to explain. Although he never provides us with a causal mechanism by which these continuities are sustained through a century of turmoil, and two, three, or even four different political regimes, he has taken the causal chain one step backward (at least) in time.[8] In his case the critical juncture is the timing of precommunist bureaucratic and civic development.

As in the case of Fish's work, in general we find Kitschelt's paper convincing. It may be worth considering, however, whether paths of continuity may be established not only over time but also over space. That is, in searching for the ligatures of continuity, we argue that it is also worthwhile to explore the connections not only between generations within the same state but also in the contact among people and institutional actors in different states. It is here that the explanations that stress the spatial diffusion of norms, lines of communication, resources, and institutions have something to offer in a causal explana-

[8] Not all path-dependent explanations are the same, nor do they all go back as far in the past. Whereas Kitschelt's legacies reflect state traditions of bureaucratic rectitude that go back into the nineteenth century, a discussion by Grzegorz Ekiert considers more recent developments, especially the development of civil society and reform communism in the 1970s and 1980s. The problem with this latter legacies explanation, as Ekiert repeatedly acknowledges, is that a major "winner" of postcommunism, the Czech Republic, had little civic development in the 1980s and no experience with reform communism. See Ekiert, "Do Legacies Matter? Patterns of Postcommunist Transitions in Eastern Europe" (Paper presented at the conference on Eastern Europe Ten Years after Communism, Harvard University, Cambridge, 1999).

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tion of postcommunist outcomes. Whereas Kitschelt is quick to discount the merits of spatial explanations, we believe that cross-border interactions, the flow of ideas and resources, and the openness of states are important factors for explaining postcommunist reform. We also contend that there is empirical evidence for evaluating these effects.

The main theoretical implication of this article is that the spatial location of a country can and should be considered an important contextual dimension that profoundly changes the nature of postcommunist dilemmas across the region and provides powerful constraints that shape the choices available to transforming elites. This is an important alternative position to the temporally based sociopolitical causality that dominates the literature on postcommunism. As we shall see, temporal and spatial patterns interact in complex ways, producing contextual constraints that are unequally distributed across the postcommunist world. Time and space therefore cannot be theoretically truncated and separated or altogether ignored.

Research Design

In the following section we first engage briefly in a small "tournament of variables" of the type criticized by Kitschelt, testing statistically the types of variables put forward by Fish and Kitschelt against spatial measures. We do so not to refute alternative, temporally based approaches (indeed, as we shall see, all come up as statistically significant) but rather to demonstrate the validity of the proposition that spatial context has an independent effect on political and economic outcomes and deserves further investigation. We therefore set up a geographical distance variable against an initial elections variable (as in Fish's study) and a bureaucratic rectitude variable (as a proxy for precommunist and communist legacies of the type of independent variable advanced by Kitschelt) as competing explanations for both economic reform and political democracy. What we find, however, is that even though it "works" statistically, conceiving of spatial context simply in terms of distance from the West does not do justice to the concept of spatial dependence. Distance is not the only way, or even the best way, of getting at geographic effects. All that distance can tell us is that factors moving over space matter. In Section III, therefore, we develop and deploy a much more complex measure of the spatial effects of neighbors. We attempt to show where the most likely channels of spatial diffusion have developed, which states are exercising the greatest impact on their neighbors, and which states are resisting the effects of their external en-

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vironment. Section IV illustrates the relationships at work through case studies of Hungary, Slovakia, and Kyrgyzstan.

II. The Crude Model: Distance from the West

As a starting point for the empirical examination of postcommunist reform, we consider the relative importance of initial elections, bureaucratic rectitude, and spatial factors to economic and political levels.[9] There are two objectives to this first model. First, we intend to demonstrate that geographic factors have a viable influence on political and economic reform above and beyond what is accounted for by path-dependent explanations. The goal, then, is to determine whether spatial issues deserve further investigation as determinants of state behavior. Including all three variables in the model not only reveals the relative importance of each but also indicates the independent effect. So although the result is a tournament of variables, this model is useful for gauging the effect of distance when controlling for path-dependent factors.

A second concern of these initial tests is the temporal realm. We use a pooled cross-sectional time-series model to examine how these factors relate to discrete changes over time. In Fish's and Kitschelt's work on this topic, as well as in an earlier review of Fish's study, single-year results were examined.[10] Although their studies provide a snapshot of postcommunist reforms, they do not consider the process of change. The results of these studies are also unreliable because of the small number of cases analyzed. To capture the ongoing reform process our model analyzes economic data for a five-year period (1995–99) and political data for a six-year period (1993–98).

Political reform is evaluated using the Polity IV data.[11] We chose the democracy measure from this data set for two reasons. First, it is con-

[9] Although Fish does not maintain that his initial elections are crucial in determining *political* (as opposed to economic) outcomes, following Kitschelt, we believe that there is a strong enough logic here to warrant including them in the model. Similarly, although Kitschelt's legacies are meant primarily to explain political outcomes, the logic of their influencing economic reforms is strong enough to warrant their inclusion in the economics model, too. In fact, they remain the primary determinants of outcomes in all of his work on postcommunism. See Herbert Kitschelt et al., *Post-Communist Party Systems: Competition, Representation, and Inter-Party Cooperation* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999), 19–41.

[10] Jeffrey S. Kopstein and David A. Reilly, "Explaining the Why of the Why: A Comment on Fish's 'Determinants of Economic Reform in the Post-Communist World,'" *East European Politics and Societies* 13, no. 3 (1999), 613–26.

[11] For a detailed explanation of the scoring criteria, see Keith Jaggers and Ted R. Gurr, "Tracking Democracy's Third Wave with the Polity III Data," *Journal of Peace Research* 32, no. 2 (1995). We calculate a "democracy minus autocracy" score from the democracy and autocracy measures. This practice follows earlier research on democratization.

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ceptually relevant for our study. The democracy and autocracy scores are aggregated from a variety of authority measures that take account of participation, liberties, and competition. These scores also incorporate institutional constraints and regulations pertinent to the determination of political reform. By contrast, Freedom House's Political Rights and Civil Liberties scores reflect a more narrow conception of political reform.[12] Second, Polity IV discloses more indications of change than do other indicators of democracy. The calculated "Democracy minus Autocracy" score produces a twenty-one-point scale of political level. When Freedom House's scores are combined, a fourteen-point scale results. This is important because the identification of slight changes in the institutions, practices, and policies of postcommunist governments is crucial for understanding the process of reform.

For the measure of economic reform we chose the Index of Economic Freedom.[13] Not only does it provide data from 1995 to the present, but it also scores countries on ten economic factors: trade policy, taxation, government intervention in the economy, monetary policy, capital flows and foreign investment, banking, wage and price controls, property rights, regulation, and black market.[14] Political and economic scores for all postcommunist states are listed in Table 1, sorted by distance from the West.

In terms of independent variables, we chose three basic indicators of the aforementioned causal explanations. To evaluate the "first election" hypothesis we employ Fish's 1990 election scores.[15] This variable scores countries on a 1–5 scale based on the results of their initial elections; scores are aggregated on the basis of who won, whether the results persisted, and whether the elections were competitive and complete. To investigate bureaucratic rectitude, we create a composite score of government corruption based on the Economic Freedom measures of property rights, government intervention, and black market.[16] We chose this in-

[12] In fact, the Freedom House scores have frequently been used to evaluate the human rights behavior of states. See Michael Stohl et al., "State Violation of Human Rights: Issues and Problems of Measurement," *Human Rights Quarterly* 8, no.1 (1986), 592–606.

[13] Bryan T. Johnson, Kim R. Holmes, and Melanie Kirkpatrick, eds., *1999 Index of Economic Freedom* (Washington, D.C.: Heritage Foundation and Dow Jones and Company, 1999).

[14] The matter of missing data for all variables was addressed using one of two methods. If country data revealed a pattern of consistent change (uniform increases or decreases), the prior year's numbers were used for missing years. If country data revealed no clear, uniform pattern, the mean score of all available country data was used. Missing data pose a particular problem for spatial analysis where geographic factors are investigated using a proximity matrix. In these instances, analysis cannot be performed if any data are missing.

[15] Fish (fn. 6).

[16] The measure of property rights is based on the following criteria: freedom from government influence over the judicial system, commercial code defining contracts, sanctioning of foreign arbitration

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TABLE 1
POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC REFORM SCORES

Distance from the West	*Political Reform Score, 1998*	*Economic Freedom Score, 1999*
35–500 miles		
Slovak Republic	8	3.05
Hungary	10	2.90
Czech Republic	10	2.05
Croatia	−1	3.65
Slovenia	10	3.10
Bosnia-Herzegovina	1	4.80
Poland	9	2.95
Macedonia	9	—
501–1000 miles		
Albania	6	3.85
Bulgaria	8	3.45
Lithuania	10	3.00
Latvia	8	2.85
Romania	8	3.30
Moldova	7	3.35
Belarus	−7	4.15
Estonia	8	2.15
Ukraine	7	3.80
1001–1500 miles		
Russia	4	3.45
Georgia	5	3.65
Armenia	6	3.45
1501–4080 miles		
Azerbaijan	−6	4.30
Turkmenistan	−9	4.45
Uzbekistan	−9	4.40
Tajikistan	−2	4.40
Kyrgyzstan	2	4.00
Kazakhstan	−3	4.05
Mongolia	9	3.20

of contract disputes, government expropriation of property, corruption within the judiciary, delays in receiving judicial decisions, and legally granted and protected private property. Regulation and intervention are a function of licensing requirements to operate a business; ease of obtaining a business license; extent of corruption within the bureaucracy labor regulations; environmental and consumer safety and worker health regulations; and regulations that impose a burden on business. The black market score is defined in terms of smuggling; piracy of intellectual property in the black market; and agricultural production, manufacturing, services, transportation, and labor supplied on the black market. Johnson, Holmes, and Kirkpatrick (fn. 13), 64–67.

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TABLE 2
EFFECT OF INDEPENDENT VARIABLES ON POLITICAL LEVEL
(1993–98)

Variable	*Coefficient*	*Std. Error*	*z*	*P>|z|*
1990 elections	.965	.597	1.616	0.11
Bureaucratic rectitude	−.799	.486	−1.645*	0.10
Distance from West	−.002	.001	−1.933**	0.05
Constant	11.469	6.327	1.813*	0.07

N = 145

*p ≤ .1; ** p ≤ .05

dicator over Kitschelt's own score because our corruption indicators vary over time; we believe this measure provides a more robust tally of the issues Kitschelt describes in his account of bureaucratic legacies. The final variable measures the distance in miles between postcommunist country capitals and Vienna or Berlin, whichever is closer. These cities are chosen as important economic and cultural referents for the countries of the former communist world.[17]

Table 2 lists the results of regressing political level on the three independent variables in a pooled cross-sectional time series running from 1993 to 1998, yielding 145 cases.[18] The statistics indicate that the farther away a country is from the West, the less likely it is to be democratic. Although not as significant, the relationship between bureaucratic rectitude and democracy is also empirically validated. Lower levels of corruption within the government are correlated with higher levels of democracy. The relationship between the initial elections and political level is not supported, however.

The substantive effect of this relationship can be described as follows: For a country that made a clean break from communism in the 1990 elections and that has an average bureaucratic rectitude score, we

[17] One alternative to this coding would simply be to substitute "distance from Brussels" as the independent variable. This choice is justifiable on conceptual grounds, since joining the EU and NATO remain important goals for most postcommunist states. Substituting Brussels does not alter the statistical results substantively. Jeffrey Sachs has recently turned to a distance variable in his explanation of postcommunist outcomes. Sachs, "Geography and Economic Transition" (Manuscript, Harvard University, Center for International Development, November 1997); idem, "Eastern Europe Reforms: Why the Outcomes Differed So Sharply," *Boston Globe*, September 19, 1999.

[18] Analysis producing the results in Tables 2–4 performed on Intercooled Stata ver. 6.0 using the *xtreg* function. This command estimates cross-sectional time-series regression models. We employed a population-averaged model to produce a generalized estimating equation that weights the countries by their available data. Standard errors are semirobust and adjusted for clustering around countries. OLS assumptions are relaxed for pooled data, in other words, so that multiple observations for each country are not assumed to be independent of one another.

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TABLE 3
EFFECT OF INDEPENDENT VARIABLES ON LEVELS OF ECONOMIC FREEDOM (1999)

Variable	*Coefficient*	*Std. Error*	*z*	*P>|z|*
1990 elections	−.203	.047	−4.302**	0.000
Corruption	.056	.036	1.533	0.125
Distance from West	.0002	.00007	2.616**	0.009
Constant	3.674	.249	14.735**	0.000

N = 24

** $p \leq .05$

can predict that if it borders the West it should have a political score of 7.1. That score for a country with the same election results and bureaucratic rectitude score but located five hundred miles from the West should decrease to 6.1. The same circumstances for a country one thousand miles from the West should result in a score of 5.1, and so forth. Distance matters, then, especially in a region where capital cities are located anywhere from 35 miles (Slovak Republic) to 3,965 miles (Mongolia) from the nearest Western city.

On the issue of levels of economic reform (Table 3) we find that once again distance from the West is statistically significant, even when controlling for corruption and initial elections. In contrast to the political results, however, distance from the West is not a substantively significant influence on economic reform. This model predicts, in other words, that moving away from the western border of postcommunist states results in a trivial change in the overall economic reform score. Note that our results in Table 3 are based on a small number of cases (N = 24); we have replaced bureaucratic rectitude with Kitschelt's "corruption" variable in order to reduce multicollinearity,[19] as well as to address the issue of economic reform more directly. This adjustment requires that we examine a single year (1999) rather than a pooled time series.[20] In this model the results of the initial election provide an additional significant variable—the more definitive the break from communist rule, the more likely a state is to have an economy free from government control.

[19] Because the factors from which the bureaucratic rectitude score is constituted are also components of the overall Economic Freedom score, we could not include the bureaucratic rectitude measure as an explanation for Economic Freedom. Kitschelt's corruption score correlates with our bureaucratic rectitude score at .8669, so it is an adequate substitute.

[20] Kitschelt's bureaucratic rectitude scores are measured for a single year, rendering a time-series model irrelevant.

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So how do we interpret these findings? Our intent is not to prove that path dependence is irrelevant to political and economic reform. It is obvious from an examination of the raw scores of economic and political reforms in the former Soviet Union (see Table 1) that there are countries that do not conform to the distance explanation. Belarus, Croatia, and Mongolia stand out in particular as outliers in the Western proximity model; from these cases alone we can see that a more elaborate account is required for explaining postcommunist reforms.[21] Nonetheless, our findings appear to support our contention that geography has been underspecified in the research on postcommunist states. Our goal is to demonstrate that cultural models of "Leninist legacies" and bureaucratic rectitude, as well as the broader historical context, are themselves spatially bound. If we think of their effects in terms of how they condition behavior across the landscape of the postcommunist states, we can imagine them generating channels of communication that facilitate diffusion. It may be the case that spatial factors not only affect the reform process but that they also are instrumental in the choices that leaders make historically. In other words, we may find not only that geography influences the process of reform but also that it helps to account for the developmental paths and critical junctures themselves.

Before we take this leap, however, we must first disaggregate the concept of space. Diffusion, after all, is a complex process that involves information flows, networks of communication, hierarchies of influence, and receptivity to change. To attribute all of this to a simple indicator of distance from the West is simply too vague to be useful. In order to begin to disentangle these plausible causes, we need to disaggregate and reformulate the way we understand spatial influence itself.

III. Diffusion: Stocks and Flows

One way of establishing which factors may be moving over space and thus distinguishing specific spatial effects from those of mere distance is to hypothesize, on the one hand, a relationship between a country's external environment and openness to outside influences and, on the other hand, its political and economic performance. In spatial analysis the objective is to identify the patterns that emerge from interactions and then make sense of them.

[21] Even if the coding of Croatia is changed to reflect recent political developments, the relationship between distance and outcomes is significantly diluted by Belarus's and Mongolia's outlier status.

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The geographic pattern of success and failure in the postcommunist world is surprisingly strong even when controlling for cultural legacies and institutional choice. It suggests a relationship between successful transformation and the spatial diffusion of resources, values, and institutions. At the core of any diffusion explanation of politics and economics, therefore, there is a relationship between stocks and flows, on the one hand, and discrete political and economic outcomes, on the other. Stocks represent the assets, liabilities, or general qualities of a given unit, in this case a given postcommunist country. These qualities may be physical, political, economic, or cultural, and they may be either helpful or harmful to democracy and economic development. Among these qualities are the environmental and structural conditions that shape the alternatives available to decision makers. In a diffusion model the stock of a country can be represented by its external environment, whereas flows represent the movement of information and resources between countries. Even if a country has a certain spatial stock, choice or circumstance may make it more or less open to flows of goods and information from the outside world.

Diffusion is difficult to disaggregate from other processes of change because it encompasses a variety of qualifying factors. As Strang and Soule note: "Diffusion arguments . . . verge on the one hand toward models of individual choice, since diffusion models often treat the adopter as a reflective decision maker. They verge on the other hand toward a broader class of contextual and environmental processes, where conditions outside the actor shape behavior."[22] For the purposes of this study we posit a given country's spatial stock to be who its neighbors are. This is best indicated by the Polity IV democracy scores and the Economic Reform scores of the countries geographically contiguous with it. Such a definition has its obvious limits, especially when one considers the different sizes and geographical contours of the units under investigation, but it does provide a convenient and comparable way of summing up the stock of a country's external political and economic environment.

Flows, for their part, are best represented by examining both the actual movement of resources and people between countries and the potential for this flow. These tend to reflect the choices made by the relevant actors—in our case the willingness and capacity of states to interact within their larger environment. The diffusion process, in other

[22] David Strang and Sarah A. Soule, "Diffusion in Organizations and Social Movements: From Hybrid Corn to Poison Pills," *Annual Review of Sociology* 24 (1998), 266–67.

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words, is in large part a function of how open and interactive states are. Accordingly, states that interact extensively are likely to exhibit similar political and economic behavior.[23] Although the units most likely to interact are those closest to one another,[24] social patterns do not always follow this logic. States may choose to ignore the behavior of their neighbors, erecting barriers to resist surrounding change.[25] In addition, states may attempt to promote their agendas to specific countries beyond their neighbors. By examining flows of resources and information, we can capture these interactions that occur beyond (the stocks of) neighboring states.

To evaluate these flows, one can employ an openness criterion such as Brams uses in his research. But whereas his operationalization of "relative acceptance" is based exclusively on elite transactions,[26] the objective here is to devise a measure that reflects receptivity of both the public and the elite. This is because the process of change in the postcommunist states was a hybrid of elite reform and mass mobilization. The measure is also intended to reflect the choices made by state actors. Whereas stocks are representative of the structural conditions within which states operate, flows indicate the willingness and capacity of states and their citizens to behave in particular ways.[27]

Our measure of openness is a composite score based on indicators that are conceptually linked to the exchange of ideas and associated in prior research studies to processes of diffusion.[28] The set of six indica-

[23] This should come as no surprise to students of Eastern Europe who are familiar with the contagion effect during the revolutions of 1989. See especially Timothy Garton Ash, *The Magic Lantern: The Revolutions of '89 Witnessed in Warsaw, Budapest, and Prague* (New York: Random House, 1990).

[24] As Strang and Soule (fn. 22) note: "Perhaps the most common finding in diffusion research is that spatially proximate actors influence each other. . . . Where network relations are not mapped directly, proximity often provides the best summary of the likelihood of mutual awareness and interdependence" (p. 275). An operationalization of this dynamic is Boulding's loss-of-strength gradient. See Kenneth E. Boulding, *Conflict and Defense: A General Theory* (New York: Harper, 1963).

[25] One of Stalin's strategies for establishing absolute power was the systematic monopolization of communication channels within the Soviet Union and, after World War II, in Eastern Europe. His control over all facets of the media not only facilitated the spread of communist ideology but also limited the possibility of undesirable interactions.

[26] Brams uses diplomatic exchanges, trade, and shared memberships in intergovernmental organizations as indicators of transaction flows; Steven J. Brams, "Transaction Flows in the International System," *American Political Science Review* 76, no. 1 (1967).

[27] Most and Starr's research presents the Opportunity/Willingness framework, which to some extent corresponds to our stocks and flows. See Benjamin A. Most and Harvey Starr, *Inquiry, Logic, and International Politics* (Columbia: University of South Carolina Press, 1989). However, flows in our model involve more than just willingness. The capacity of states is important for determining the extent of interaction and exchange of resources and ideas. Although we admit that this leads to a blurring of the line between stocks and flows, we expect that any operationalization of flows is likely to overlap with stocks.

[28] It could be argued that some of these measures, such as the number of televisions or newspaper circulation, reflect modernization rather than the diffusion of information. This is precisely why we

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tors gathered from the *World Development Indicators, 1998*, includes the number of televisions per thousand households; newspaper circulation per thousand people; outgoing international telecommunications, measured in minutes per subscriber; international inbound tourists; total foreign direct investment as a percentage of GDP; and international trade (sum of exports and imports) as a share of GDP, using purchasing power parity conversion factors. Each individual indicator is assigned a score ranging from 1 to 5, based on its raw number.[29] These scores are then aggregated into an overall openness measure, which ranges from a low of 6 to a high of 27, and is intended to reflect the awareness of external ideas within the population and the willingness and capacity of elites to permit their exchange. The period of coverage (1991–96) begins with the early years of democratization efforts and includes a sufficient period of time for postcommunist countries to develop exchanges and establish patterns of interaction.

The results of regressing the openness measure on political and economic reforms are displayed in Table 4. These results reveal a significant and substantive effect of openness on both political and economic reforms.[30] And they show that a country with the highest level of openness would be likely to have an economic reform score of 2.35 (a medium-high level of reform), while a country with the lowest should have a score of 4.36 (a very low level of reform). For political level, the lowest level of openness corresponds with a democracy score of 1.3 (an

developed a composite index—our intent is to capture a variety of sources that could contribute to diffusionary processes of reform. Furthermore, most of our indicators have been frequently cited as tools of interaction in diffusion studies. Newspapers, television, and the mass media in general have been studied extensively as mechanisms of diffusion. See, for example, S. Spilerman, "The Causes of Racial Disturbances: A Comparison of Alternative Explanations," *American Sociological Review* 354 (1970); A. Oberschall, "The 1960s Sit-Ins: Protest Diffusion and Movement Takeoff," *Research in Social Movements, Conflict and Change* 11 (1989), 31–33; R. Koopmans, "The Dynamics of Protest Waves: West Germany, 1965 to 1989," *American Sociological Review* 58 (1993). Foreign direct investment has been identified as an important channel for the diffusion of ideas and information. See, for example, Ray Barrell and Nigel Pain, "Foreign Direct Investment, Technological Change, and Economic Growth within Europe," *Economic Journal* 107, no. 445 (1997). Trade is also recognized as a source of diffusing ideas. See, for example, Jonathon Eaton and Samuel S. Kortum, "International Technology Diffusion: Theory and Measurement," *International Economic Review* 40, no. 3 (1999). The telephone is a mechanism of within- and between-group information exchange and seems an obvious indicator for our purposes. Not only is tourism a means of communication, but it also provides a means by which individuals can compare their own political and economic circumstances to those of others.

[29] Scores are assigned in such a manner as to provide for the most even distribution of cases across the 1–5 categories.

[30] The lag between openness measures (1991–96) and the dependent variables of political level (1993–98) and economic reform (1995–99) is intentional. Our expectation is that interaction will influence political and economic behavior over time. Although there may be some immediate effects, we expect that a period of three to four years is most likely to capture the learning and implementation processes that would result from new information.

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TABLE 4
EFFECT OF OPENNESS ON POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC REFORMS

Variable	*Coefficient*	*Std. Error*	*z*	*P>|z|*
Political level				
Openness	.268	.111	2.410**	0.016
Constant	−.324	1.950	−0.166	0.868
N = 162				
Economic freedom				
Openness	−.096	.015	−6.365**	0.000
Constant	4.940	.208	23.764**	0.000
N = 98				

** $p \leq .05$

anocracy), and the highest with a democracy score of 6.9 (full-fledged democracy). In short, it appears that the effect of a state's receptivity and openness to external ideas and resources is an important factor in both political change and economic reform.

NEIGHBOR EFFECTS: SPATIAL DEPENDENCE

We have established a relationship between a country's openness to outside influences and its political and economic performance. To what extent does a country's locational stock determine its performance? Do neighboring states affect a country's democratic and economic freedoms? Do domestic conditions of openness and awareness affect the process of diffusion? What is the independent influence of these two factors? Are there particularly influential states or blocs of states that encourage or discourage liberalization and marketization? In attempting to answer these questions in this section, we seek to integrate domestic factors and international influences.

We draw upon methods from research in political geography, where the central expectation of research is that the conventional explanations of domestic political change are often inadequate. Geographers argue that place-specific factors must be included in these models in order to uncover the dynamics of political and economic change.[31] And in our case, this would suggest that where a state is located can influence the extent to which that state is dependent upon its path of prior circumstances.

[31] See, for example, John O'Loughlin, Colin Flint, Luc Anselin, "The Geography of the Nazi Vote: Context, Confession, and Class in the Reichstag Election of 1930," *Annals of the Association of American Geographers* 84, no. 2 (1994); R. J. Johnston, *A Question of Place* (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1991); John Agnew, *Place and Politics: The Geographical Mediation of State and Society* (Boston: Allen and Unwin, 1987).

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The concept of spatial dependence is central to geographic research. It is often termed the "friends and neighbors effect" on the assumption that "behavior in a place is related, in part, to conditions in neighboring places."[32] Because of this association, patterns of diffusion can be identified where there is spatial dependence, or clustering.

A first step in disaggregating the concept of space is to create a more sophisticated measure—one that would operationalize spatial context differently. To this end we have created new variables that measure the economic and political levels of a state's physically contiguous neighbors. The logic behind the relevance of a neighbor's performance to a given state's economic and political performance is straightforward. If we believe that geographical proximity to the West may help a country or that geographical isolation in the East (or proximity to other, nondemocratic, weakly marketized or authoritarian states) may hurt a country, then it makes sense to say that a state will be influenced by its neighbors wherever it is located. These measures are intended to establish similarities and differences between economic and political choices and developments of states. We expect that the extent of similarity between states partially represents the contextual factors that are associated with geography.

In order to analyze the postcommunist states in the context of their surroundings, we look at the scores for these states and for their neighbors. Because we want to identify which neighbors influence each other, our population of cases includes the postcommunist states as well as the countries immediately bordering them. It is certainly the case that countries outside of the formerly communist world are promoting democracy and open markets, but whether these countries are actually affecting the reform processes is an empirical question. Accordingly, the following tests relate to forty-one countries, twenty-seven of which are postcommunist states.

The results shown in Tables 5 and 6 reveal the extent to which neighbors influence democratization and marketization. In the same manner that a temporal lag measures the extent to which a state's characteristics are a function of its past, we use a spatial lag to determine how dependent states are upon their neighbors. We regress democracy and political levels on a state's neighbor scores in order to evaluate the proposition that ideas are most likely to be shared among states in close contact. Given that geographical proximity is one determinant of interaction, the extent to which states are influenced by their neighbors can

[32] O'Loughlin, Flint, and Anselin (fn. 31), 359.

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TABLE 5
NEIGHBOR EFFECTS AND POLITICAL LEVEL

	Coefficient	*S.D.*	*t-value*	*Probability*
Democracy, 1998				
Spatial lag	.680	.205	3.313**	0.002
Openness	.469	.208	2.258**	0.030
Constant	−5.149	2.817	−1.828*	0.075
r^2 = .501				
Democracy, 1996				
Spatial lag	.546	.216	2.531**	0.016
Openness	.754	.256	2.945**	0.005
Constant	−8.555	3.239	−2.641**	0.012
r^2 = .555				
Democracy, 1994				
Spatial lag	.794	.194	4.091**	0.000
Openness	.486	.214	2.273**	0.029
Constant	−4.839	2.467	−1.961*	0.057
r^2 = .595				
N = 41				

* $p \leq .1$; ** $p \leq .05$; analysis performed using spacestat

be addressed through the use of spatial lags. In addition, we include the openness score for each state to assess its importance, independent of neighbor effects.

The results suggest that both neighbors and openness are strong determinants of political and economic behavior. These variables are consistently and robustly related to political levels in 1994, 1996, and 1998, as well as to economic freedom scores in 1995, 1997, and 1999. Equally important to our argument is the fact that both variables—openness and neighbors—are statistically significant when controlling for the other. This suggests that internal conditions as well as the external environment have played an important role in the reform process of the postcommunist states. It also suggests that spatial proximity permits a more extensive level of diffusion, which, in turn, exercises a strong and independent effect on political and economic outcomes. Alternatively, we can think of this result as revealing the importance of *both* stocks (neighbors) and flows (openness) for the process of diffusion in the postcommunist world.

Spatial dependence involves more than neighbor effects, however. As stated above, the types of patterns that we expect to see include the ex-

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TABLE 6
NEIGHBOR EFFECTS AND ECONOMIC FREEDOM

	Coefficient	*S.D.*	*t-value*	*Probability*
Economic reform, 1999				
Spatial lag	.707	.190	3.714**	0.000
Openness	−0.100	.025	−3.954**	0.000
Constant	2.278	.899	2.533**	0.016
r^2 = .685				
Economic reform, 1997				
Spatial lag	.180	.226	.797	0.430
Openness	−.155	.030	−5.171**	0.000
Constant	4.901	1.111	4.409**	0.000
r^2 = .580				
Economic reform, 1995				
Spatial lag	.835	.205	4.066**	0.000
Openness	−.078	.022	−3.462**	0.001
Constant	1.650	.922	1.791*	0.081
r^2 = .649				
N = 41				

* p≤.1; ** p≤.05 analysis performed using spacestat

tent to which openness, receptivity, and influence matter for processes of reform. To assess the extent of this spatial dependence, we rely on two additional spatial statistics. The first is the Moran's I, a measure of the spatial pattern for the entire population of cases under investigation.[33] This statistic will indicate the clustering of similar values of political and economic reform, as well as their significance level. It reveals whether the reforms of postcommunist states are randomly distributed across space or subject to identifiable patterns. Second, we employ a localized measure of spatial association. The G_i^* statistic, like the Moran's I, gives an indication of clustering.[34] The difference between the two is that the G_i^* measure addresses the extent of clustering around each particular state, rather than the overall level of clustering within the system. It is useful for assessing both the extent to which each state influences those around it and the extent to which states resist external influences.

The Moran's I scores indicate whether bordering states are the most similar in terms of the variables tested; they are reported in Table 7.

[33] For technical notes on the logic and use of Moran's I, see Arthur Getis and J. K. Ord, "The Analysis of Spatial Association by Use of Distance Statistics," *Geographical Analysis* 24, no. 1 (1992); Luc Anselin, "Local Indicators of Spatial Association—LISA," *Geographical Analysis* 27, no. 2 (1995).

[34] G_i^* statistics and other local indicators of spatial association are explained in Anselin (fn. 33).

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TABLE 7
MORAN'S I TEST FOR SPATIAL AUTOCORRELATION

Variable	*Moran's I-Score*	*Z-Value*	*Probability*
Political level			
1994	.504	5.096**	0.000
1996	.462	4.688**	0.000
1998	.455	4.626**	0.000
Economic level			
1995	.466	4.729**	0.000
1997	.315	3.283**	0.001
1999	.428	4.361**	0.000
Openness			
1992	.299	3.122**	0.002
1994	.400	4.100**	0.000
1996	.285	2.989**	0.003
Bureaucratic rectitude			
1992	.441	4.494**	0.000
1994	.416	4.247**	0.000
1996	.349	3.601**	0.000

** $p \leq .05$; analysis performed using spacestat

The strength and uniformity of positive spatial autocorrelation reveals that in fact there is significant clustering for all three years tested and for all three measures of political level, economic freedom score, and openness. This indicates that there is a substantial spatial component to these variables that warrants investigation.

Finally, we address the importance of receptivity and influence to reform. Using the G_i^* statistic, we seek to identify which states promote change and which resist it. In Figure 1 and Table 8 we see that thirteen of the forty-one countries are significantly associated with their neighbors. Nine are negatively associated, or grouped at the low end of the spectrum of political scores, and four are positively correlated around high levels of democracy. Clustering among high similar scores is apparent along the border between Western and Eastern Europe, where Austria, Germany, Slovakia, and the Czech Republic display the highest scores. Low-score groupings can be seen to the east of the Caspian Sea, with Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan, and Afghanistan displaying particularly significant scores. One can think of these scores as suggesting the substantial influence of these states on their neighbors. This can be conceptualized in the West in terms of democratic promotion and in Central Asia in terms of a regional trend toward autocratization.

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

FIGURE 1
CLUSTERING OF DEMOCRACY
(1998)

The middle category, denoted by medium gray, represents those states that resist the influences of their neighbors. We see subregions of resistance within the Caucasus—the territory between the Black, Azov, and Caspian Seas, bordering on Turkey and Iran in the south—as well as in the former Yugoslavia. Interestingly, these are two areas of violent conflict. It stands to reason that states in the midst of such turmoil are less likely to be receptive to the diffusion of ideas and more concerned with the outcome of their disputes. Accordingly, these states reject the influences of surrounding countries and focus on their domestic issues.

A second set of middle-level countries—Russia, Turkey, and Mongolia—are not clustered. These states appear instead as the remnant cores of formerly imperial powers that are especially impervious to outside influences. They are now insignificant statistically speaking, but given the right circumstances they have the potential to be key power centers once again.[35] A second way of thinking about these states is via the shatterbelt literature, which describes these as countries caught be-

[35] Stephen E. Hanson and Jeffrey S. Kopstein, "The Weimar/Russia Comparison," *Post-Soviet Affairs* 13, no. 3 (1997).

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TABLE 8
G_i^* RESULTS FOR DEMOCRACY AND ECONOMIC REFORMS

Country	*Z-Score: Democracy 1998*	*Probability: Democracy 1998*	*Z-Score: Econ. Reform 1999*	*Probability: Econ. Reform 1999*
Afghanistan	−4.051**	0.000	−2.877**	0.004
Albania	0.250	0.803	−0.390	0.697
Armenia	−0.870	0.385	−1.381	0.167
Austria	2.425**	0.015	2.800**	0.005
Azerbaijan	−0.801	0.423	−1.137	0.255
Belarus	0.474	0.635	−0.143	0.886
Bosnia	−1.538	0.124	−1.784*	0.075
Bulgaria	0.856	0.391	0.453	0.650
China	−2.525**	0.012	−2.313**	0.021
Croatia	−0.388	0.698	−1.113	0.266
Czech Republic	1.884*	0.060	2.377**	0.018
Estonia	0.711	0.477	1.252	0.211
Finland	1.057	0.291	1.657*	0.010
Georgia	−0.181	.856	−0.308	0.758
Germany	1.768*	0.077	2.452**	0.014
Greece	1.471	0.141	0.068	0.946
Hungary	0.829	0.407	0.347	0.729
Iran	−2.394**	0.017	−1.883*	0.060
Italy	1.576	0.115	1.927*	0.054
Japan	0.643	0.520	1.281	0.200
Kazakhstan	−2.904**	0.008	−1.634	0.102
Korea, North	−2.057**	0.040	−1.446	0.148
Kyrgyzstan	−2.660**	0.008	−1.918*	0.055
Latvia	0.232	0.817	0.766	0.444
Lithuania	0.301	0.764	0.229	0.819
Macedonia	0.507	0.612	−0.200	0.841
Moldova	0.884	0.377	−0.091	0.923
Mongolia	−0.500	0.617	−0.097	0.923
Norway	1.057	0.291	1.657*	0.098
Poland	1.113	0.266	1.012	0.312
Romania	0.665	0.506	0.106	0.916
Russia	0.057	0.955	0.518	0.605
Serbia	0.204	0.839	−1.116	0.265
Slovakia	1.940*	0.052	1.348	0.178
Slovenia	1.333	0.182	1.303	0.193
Tajikistan	−2.935**	0.003	−2.187**	0.029
Turkey	−0.149	0.882	−0.935	0.350
Turkmenistan	−3.692**	0.000	−2.724**	0.007
Ukraine	0.829	0.407	0.125	0.900
United States	0.643	0.520	1.281	0.200
Uzbekistan	−3.286**	0.001	−2.380**	0.017

* $p \leq .1$; ** $p \leq .05$; analysis performed using spacestat

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

FIGURE 2
CLUSTERING OF ECONOMIC FREEDOMS
(1994)

tween competing ideologies, histories, and cultures.[36] Finally, the case of Mongolia is, to date, the true outlier in the postcommunist world, not conforming to the expectations of any extant theory.[37]

Figure 2 shows the G_i^* statistics for economic freedoms. In this instance we see a uniform shift from high positive association in the West to high negative association in the southern portion of the map. Note that the fourteen statistically significant scores (six positive, eight negative; see also Table 8) are located in these two areas, with a large buffer zone of states displaying intermediate scores in between. Economic reforms are promoted from the bordering states of Western Europe—Austria, Germany, and Italy—while economic corruption and government control of the economy is the norm in Iran, Afghanistan, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, and China. The diffusion of these competing economic orientations is evident in the map where the middling

[36] Saul B. Cohen, "Global Geopolitical Change in the Post-Cold War Era," *Annals of the Association of American Geographers* 81, no. 2 (1991); Paul F. Diehl, "Territory and International Conflict: An Overview," in Paul F. Diehl, ed., *A Road Map to War: Territorial Dimensions of International Conflict* (Nashville, Tenn.: Vanderbilt University Press, 1999).

[37] M. Steven Fish, "Mongolia: Democracy without Prerequisites," *Journal of Democracy* 9, no.3 (1998).

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scores fall geographically between these polar opposites—evidenced by the medium gray shading of Eastern and Central Europe. Poland, Slovakia, Latvia and Estonia appear inclined toward the West, while Azerbaijan and Armenia lean toward Central Asia.

This map may provide the clearest visual representation of the sort of effect we seek to demonstrate. It is certainly the case that path dependence and the historical evolution of political and economic choices and values are an important explanation for postcommunist reforms. The evidence presented in both figures suggests, however, that this path dependence is in large part a function of the geopolitical landscape. Cultures certainly shift, and ideas spread across space, but the shortest route between two points is the most likely one for information to travel. The path dependence of political and economic reforms may explain the process of change, but as these figures indicate, location determines the path.

IV. How Does Geography Matter? External Promoters and The Constitution of Interests

Put most boldly, our statistical treatment suggests that location matters more than domestic policy itself in determining outcomes, or at least it appears to influence which policies are chosen.[38] If our explanation is correct, then, a country that chooses all the right policies but is poorly located should ultimately not perform well. Conversely, bad policies should be mitigated by good location. Why would this be the case?

In this section we deepen the explanation for how geography might matter. The data analysis of spatial dependence above suggests a purely structuralist story, one in which stocks and flows determine outcomes. Such an explanation stands up to statistical scrutiny and constitutes an important part of the diffusion story. But it is only part of the story. A country's external environment is the product of more than its spatial stock and its openness to outside influence. It is also strongly affected by the decisions of other states or groups of states. The G_i^* statistics, for example, indicate that the countries bordering Western Europe are strongly influenced, in a positive direction, by their Western neighbors. Similarly, states in close proximity to Afghanistan and Iran are

[38] In a similar vein Vladimir Popov has recently argued that policy choices cannot account for variation in the recessions in the postcommunist world between 1990 and 1993. Popov, "Explaining the Magnitude of Transformational Recession" (Manuscript, Department of Economics, Queens University, Canada, 1999).

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influenced in a direction that hinders democratic and capitalist development.

One explanation for the effects of spatial context is the impact of external actors on the structure of domestic interests and the policies chosen by elites. We expect, for example, the possibility of EU and NATO membership for the countries of Central Europe bordering on the eastern and northern frontier of "Western Europe" to alter the expected utilities of elites and masses in ways that would not be the case in Eastern Europe and Central Asia.[39] And we hypothesize that the potential for integration into just-in-time delivery systems in regional production chains or the stabilizing effects of probable membership in a larger military alliance have altered the relative expectations for future economic success and political stability. Elites and masses in Central Europe have calculated that economic and political institutions similar to those of the EU will improve the chances that such benefits will actually be realized. We expect the real changes to come about in the region as a result not so much of actual EU or NATO membership as of *anticipated* membership. These divergent, externally induced incentives are part of what accounts for differences in institutional reform, state behavior, and popular discourse in the countries of postcommunist Europe.

Presumably, one could tell a similar tale in reverse, about the baneful effects of poor location on the structure of interests, institutional reform, state behavior, and political discourse. From our Figure 2, for example, it would seem that proximity to the general crisis zone of Islamic fundamentalism that has engulfed Afghanistan and Tajikistan or to war in the Balkans should subvert even the hardiest of domestic political reformers and ardent marketizers.

We turn now to a brief examination of the cases in order to get at this logic and begin to disentangle the causal connections between spatial context, domestic processes, and political and economic outcomes. If we sample on the independent variable of location, while at the same time controlling for the rival independent variable of policy and institutional choice, the universe of postcommunist countries can be illus-

[39] The logic of EU enlargement, one based mostly on a standard of geographical contiguity and proximity, is a topic that remains mostly unexplored, due principally to the crypto-political nature of most discussions of the matter among policymakers. Such an explanation, of course, represents a departure from a purely structuralist approach to diffusion, in that EU and NATO decisions to admit particular countries is itself an element of spatial context, and these decisions were influenced by a whole range of considerations, not only strategic but also *cultural*, of where EU members consider Europe's boundaries properly to lie and who should be a member of "Europe." If culture is to reenter the picture in our spatial diffusion analysis, we suspect that this is the proper place for it.

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Policies	Location: Good	Location: Bad
Good	Hungary, Poland, Czech Republic, Estonia, Slovenia, Lithuania, Latvia	Kyzgyzstan, Moldova, Georgia (1996), Mongolia, Macedonia
Bad	Slovakia, Croatia	Ukraine, Russia, Belarus, Turkmenistan, Kazakhstan, Tajikistan, Azerbaijan, Bulgaria, Armenia, Albania, Romania

FIGURE 3
POSTCOMMUNIST POLICIES AND SPATIAL ADVANTAGE/DISADVANTAGE (1999)

trated in a simple two-by-two format (see Figure 3). We have chosen three cases for more detailed examination based on their theoretical interest. (Obviously, because the outcomes of "bad location, bad policy" are so overdetermined, it makes little sense to discuss them here in any detail.) Hungary illustrates the effects of close institutional ties to the EU based on its good location. Slovakia is well located and was initially considered for rapid EU and NATO accession, but in the years after its independence in 1993 it made a series of exceedingly poor political and economic choices, a combination that yields better than expected outcomes. And Kyrgyzstan, by contrast, is poorly located, in close proximity to the authoritarian and semiauthoritarian states of Central and South Asia. In the first years of independence it adopted most, if not all, of the policies and institutions that Western experts and advisers maintained were important for success in the political and economic transition.

HUNGARY

The first quadrant depicts the countries that both are well located and have chosen "good policies."[40] Hungary provides a good example of the trends in this quadrant. As in the cases of Poland and the Czech Re-

[40] Of course, some countries in this group have restructured their polities and economies more than others. Hungary and Poland, for example, have arguably restructured more than the Czech Republic and Slovenia. In fact, an alternative construction of this figure as a scatter plot could have shown the gradations of variation in location and policy. We have chosen the two-by-two for clarity of presentation.

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public, after 1989 Hungary received a significant amount of foreign investment as a result of the publicity of being among the first to exit from communism and its close proximity to Western markets.[41] Quickly following on these early public relations coups came the possibility of relatively rapid accession to the EU, a possibility formalized when the European Commission drew up a list of the postcommunist countries that would be considered for admission in a "first round."[42] Since then, during the second half of the 1990s, the flow of domestic political legislation and the shape of domestic discourse have revolved around the issue of accession to the EU. Even accounting for differences over such contentious domestic issues as privatization and social policy, party competition in Hungary, as in Poland and the Czech Republic, has been heavily influenced by the question of which party is more competent to guide the country to early accession. It is all but impossible to understand politics in these countries without considering the effects of the expectation that they could participate in prospective EU enlargement.[43]

The effects have not only been political, but perhaps more importantly they have also been legislative and institutional. As a "tutor and monitor," the European Commission has helped to usher in a flood of new institutional legislation and organizational reforms, as Hungarian ministries and successive governments have rushed, in competition with other prospective states, to alter their own legislation and institutions to conform with the eighty-eight-thousand-page *acquis communautaire* with its more than ten thousand directives.[44] EU monitors regularly evaluate Hungary's progress in institutional change and issue

[41] Between 1989 and 1998 Hungary received the largest share of FDI by far in the formerly communist world. In second and third place came Poland and the Czech Republic. Jacqueline Coolidge, "The Art of Attracting Foreign Direct Investment in Transition Economies," *Transition* 10, no. 5 (1999), 5.

[42] Wade Jacoby, "Priest and Penitent: The European Union as a Force in the Domestic Politics of Eastern Europe," *East European Constitutional Review* 8, no. 1 (1999), 62–67. In March 1998 the EU formalized what was already widely known, that there would be two tiers of accession candidates. The Czech Republic, Poland, Hungary, Estonia, and Slovenia are in the first group for accession, and Bulgaria, Slovakia, Latvia, Lithuania, and Romania are in the second group. Since then, EU officials have alternated between an admit-each-when-it-is-ready and an admit-them-in-groups approach.

[43] Rudolf Tökes, "Party Politics and Participation in Postcommunist Hungary," in Karen Dawisha and Bruce Parrott, eds., *The Consolidation of Democracy in East-Central Europe* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997); Bennett Kovrig, "European Integration," in Aurel Braun and Zoltan Barany, eds., *Dilemmas of Transition: The Hungarian Experience* (Lanham, Md.: Rowman and Littlefield, 1999); Atttila Agh, "Die neuen politischen Eliten in Mittelosteuropa," in Hellmut Wollmann, Helmut Wiesenthal, and Frank Bönker, eds., *Transformation sozialistischer Gesellschaften: Am Ende des Anfangs* (Opladen: Westdeutscherverlag).

[44] Jacoby (fn. 42). In Hungary's June 1999 parliamentary session, for example, 180 laws were passed, 152 of which were not subject to any debate because they were part of the *acquis communautaire*; see *Magyar Nemzet*, June 19, 1999. We thank Andrew Janos for providing us with this information.

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reports about lacunae in legislation and offer checklists and blueprints to follow.[45]

The point is not that domestic politics does not matter. Indeed, privatization of state assets and stabilization of the national budget, the establishment of a free press, legislation on national minorities, and social policy reform were strategies common to all postcommunist states. But what the EU has done, especially since the mid-1990s, is to provide the crucial external push that has altered domestic interests in favor of accomplishing some of the key tasks of postcommunism. Even where legislative changes have not occurred, EU influence has put the question on the agenda. A good example in Hungary is in the area of foreign ownership of land. In Hungary foreign nationals are still forbidden to own land and economists have identified a number of drawbacks to this policy for domestic capital formation and the modernization of the agricultural sector (a key feature of Hungary's economy). In order to gain acceptance into the EU, however, Hungary will have to permit foreign nationals to own land. Although no government since 1989 has attempted to push through the kind of legislation that will be required, there is a general consensus that such legislation will eventually pass, a consensus that would not as easily have come about without the prospect of EU membership on the horizon.[46]

Taken together, the tutoring and monitoring of the EU during the 1990s helped to embed political and economic reform practices and legislation more deeply than if the countries of Central Europe had been left on their own. The rapid marginalization of populist and nationalist discourse from political life after an initial flirtation with it in

[45] Fritz Franzmeyer, "Wirtschaftliche Voraussetzungen, Perspektiven und Folgen einer Osterweitung der Europäische Union," *Ost-Europa-Wirtschaft* 22, no. 2 (1999), 146. One Brussels-based Bulgarian diplomat involved in negotiations on EU accession recently spoke openly about the process: "These are not classic negotiations, you are not sitting there bargaining in the true sense of the word. You are an applicant, and the rules of the club are as follows, so basically if you are aspiring to become a member of this particular club, you will have to accept the rules that are being laid out for you." And on the *acquis*: "On the bulk of the rules, or the so-called acquis communautaire, there won't be any bargaining, simply we must find ways to incorporate them in our legislation and to also effectively implement them in our daily work in Bulgaria, and not argue whether we accept them or not." Quoted in Breffni O'Rourke, "EU Enlargement Negotiations: A Difficult Path to Tread," *RFE/RL Newsline* 4, no. 56, pt. 2, March 20, 2000.

[46] Paul Marer, "Economic Transformation, 1990–1998," in Braun and Barany (fn. 43). There is, of course, nothing inevitable about EU enlargement. It follows that outright abandonment of enlargement by the member states of the EU would have a detrimental effect on the transformation of Central Europe, but even this unlikely outcome would not alter the fundamental institutional changes that have already occurred in preparation for EU accession. But even if we assume that the best-prepared postcommunist candidates for accession are admitted "on schedule," by 2003 or 2005, the whole operation will most likely proceed in fits and starts, as in earlier periods of European institutional history, with periods of euphoria followed by bouts of pessimism.

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several Central European countries after 1989 is a final example of how the prospect of EU accession influenced domestic politics.[47] In Hungary the extreme nationalist Istvan Csurka was eventually driven out of the ruling conservative MDF by moderate forces who feared that his followers would adversely affect the prospects for EU admission. The marginalization of the extreme nationalists also influenced Hungarian foreign policy. Given the large minority populations of Hungarians in Romania, Slovakia, and Yugoslavia, one could reasonably have expected Hungary's primary foreign policy aims after 1989 to have concerned the status of these groups. Yet after an initial abortive orientation of this sort under the Antall government, Hungarian foreign policy was consistently guided by the larger policy goal of gaining entry to the EU, going so far as to risk retribution against ethnic Hungarians in Voivodina during Hungary's reluctant support for the Kosovo campaign in 1999. In short, those forces that were favorably inclined toward capitalist democracy and were already strong and present in the postcommunist countries of Central Europe in 1989 received invaluable support for their position by virtue of their location on the European continent.

SLOVAKIA

An interesting contrast to Hungary in this respect is Slovakia. Located in close proximity to West European markets, like the other countries of the Visegrad Group (Hungary, Poland, and the Czech Republic), Slovakia was initially considered to be a prime candidate for membership in the EU and NATO. Between 1990 and 1992, as part of the still existing Czechoslovakia, the Slovak Republic began to democratize its politics and made an impressive start in financial reform and privatization. After independence in 1993, however, and especially after Vladimir Mečiar's return to power as prime minister in 1994, Slovakia's course became increasingly undemocratic and corrupt. Similar to Croatia under Franjo Tudjman, Slovakia under Mečiar quickly descended into a seemingly hopeless form of political and economic Peronism, a course that was not altered until the national elections in September 1998. Slovakia thus provides us with the crucial test case of a country that is well located but that, on the whole, pursued "bad" policies: the

[47] Tibor Frank, "Nation, National Minorities, and Nationalism in Twentieth Century Hungary," in Peter F. Sugar, ed., *Eastern European Nationalism in the Twentieth Century* (Washington D.C.: American University Press, 1995); Daniel Nelson, "Regional Security and Ethnic Minorities," in Braun and Barany (fn. 43).

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combination has yielded much better results than would have been expected on the basis of the policies alone.[48]

After 1994 Mečiar ruled over an increasingly nondemocratic "thugocracy"; parties competing with his misnamed Movement for a Democratic Slovakia (HZDS) labored under discriminatory procedures, intellectuals and journalists critical of his government were intimidated, laws were simply ignored, opposition figures were detained or kidnapped, and power was distributed to an incompetent group of Mečiar's political clients.[49] After coming to power on an antireform program, Mečiar corrupted the privatization process by doling out the choicest parts of the economy to his cronies.[50] This delayed the restructuring of the badly decaying, formerly military industries of central Slovakia.[51] Shunned by the EU, Mečiar shunned the EU in return.[52] Instead of Western integration, Mečiar pursued an anti-Western alliance with Russia and managed to have his country included in Russia's pantheon of partnerships with other international outcasts such as Iraq, Yugoslavia, and Belarus.[53] In short, unlike Hungary, Slovakia after 1994 consistently pursued a course of political populism and economic cronyism.

Despite the damage done to its democracy and its economy, by 1999 Slovakia appeared once again to be on track—albeit facing the formidable challenge of regaining the ground lost in the previous half decade. A large part of the reason for Slovakia's remarkable turnaround, we maintain, is its favorable location—its close proximity to the West and its good prospects for joining the EU and NATO. Again, as in Hungary, external influences have been channeled through domestic institutions and interests, and domestic politics remains crucial in any consideration of the Slovak case. Civic groups and political parties that had come into existence during the Velvet Revolution did not disappear

[48] Croatia, a country in the same quadrant, followed much the same trajectory as Slovakia in the 1990s, including a rejection of dictatorship at the end of the decade and a renewed attempt to conform to the expectations of European institutions.

[49] Sharon Wolchik, "Democratization and Political Participation in Slovakia," in Dawisha and Parrott (fn. 43), 244.

[50] Josef Kotrba and Jan Svejnar, "Rapid and Multifaceted Privatization: Experience of the Czech and Slovak Republics," *Moct-Most* 4, no. 2 (1994).

[51] Having come to power on a platform that promised a less painful, "Slovak path" to the economic transition, Mečiar's economic policies produced mixed results in the short run and very poor results in the long run. The Slovak economy's main weakness is its industrial core, which came into existence almost entirely during the communist era and was designed to support a much reduced (and now truncated) Czechoslovak military-industrial complex.

[52] Christopher Walker, "Slovakia: Return to Europe Questionable," *RFE/RL Weekly Report*, September 25, 1998, http://www.rferl.org/nca/features/1998/09/F.RU.980925133407.html.

[53] M. Steven Fish, "The End of Mečiarism," *East European Constitutional Review* 8, no. 1 (1999).

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during the 1990s but remained in disarray and at odds with one another. The Slovak presidency, supreme court, and central bank retained an important measure of autonomy even at the height Mečiarism and acted as a brake on Mečiar's accumulation of power. The public broadcast media, although increasingly a pawn of the HZDS, was balanced by a vigorous free press and third sector.[54]

Yet even these rudiments of democracy might have been undermined—the case of Kyrgyzstan, as we shall see, opens up such a possibility—were it not for Slovakia's position on the European continent and the influence of outside actors. Even with less than exemplary economic policies during Mečiar's rule, Slovakia's economic performance was buoyed by surprisingly high—even rising[55]— levels of foreign direct investment; the economy even enjoyed a mild level of prosperity.[56] The country's sustained cultural connections to Western and Czech political parties also ensured that Mečiar's moves were subject to constant scrutiny in the foreign press and on Czech radio and television. Slovak NGOs were sustained by their strong connections to their European counterparts.[57]

Under these circumstances Mečiar pulled back from outright dictatorship. As one student of the end of Mečiarism has noted, "Its location may have created counterpressures against the would-be dictator that were stronger than those endured by, say, the Belarusian or Kazakh rulers."[58] Despite his efforts, Mečiar was not able to neutralize his political opponents. Nor did he manage to completely subvert the formal rules and procedures of Slovakia's constitutional provisions.[59] Perhaps most important, his opponents could coalesce around the quite reasonable assertion that Slovakia was squandering its opportunity to join the West. Indeed this is what transpired when Mečiar's HDZS lost to a

[54] Martin Butora, Grigorij Meseznikov, and Zora Butorova, "Overcoming Illiberaism: Slovakia's 1998 Elections," in Martin Butora et al., eds., *The 1998 Parliamentary Elections and Democratic Rebirth of Slovakia* (Bratislava: Institute of Public Affairs, 1999).

[55] After an initial drop to $182 million of FDI in 1995 from $203 million the year before, FDI in Slovakia doubled its level over the next three years; see Coolidge (fn. 41), 5.

[56] See especially the annual reports of the National Bank of Slovakia, an institution that retained a remarkable degree of autonomy under Mečiar; http://www.nbs.sk/INDEXA.HTM. It is now apparent that part of the secret of Mečiar's economic success was connected with huge, debt-driven infrastructure programs undertaken in 1996 and 1997.

[57] "Slovak NGOs had their natural partners abroad, and they exchanged skills, technical advice, and moral encouragement with them"; Butora, Meseznikov, and Butorova (fn. 54), 19.

[58] Fish (fn. 53), 50. Fish maintains that "the very birth and persistence of Mečiarism show that geography is not destiny" but concedes that location may well have mattered in the longer run.

[59] In an attempt to take advantage of an opposition that was fragmented into a number of competing parties, he did change the electoral rules just before the 1998 elections so that it would have been impossible for the opposition to win had they not coalesced into a single party.

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broad coalition of parties in the parliamentary elections of 1998.[60] Although it would inaccurate to attribute Mečiar's defeat entirely to "location," there is ample evidence that Slovkia's continued close connections with other Central European states undermined Mečiar's populist project. It is also fair to say that the sustained criticism leveled at the country by the EU during the 1990s in regard to its "democratic deficit," combined with the implied prospect of EU membership if Mečiar were ousted, helped the opposition solve its own internal collective action problems in a way that would likely not otherwise have occurred.[61]

After 1998 Slovakia quickly resumed accession negotiations with the EU, and the EU in turn attempted to support the diverse coalition of parties that opposed dictatorial rule. Of course, Slovakia's future is not preordained by its position on the European continent.[62] But any return to a new variation of Mečiarism or anti-Western populism is likely to meet with the same kinds of capacities and resources that the Slovak opposition brought to bear on the would-be dictator of the 1990s—capacities and resources that are in large part a function of the country's location in the heart of Europe.

Kyrgyzstan

Our final case, Kyrgyzstan, illustrates the kinds of obstacles facing a geographically remote and disadvantaged country that is trying to integrate itself into Western political and economic structures. In the first few years after the breakup of the Soviet Union in 1991 Kyrgyzstan was the regional darling of Western governments and financial institutions. Under the leadership of a liberal physicist, Askar Akaev, who managed against long odds to win the presidency in 1991, Kyrgyzstan quickly privatized many of its main enterprises; it was the first Central Asian country to leave the ruble zone and introduce its own currency, the som; it even managed to gain entry into the World Trade Organiza-

[60] Jolyon Naegele, "Slovakia: Democratic Opposition Has Chance to Change Policies," *RFE/RL Weekly Report*, September 28, 1998, http://www.rferl.org/nca/features/1998/09/F.RU.980928134909.html.

[61] As Butora, Meseznikov, and Butorova (fn. 54) note in their account of the 1998 election: "The West's open emphasis on the need for democratization was of great importance in shaping public opinion. Research data repeatedly showed that a substantial segment of the population considered the criticism from abroad to be justified and saw democratization as a prerequisite for Slovakia's integration into Euro-Atlantic structures. The global democratic community had shown its power."

[62] Having come to power in 1998, the new liberal coalition found the treasury almost empty, depleted by years of fiscal profligacy and political corruption. Confronting this legacy required fiscal austerity measures, which led to tensions within the coalition and renewed support for the populists. On Mečiar's economic legacy, see Euen Juzyca, Marek Jakoby, and Peter Pažitny, "The Economy of the Slovak Republic," in Grigorij Meseznikov, Michal Ivantysyn, and Tom Nicholson, eds., *Slovakia 1998–1999: A Global Report on the State of Society* (Bratislava: Institute for Public Affairs, 1999).

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tion.[63] International financial institutions rewarded Kyrgyzstan with substantial loans (considering its small size), bolstering Akaev's popularity; and Western political organizations lauded its political record.[64] In the first few years of independence civic organizations flourished, there were lively if somewhat irresponsible print media, a private television station began broadcasting from the capital, Bishkek, and opposition parties were formed (though they lacked significant grassroots support).

Despite this positive beginning, however, Kyrgyzstan did not have the capacity to attract sufficient Western attention to help it overcome the pressures of its immediate international environment. Since, unlike other former Soviet republics, it did not possess nuclear weapons or border on bodies of water adjacent to Western states, Kyrgystan posed no concerns for the West about nuclear or environmental matters. Typical of Central Asia as a whole, foreign direct investment focused primarily on resource extraction (gold mining), as opposed to the long-term investment in manufacturing and services received by Hungary, Poland, the Czech Republic, and even Slovakia.[65] The effect of this pattern of economic engagement with the West, rather than training new middle classes, has been to restrict contact between business classes to the highest political levels, which in turn has fostered political favoritism and corruption.[66]

By 1995, despite Kyrgyzstan's official self-representation as the "Switzerland of Central Asia" (a neutral multiethnic, [relatively] prosperous, democratic mountain republic), the entire Kyrgyz political economy was slowly unraveling.[67] As in our previous two cases, any understanding of this one must derive from an analysis of both international and domestic factors. Confronting a stagnating economy and impatient foreign creditors, on the one hand, and the increasing power and authority of provincial elites, on the other, President Akaev undermined his country's democratic institutions by rigging both parliamen-

[63] Eugene Huskey, "Kyrgyzstan: The Fate of Political Liberalization," in Karen Dawisha and Bruce Parrott, eds., *Conflict, Cleavage, and Change in Central Asia and the Caucasus* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997).

[64] Eugene Huskey, "Kyrgyzstan Leaves the Ruble Zone," *RFE/RL Research Report*, September 3, 1993, 38–43.

[65] Although Slovakia and Kyrgyzstan both have about five million inhabitants, in 1998 Kyrgyzstan received $55 million of FDI while Slovakia received almost seven times that much, even though the two countries' rankings in the various economic freedom indexes were not so far apart. See Coolidge (fn. 41).

[66] By 1999, for example, the son-in-law of President Akaev was reported to have gained control of almost all of the energy, transport, communications, and alcohol industries, as well as its airline. See *Moskovski Komsomolets*, December 9, 1999, 3.

[67] John Anderson, *Kyrgyzstan: Central Asia's Island of Democracy?* (Amsterdam: Harwood Academic Publishers, 1999).

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tary and presidential elections in the 1990s. During the parliamentary elections in the early spring of 2000 the irregularities were all but institutionalized, and by the late spring of that year Akaev had imprisoned his main opponent, Felix Kulov, on highly questionable charges of tax evasion. Unlike the Slovak opposition, the fragmented opposition in Kyrgyzstan possessed neither international referents nor material support nor the possibility of inclusion in a wealthy trading bloc that would have helped its leaders solve their collective action problems. Under these conditions President Akaev had little trouble keeping his opponents at bay through corruption and repression.

The evidence is suggestive that Akaev took his cue from the experience of other postcommunist presidents, especially Leonid Kravchuk in Ukraine and Stanislau Shuskevich in Belarus, both of whom lost their positions in elections in 1994. In his December 1995 presidential race, according to one student of the region, Akaev manipulated "registration rules to keep strong opponents out of the race" but "left some small fish in the pond in order to create a plausible veneer of electoral competition."[68] Even more compelling is the evidence that Akaev conformed to the expectations of the other Central Asian presidents who preside over more or less authoritarian dictatorships. Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan, larger and more powerful than Kyrgyzstan, have let it be known that they prefer a noncompetitive political system in a country that has so much contact with their own.[69] Kyrgyzstan's powerful neighbors have also criticized its attempts to integrate more closely with the West.[70] Both the policy of leaving the ruble zone in 1993 and the entry into the WTO in 1999, for example, were met by stoppages in natural gas deliveries and the imposition of tariffs and limitations on goods imported from Kyrgyzstan to Uzbekistan and Russia.[71] By the end of the decade Kyrgyzstan's continued attempts to forge a stable connection to the West that ran through other hostile Central Asian countries had largely run out of steam.[72]

[68] Peter Rutland, "Count Them in or Count Them Out? Post-Socialist Transition and the Globalization Debate" (Paper presented at the American Association for the Advancement of Slavic Studies, St. Louis, Mo., 1999).

[69] Eugene Huskey, "National Identity from Scratch: Defining Kyrgyzstan's Role in World Affairs" (Manuscript, Department of Political Science, Stetson University, July 1999).

[70] Ibid. In 1998, for example, Uzbekistan's president Karimov criticized Kyrgyzstan's dreams of Westernizing its economy. "Kyrgyzstan," Karimov admonished the Kyrygz leadership, " is tied more closely to the IMF, which is your 'Daddy' and supervises everything." "O druzhbe, bez kotoroi ne prozhit'," *Slovo Kyrgyzstana*, December 2, 1998, 2, cited in Huskey.

[71] Bruce Pannier, "Central Asia: Concern Grows over Possibility of Trade War," *RFE/RL Weekly Report*, February 16, 1999.

[72] Adding to Kyrgyzstan's woes (but predictable given its location) were sporadic but heavily armed skirmishes during the second half of the 1990s between government forces and foreign Islamic guerrillas who had crossed the border in search of a secure operating base.

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Confronted by a steady increase in reports of human rights abuses, political and electoral corruption, and economic stagnation, Kyrgyzstan could no longer easily distinguish itself from the other authoritarian countries of the region.[73] Despite its best efforts, therefore, during the 1990s Kyrgyzstan was unable to free itself from the constraints of its new regional politics.

Conclusions

In this article we have demonstrated the plausibility of the thesis that geographical proximity to the West has exercised a positive influence on the transformation of communist states and that geographical isolation in the East has hindered this transformation. We have pursued the spatial logic further to examine the facilitating role that openness to outside influences has played in shaping the spatial diffusion of democracy and capitalism. Moreover, we have conceived of geographical effects in a more complex manner than is traditionally done and attempted to operationalize the concept through a statistical test of "neighbor effects" on the development of the postcommunist states. Finally, we have illustrated plausible mechanisms by which geography is influencing outcomes in three theoretically important cases.

We have attempted to unpack the phenomenon of the spread of democracy and capitalism by investigating which factors are at work in the diffusion process. Our research indicates that the political and economic behaviors of postcommunist states are related in part to the behaviors in neighboring states. Accordingly, some process of spatial diffusion is operating. Underlying the idea of spatial diffusion, however, are two determinants of spatiality: spatial dependence and spatial heterogeneity. Spatial dependence represents the extent to which behavior in one state is a function of behavior in adjoining states. Spatial heterogeneity, by contrast, involves regional distinctions and is characterized by differentiation among states on similar characteristics. O'Loughlin and Anselin present the concepts on a continuum of spatiality. "At one extreme, if high spatial heterogeneity exists, then every region is unique and no general statements or models are possible. At the opposite extreme, the same relationships hold for all scales and regions."[74]

[73] "Human Rights Watch on Kyrgyzstan," *RFE/RL Daily report on Kyrgyzstan*, December 10, 1999, http://www.rferl.org/bd/ky/reports/today.html.

[74] John O'Loughlin and Luc Anselin, "Geography of International Conflict and Cooperation: Theory and Methods," in Michael D. Ward, ed., *The New Geopolitics* (Philadlphia: Gordon and Breach Science Publishers,1992).

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The postcommunist states fall between these extremes. The results of the Moran's I test reveal that there is strong spatial dependence across the full set of states. Within the space of postcommunist states, however, there are different levels of political and economic reforms. At the high end are Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic, and at the low end are Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan, and Tajikistan. The table and figures of the G_i^* statistics indicate statistical significance for states within each of these subregions.

In exploring the dynamics of diffusion, we have distinguished between two sets of factors: stocks and flows. These stocks and flows have been examined simultaneously in our model of neighbor effects. We have simplified the complexity of spatiality, geographic influence, and state choices into two variables that we believe capture the essence of stocks and flows in spatial diffusion: neighbor scores and openness. The neighbor scores reflect the stock of locale—where a state is positioned shapes the interactions that are likely to occur, the examples that influence elites and masses, and the resources that are readily accessible, as well as cultural, religious, and ethnic affiliations that are often a function of place. The openness score is indicative of the flow of ideas and the willingness and capacity of the ruling regime to allow interaction with surrounding states and to accept the influx of communication, transportation, and technology that has the potential to transform attitudes and behavior. The model provides support for the proposition that both of these factors are important. Even when controlling for the other, there is statistical significance to both stocks and flows.

In assuming that political and economic reforms in the postcommunist world involve a process of spatial interaction, we must also consider the dynamics of "origin" and "destination" or "target" states. The case studies included in our discussion illustrate this point. The strategy of EU enlargement based on a geographical contiguity and proximity has altered the context of politics in the states of East-Central Europe in important ways. The states of Central Asia, by contrast, even those that have tried to escape from their Leninist and pre-Leninist legacies, have been constrained by their isolation, their politically and economically unstable and undemocratic neighbors, and the absence of sustained outside sponsorship by economically powerful, democratic states.

The integration of spatial and temporal factors is essential to a deeper understanding of the postcommunist world. It may be possible to separate and isolate these factors for methodological purposes. Indeed this is what much of our article has done. Any consideration of real cases, however, even the short discussions outlined above, suggests

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that variation in political and economic reform in the postcommunist states is best understood in the context of spatiotemporal analysis. Temporal or path-dependent arguments must be couched in terms of a geographic context. Likewise, spatial factors cannot stand alone. Such considerations suggest that the task that stands before social science is the integration of history and geography into the analysis of political change.

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PARTISAN GOVERNMENTS, THE INTERNATIONAL ECONOMY, AND MACROECONOMIC POLICIES IN ADVANCED NATIONS, 1960–93

By CARLES BOIX*

WITHIN the comparative political economy literature of the determinants of the business cycle, there are several conflicting interpretations about the role that political parties and domestic institutions play in the management of macroeconomic conditions. A first generation of partisan models claimed that different parties could and did maintain different levels of inflation and unemployment over time. For the most part these models used evidence from the prestagflation period and equated social democracy with full employment and conservatism with price stability. Partly as a result of a shift in macroeconomic theory toward rational expectations models but mostly as a consequence of the empirical collapse of a stable Phillips curve across OECD nations, two new lines of research were generated in the early and mid-1980s. On the one hand, several political economists, incorporating rational expectations into their assumptions, predicted that partisanship had only temporary effects. On the other hand, new models stressed the need to develop a better specification of the institutional conditions—particularly the organization of the labor market and the locus of monetary authority—under which parties operate. According to the neoinstitutionalist approach, social democracy could thrive and attain its full-employment goal only in corporatist countries. Conversely, conservative cabinets could behave that way only in decentralized economies. More recently, a fourth wave of analysis, most of it qualitative in nature, has claimed that different partisan governments do not differ at all in regard to macroeconomic policies and out-

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comes—even when they operate under the proper corporatist or decentralized institutional conditions. According to these studies, increasing economic interdependence, changes in the domestic processes of production, and the emergence of new electoral cleavages have altered the postwar basis of politics and led to the demise of partisan politics. And in a peculiar twist in the literature, some scholars today reject the idea that macroeconomic policies ever—even before the 1980s—distinguished social democrats from conservatives.

So far most empirical work to assess the validity of these different models has been done on economic aggregates. By contrast, surprisingly little systematic research has been conducted on the impact of parties and institutions on fiscal and monetary policy instruments. Yet such work has a central place in our research agenda. For if, as part of the literature claims, partisanship and the extent of corporatist institutions affect unemployment and growth rates, it is necessary to determine through which specific policy strategies they act on the economy—that is, whether through loose monetary policies or through human capital formation. This is, in turn, relevant to understanding the nature of partisan politics, as well as to predicting how much autonomy governments will be left with in an increasingly internationalized economy.

Accordingly, this articles explores the role of parties, domestic institutions, and the international economy in the evolution of fiscal and monetary policies (measured through the evolution of public deficits and of interest rates) using a sample of nineteen OECD economies from 1960 to the mid-1990s. The article shows that parties, both separately and in interaction with the organization of the labor market, have affected the conduct of fiscal and monetary policies. Still, their impact has been heavily constrained by the extent of capital mobility and the exchange-rate regime in place. The results can be summarized as the following five points:

1. After being stable and relatively similar across countries in the 1960s, monetary policy became much looser in the wake of the first economic shocks of the 1970s. It quickly tightened in the early 1980s. Real interest rates peaked in the mid-1980s and then declined slowly. Fiscal policies became expansionary in the 1970s. Afterward most OECD countries strove for fiscal consolidation.

2. Within these overall trends, conservative governments have generally pursued more restrictive macroeconomic policies. They have kept real interest rates above the OECD average and, except for the mid-1970s and early 1980s and then again in the mid-1990s, maintained roughly balanced budgets.

3. After being strongly committed to stable macroeconomic policies in the 1960s, socialist governments engaged in expansionary strategies in the aftermath of the oil shocks of the 1970s. But the type of policies they relied on to

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smooth the business cycle varied with the organization of the domestic labor market. In corporatist countries social democratic cabinets developed strongly countercyclical budgetary measures to overcome the economic slowdown that followed the oil shocks. Yet, contrary to a rather extended view, they pursued very similar monetary policies to those of conservative-led countries.

4. Under socialist administrations in decentralized labor markets in the 1970s both monetary and fiscal policies became sharply expansionary. Keynesian demand management was reversed in the 1980s, however. Real interest rates converged to the OECD average by the mid-1980s. By contrast, it took much longer there than in other countries to achieve fiscal discipline, and it quickly waned with the economic recession of the early 1990s.

5. The substantial cross-national variation of the 1970s—when partisan differences were significant—followed by the rapid convergence of the 1980s has its roots in the evolution of the international economy. Until the early 1980s generalized capital controls and floating exchange rates provided policymakers with considerable autonomy to respond to the stagflation crisis. Yet as international financial markets grew exponentially, capital controls lost their viability, fixed-exchange-rate regimes were reintroduced, and the socialist-led Keynesian expansions of the 1970s were no longer feasible by the mid-1980s, regardless of the labor market organization in place.

The article is organized as follows. Section I briefly reviews the theories on the impact of parties and corporatist regimes on macroeconomic policies. Section II summarizes previous empirical work and points to the empirical gaps in the literature. Section III considers the evidence for monetary policy. Section IV presents the results for fiscal policies. Section V concludes by offering a global interpretation of the results in the context of the literature on comparative political economy. This includes an assessment of the causes behind the process of internationalization, as well as a call to redefine both how we characterize corporatism and which political-economic strategies distinguish left-wing governments.

I. Previous Theoretical Work

Several partially conflicting interpretations coexist in the political economy literature on the role of partisan politics and political institutions in the management of the business cycle through fiscal and monetary policies. Assuming a stable Phillips curve and policymakers with different goals as a function of their electoral constituencies, the initial model, or classical partisan theory, predicted permanent differences between different partisan governments in both macroeconomic policies

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and aggregates.[1] Left-wing governments were predicted to pursue a Keynesian macroeconomic strategy to smooth the business cycle, hold the unemployment rate down, and boost the disposable income of the worst off. Right-wing governments, by contrast, were assumed to provide a stable and certain economic framework to private agents based on fighting inflation and running a balanced budget.

Challenging the classical model of partisan politics and relaxing its underlying assumptions in several ways, more recent research, however, has downplayed the importance of parties in the determination of macroeconomic policy choices. Revising the economic assumptions that ground the classical partisan model, parties have been said to affect the economy only temporarily—unless they can count on a specific set of institutions to affect it permanently.

Maintaining the political assumptions of the classical partisan model the rational partisan model has incorporated a hybrid model of the economy.[2] Economic actors are fully rational in gathering information and making decisions, but they operate in markets where prices and wages do not adjust freely in the short run. In this framework the (unexpected) election of a socialist government, committed to higher growth rates and full employment, induces an economic expansion. Conversely, the electoral victory of a conservative party, geared toward price stability, leads to an economic recession. Over time, however, agents adjust prices and wages to the new conditions, and unemployment and output return to their previous rates. Thus, in the medium run partisan differences disappear.[3]

The literature on social democratic corporatist regimes holds that partisan differences exist and under the proper institutional arrangements are permanent. Social democratic governments can pursue noninflationary expansionary policies only if economic agents—in particular, the labor movement—agree to moderate wage increases. This requires, in turn, a highly encompassing and centrally organized union, capable both of internalizing the output and unemployment costs of excessive wage aggressiveness and of enforcing wage restraint

[1] Douglas A. Hibbs, "Political Parties and Macroeconomic Policy," *American Political Science Review* 71 (December 1977); idem, *The American Political Economy: Macroeconomics and Electoral Politics* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1987).

[2] Alberto Alesina, "Politics and Business Cycles in Industrial Democracies," *Economic Policy* 8 (April 1989); Alberto Alesina and Howard Rosenthal, *Partisan Politics, Divided Governments, and the Economy* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1995).

[3] Inflation, however, is likely to remain above its preelection level under a left-wing government, because the latter's natural preference for expansionary policies erodes its anti-inflationary credibility.

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on all workers.[4] In the absence of encompassing union movements, socialist parties eventually introduce stabilizing policies to avoid high inflation, a net loss of competitiveness, and electoral defeat.[5] Similarly, the autonomy of governments is a function of the independence of central banks: independent central banks controlling monetary policy thwart left-wing expansionary policies.[6]

More recent work has fundamentally challenged on two counts the hypothesis that parties, even when relying on the appropriate domestic institutions, may ever affect economic policies. First, pointing out that partisan theories have generally been developed for closed-economy models, several scholars have stressed that parties and governments will be strongly constrained by the international economy. On the one hand, under trade openness, which has been increasing over time, a higher portion of domestic demand is satisfied abroad. Hence internally engineered expansionary policies have a small impact on the domestic growth rate. On the other hand, the higher the levels of capital mobility, the lower the autonomy of policymakers to shape fiscal and monetary policies. In a financially open economy interest rates will converge worldwide. With fixed exchange rates (and monetary policy geared toward sustaining the currency), only fiscal policy can affect domestic demand. Still, fiscal policy is constrained by the performance of the current account in the long run. With floating exchange rates monetary expansion is possible via currency depreciations, yet its effects may be quickly outweighed by the increasing cost of imports and a wage push that neutralizes the gains of the depreciation.[7]

Second, it has been suggested that fundamental changes in the production sphere and new electoral realignments have progressively dissolved the particular class-based coalitions that in the past had led to different unemployment-inflation preferences across political parties.[8]

[4] Mancur Olson, *The Rise and Decline of Nations* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1982); John Goldthorpe, ed., *Order and Conflict in Contemporary Capitalism* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1984); Lars Calmfors and John Driffill, "Bargaining Structure, Corporatism and Macroeconomic Performance," *Economic Policy* 6 (April 1988).

[5] Fritz W. Scharpf, "A Game-Theoretical Interpretation of Inflation and Unemployment in Western Europe," *Journal of Public Policy* 7 (July–September 1987); idem, *Crisis and Choice in European Social Democracy* (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1991).

[6] Alberto Alesina and Lawrence Summers, "Central Bank Independence and Macroeconomic Performance," *Journal of Money, Credit and Banking* 25 (May 1993).

[7] For a review of open economy models of policy-making, see Robert O. Keohane and Helen V. Milner, eds., *Internationalization and Domestic Politics* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1996). A good review of the growing internationalization of capital markets can be found in Beth Simmons, "The Internationalization of Capital," in Herbert Kitschelt et al., eds. *Continuity and Change in Contemporary Capitalism* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1999).

[8] See, for example, Herbert Kitschelt, *The Transformation of European Social Democracy* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1994).

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II. Review of Empirical Results

Most of the empirical studies on partisan business cycles have focused on the variation of economic outcomes, namely, growth rates, unemployment, and inflation, rather than on policy instruments. Initially the literature found evidence supporting the classical partisan theory and the existence of permanent differences between left-wing parties and right-wing parties regarding unemployment and inflation.[9] Moreover, an influential strand of work stressed that Keynesianism had been the key basis of social democratic economic policies, which, in turn, ensured the social consensus and political stability of postwar Europe.[10] More recent empirical work, based on U.S. data and OECD cross-national cross-temporal samples, shows, however, that the effects of parties tend to conform to the rational partisan model. Growth rates and unemployment vary along partisan lines after a change in government, but any differences wane completely by two years after the last election.[11] Still, several problems remained unresolved in the rational partisan model. The methodology employed to test it has been considered unsuited to prove parts of its claims.[12] The way in which left-wing cabinets manage fiscal and monetary policy after economic agents have adjusted to the initial shock is not well specified in the model.[13] Finally, the rational partisan theory hardly accounts for the hysteretical behavior of European unemployment in the 1980s and for the emergence of learning patterns among governments having different ideological traditions. As for the impact of political institutions, recent research provides empirical confirmation of the favorable impact of social democratic corporatist regimes on growth rates.[14] Finally, central bank independence has been found to curtail inflation.[15]

By contrast, studies on the impact of political parties and corporatist institutions on policy instruments have been fewer in number and less

[9] Hibbs (fn. 1, 1977).

[10] Adam Przeworski and Michael Wallerstein, "Democratic Capitalism at the Crossroads," in Przeworski, *Capitalism and Social Democracy* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1985).

[11] Alberto Alesina and Nouriel Roubini with Gerald Cohen, *Political Cycles and the Macroeconomy* (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1997).

[12] Douglas A. Hibbs, "Partisan Theory after Fifteen Years," *European Journal of Political Economy* 8 (1992).

[13] Notice, also, that if economic actors are capable of either writing contracts that overcome the uncertainty of future electoral outcomes or renegotiating them immediately after elections, parties will not affect the business cycle at all.

[14] R. Michael Álvarez, Geoffrey Garrett, and Peter Lange, "Government Partisanship, Labor Organization and Macroeconomic Performance, 1967–1984," *American Political Science Review* 85 (June 1991); Nathaniel Beck et al., "Government Partisanship, Labor Organization, and Macroeconomic Performance: A Corrigendum," *American Political Science Review* 87 (December 1993).

[15] Alesina and Summers (fn. 6).

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systematic.[16] The best accounts of macroeconomic policy-making are case studies of the evolution of social democratic corporatism in the 1960s and of several expansionary episodes under socialist governments in the late 1970s and early 1980s, showing that social democratic governments followed tight fiscal policies in the 1960s but engaged in sizable expansions in the 1970s (until the 1980s social democracy governed only in corporatist countries).[17] Quantitative analyses of the effects of partisanship on fiscal and monetary instruments have been scarce and have basically focused on the interactive effect of corporatism and social democracy and, to some extent, on the impact of constitutional structures on public deficits. Interestingly, most of the quantitative research tends to depict social democratic corporatist regimes differently from how they are depicted in qualitative research, that is, as having little independent effect on fiscal and monetary policy instruments.[18] A recent study of partisan policies in the context of increasing trade and financial integration concludes that as internationalization progresses, social democratic corporatist governments pursue both looser fiscal policies and tighter monetary policies.[19] That analysis nevertheless pays little attention to two factors that are shown in this article to be central to the choice of macroeconomic policies: first, the variation in domestic institutions (that is, the degree of central bank independence and the organization of labor markets, especially the impact of uncoordinated wage bargaining systems on socialist strategies) and second, the interaction of the exchange-rate regime and capital mobility.

III. Monetary Policies

Figures 1 and 2 provide a general overview of the evolution of inflation and monetary policy in the advanced world from 1960 to 1994. Figure

[16] The impact of electoral cycles on macroeconomic policies has been examined extensively, however. Alesina and Roubini with Cohen (fn. 11) do so in the context of a closed economy model. More recently, in examining how the international economy affects the existence of an electoral business cycle, opportunistic policies have been shown to be less likely in the presence of a fixed-exchange-rate regime and high levels of capital mobility. See William R. Clark and Usha N. Reichert with Sandra L. Lomas and Kevin L. Parker, "International and Domestic Constraints on Political Business Cycles in OECD Economies," *International Organization* 52 (Winter 1998).

[17] Andrew Martin, "The Dynamics of Change in a Keynesian Political Economy," in Colin Crouch, ed., *State and Economy in Contemporary Capitalism* (London: Croom Helm, 1979); Fritz W Scharpf (fn. 5); Jeffrey Sachs and Charles Wyplosz, "The Economic Consequences of President Mitterrand," *Economic Policy* 2 (April 1986); Peter A. Hall, *Governing the Economy: The Politics of State Intervention in Britain and France* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1986).

[18] Geoffrey Garrett and Peter Lange, "Political Responses to Interdependence: What's 'Left' for the Left?" *International Organization* 45 (Autumn 1991). For a recent analysis of the interaction of partisan politics and central banks, see Christopher Way, "Central Banks, Partisan Politics, and Macroeconomic Outcomes," *Comparative Political Studies* 33 (March 2000).

[19] Geoffrey Garrett, *Partisan Politics in the Global Economy* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1998).

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

FIGURE 1
EVOLUTION OF INFLATION AND INTEREST RATES
(1960–94)

1 displays the evolution of average inflation and real short-term interest rates in the OECD; definitions and sources are listed below, in the text. Figure 2 shows the standard deviation of national interest rates. As is well known, inflation, which averaged 2 percent until the late 1960s, experienced a sharp jump in the wake of two consecutive oil price rises and then declined to pre–oil shock levels in the mid-1980s. Until 1972 real interest rates were low and relatively similar across OECD nations—economic stability and the Bretton Woods system resulted in a considerable alignment of policy in the developed world. Generally speaking, all OECD governments responded to the economic slowdown of the 1970s by first reducing interest rates. The average interest rate became negative in real terms in 1973. Still, the response to the oil shock of 1973 varied widely across nations. The standard deviation of real interest rates jumped to 5 percent; their values spread from −15 percent in Greece to 3.3 percent in Germany. Failing to curb inflation, however, most governments eventually embraced tighter monetary policies. By 1984 short-term interest rates had climbed to over 4 percent in real terms, and cross-national differences had shrunk to prestagflation levels.

PARTIES, INSTITUTIONS, AND MONETARY POLICY

Against this historical background, I examine the effect of partisanship and corporatist institutions on monetary policy with data for 1960–93

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

FIGURE 2
CROSS-NATIONAL VARIATION IN SHORT-TERM INTEREST RATES
(1960–94)

from all of the OECD countries with over one million inhabitants and for which data are available: Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Netherlands, Norway, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, the United Kingdom, and the United States. The procedure to test the effects of parties, alone and in combination with corporatist structures, takes the following form:

$$IR_{it} = \alpha + \alpha_1 IR_{it-1} + \alpha_2 INFL_{it-1} + \alpha_3 GDP\text{–}DECLINE + \alpha_4 OPENNESS_{it} + \alpha_5 SOC_{it} + \alpha_6 d(SOC_{it}{}^{*}LABORG_{it}) + \varepsilon_t$$

where:

(1) IR_{it} and IR_{it-1} are the short-term real interest rate (government yield bonds)[20] in country *i* at times *t* and *t – 1*, respectively.

(2) $INFL_{it-1}$ is the annual change in the consumer price index for country *i* at time *t – 1*.[21] The coefficient is expected to be positive since governments are likely to raise interest rates in response to high inflation.

(3) GDP–DECLINE is the difference between the annual growth rate at time *t – 1* and time *t* (or $\Delta GDP_{t-1} - \Delta GDP_t$),[22] so that the variable is a

[20] IMF, *International Financial Statistics*. Figures are adjusted for inflation.
[21] OECD, *Main Economic Indicators*.
[22] Ibid.

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positive number whenever there is a decline in the annual growth rate. The coefficient of the variable is expected to be negative since a decline in the growth rate should push governments to cut interest rates.

OPENNESS refers to the extent to which the economy is open, and it is measured through two variables:

(4) TRADE or the sum of exports and imports as a percentage of GDP.

(5) FINANCIAL RESTRICTIONS or the presence of restrictions to capital flows. The presence of restrictions is the reverse of the Quinn's financial liberalization index of government restrictions on international capital movements (based on the IMF's coding), normalized to a range from 0 to 1. Increasing openness should be expected to reduce the capacity of governments to pursue expansionary monetary policies.[23]

The political and institutional variables are

(6) SOC or socialist control of government. Since in several countries monetary policy rests in the hands of a monetary authority that is quite independent from the government, and the ability of social democratic governments to pursue expansionary policies should be lower there, the variable socialist control of government is calculated as SC*(1−CBI), where

(a) SC is the share of cabinet posts controlled by socialist and communist parties every year. It runs as a continuous variable from 1 (full control of government) to 0 (no ministerial cabinets held by those parties in that given year).[24]

(b) CBI is the level of central bank independence. The higher the level of central bank independence, the closer the resulting variable SC*(1−CBI) will be to 0. The index of central bank independence, running from 0 (minimum independence) to 1 (maximum independence), is taken from Cukierman.[25]

From SC*(1−CBI) it follows that the higher the level of central bank independence, the lower the autonomy of a socialist government and the closest the country's monetary policy will be to the one pursued by a nonsocialist cabinet.

(7) LABORG is the organizational power of labor. Following Cameron, this index is calculated as the average of the average propor-

[23] Dennis Quinn, "The Correlates of Change in International Financial Regulation," *American Political Science Review* 91 (September 1997).

[24] Data on partisan control of office are taken from Lane, McKay, and Newton for the period 1960–88 and, using their criteria, my own calculations based on the data published in the *Keesing's Contemporary Archives* for 1989–93. Jan-Erik Lane, David McKay, and Kenneth Newton, *Political Data Handbook: OECD Countries* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1991).

[25] Alex Cukierman, *Central Bank Strategy, Credibility and Independence* (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1992).

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tion of the unionized labor force and the sum of the measures of organizational unity and labor confederation power in collective bargaining.[26] Data for the organizational power of labor is based on Cameron for the period before 1980 and modified for the 1980s to take account of recent changes in the organization of the labor movement across OECD countries, following the data presented in Golden and Wallerstein, Lange, Wallerstein and Golden, OECD, and Traxler.[27] Using data on levels of unionization it has been expanded to Greece. The index, which is standardized to homogenize results before and after 1980, goes from 0 to 1. The appendix reports the values of this index across countries and time periods.

(8) The interactive term SOC*LABORG measures the presence of social democratic corporatist regimes, that is, socialist governments in countries in which there are strong and highly unified labor movements.

I estimate the pooled cross-sectional time-series model through the Beck-Katz method of ordinary least squares, adjusting the standard errors for unequal variation within panels, introducing a lagged endogenous variable and correcting for autocorrelation.[28]

Model 1 in Table 1 displays the regression of the purely economic determinants on the dependent variable, the short-term real interest rate. Confirming the existence of substantial stickiness in monetary policy, the previous interest rate enters strongly into the regression. The positive coefficient of the inflation rate shows that high inflation in the past fuels a contractionary policy among all governments. Each point of inflation translates into an increase of about 0.16 percentage points

[26] David Cameron, "Social Democracy, Corporatism, Labor Quiescence and the Representation of Economic Interest in Advanced Capitalist Society," in Goldthorpe (fn. 4).

[27] Cameron (fn. 26); Miriam Golden and Michael Wallerstein, "Trade Union Organization and Industrial Relations in the Postwar Era in Sixteen Nations" (Paper presented at the annual meeting of the American Political Science Association, New York, 1994); Peter Lange, Michael Wallerstein, and Miriam Golden, "The End of Corporatism? Wage Setting in the Nordic and Germanic Countries," in Sanford M. Jacoby, ed., *The Workers of Nations: Industrial Relations in a Global Economy* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995); OECD *Employment Perspectives 1993* (Paris: OECD 1993); Franz Traxler, *The Level and Coverage of Collective Bargaining: A Cross-National Study of Patterns and Trends* (Paris: OECD, 1994).

[28] All panel regressions have been run with and without fixed effects. Fixed effects imply introducing n − 1 country dummies. In the regressions on monetary policy (Tables 1 and 2), the inclusion of country dummies (to allow for variation across countries' intercepts) does not change the coefficients of the independent variables. Except for the last model (in Table 2), the country dummies are not statistically significant (even in a joint F-test). In the regressions on fiscal policy (Tables 3 and 4) the inclusion of country dummies partially alters model 5 in Table 3—in fact intensifying the direction of the partisan and labor-market effects found in the non-fixed-effects model. Tables 1, 2, 3, and 4 (those displaying panel regression results) report the results obtained without fixed effects both because of the general lack of statistical significance of fixed effects and for theoretical reasons (the introduction of country dummies simply controls for unexplained factors; see Adam Przeworski and Henry Teune, *The Logic of Comparative Social Inquiry* [New York: Wiley, 1970]). Results with fixed effects can be obtained from the author.

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TABLE 1
MONETARY POLICY AND PARTISAN GOVERNMENTS: A CROSS-NATIONAL TIME-SERIES ANALYSIS OF SHORT-TERM REAL INTEREST RATES (1961–94)

	Model 1	*Model 2*	*Model 3*	*Model 4*	*Model 5*
Constant	−2.161***	−2.148***	−2.003***	−1.994***	−2.371***
	(0.615)	(0.626)	(0.679)	(0.703)	(0.840)
Interest rate t-1	0.851***	0.852***	0.810***	0.828***	0.766***
	(0.039)	(0.041)	(0.046)	(0.041)	(0.048)
Inflation rate t-1	0.160***	0.160***	0.154***	0.156***	0.170***
	(0.031)	(0.031)	(0.034)	(0.032)	(0.037)
Decline in the growth rate	−0.058***	−0.058***	−0.058***	−0.211***	−0.205***
	(0.021)	(0.021)	(0.020)	(0.034)	(0.034)
Level of financial restrictions [a]	−2.117***	−2.105***	−2.097***		
	(0.671)	(0.683)	(0.702)		
Socialist control of government$_t$ [a]		−0.067			
		(0.381)			
Socialist control of government, 1962–72 [a]			0.481		1.752
			(0.692)		(1.873)
Organizational power of labor, 1962–72					1.247*
					(0.710)
Socialist control of government				0.480	−2.917
* organizational power of labor, 1962–72				(0.806)	(2.315)
Socialist control of government, 1973–82 [a]			−1.651**		−4.486***
			(0.669)		(1.565)
Organizational power of labor, 1973–82					−0.534
					(0.780)
Socialist control of government				−0.844	5.699***
* organizational power of labor, 1973–82				(0.891)	(2.283)
Socialist control of government, 1983–93 [a]			0.690		1.217**
			(0.487)		(0.587)
Organizational power of labor, 1983–93					1.770***
					(0.476)
Socialist control of government				1.196	−2.466*
* organizational power of labor, 1983–93				(0.703)	(1.372)
chi^2	659.91	662.77	685.22	671.49	768.75
Pr > chi^2	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000
Number of observations	588	588	588	558	558

* $p \leq 0.10$; ** $p \leq 0.05$; ***$p \leq 0.01$.

[a] Index goes from 0 to 1. Standard errors are in parentheses.

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in the real interest rate the following year. A fall of one percentage point in the growth rate leads governments to cut real interest rates by 0.06 points. Trade has no statistically significant impact on interest rates and has been dropped from column 1. By contrast, the presence of restrictions in financial flows has a substantial effect on interest rates—they are 2 percentage points lower in a completely closed economy, other things being equal.

Model 2 introduces the variable socialist control of office. The coefficient has the expected sign but it is rather small, with real interest rates 0.07 points lower on average under socialist governments. The coefficient is not statistically significant. The regression in model 3 explores the extent to which the response by different parties in power has varied by time period. As discussed above, international conditions, in the form of the collapse of the Bretton Woods system of fixed exchange rates, the oil shocks of the 1970s, and a continuous process of financial liberalization, have altered the environment in which policy has been made. Model 3 adds to the initial model three political variables that measure the share of left-wing ministers in 1962–72, 1973–82, and 1983–93 separately.[29] This regression generates a more complex picture than the one presented in model 2.

Figure 3 simulates the evolution of real interest rates under social democratic and conservative governments according to the results in Table 1, model 3.[30] Within this context social democratic governments ran slightly less expansionary monetary policies in the 1960s and in the 1980s (interest rates were 0.48 and 0.69 points higher, respectively) than did conservative cabinets. But both coefficients are not statistically significant. Socialist governments responded differently than nonsocialist cabinets did in the 1970s: the coefficient is statistically significant and indicates that socialist governments lowered real interest rates by 1.65 points more than conservative governments.[31]

[29] Results do not vary when the last year of the "stagflation" period is modified, that is, when the historical periods are 1973–79 and 1980–93. The closer the divide is to 1982, the less significant in statistical and substantive terms the effect of socialist cabinets in the 1980s.

[30] For the simulation I have set all the variables at their mean levels, with the exception of partisanship and the interactive term "partisanship*organizational power of labor." The annual change of interest rates that results from the regression is added to the world real interest rates at time $t-1$ to calculate the level of interest rates at time t (which is the result represented in the simulations). The world interest rate is the weighted average (by size of GDP) of the interest rates of the seven largest economies—Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, the U.K., and the U.S.

[31] Results not reported here show that central bank independence is an important factor in the management of monetary policy. When socialist control of government (without adjusting for the level of central bank independence) is regressed on interest rates, the size of the coefficient is smaller. For example, socialist control of the government in the 1970s reduces interest rates by 0.99 points (versus 1.65 in Table 1, model 3).

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

FIGURE 3
POLITICAL PARTIES AND THE EVOLUTION OF INTEREST RATES
(1961–93)

Model 4 explores the impact of social democratic corporatism by historical periods.[32] Since 1973 social democratic corporatist governments have pursued looser monetary policies than have conservative governments. The coefficients are not statistically significant.

The results in models 3 and 4 of Table 1 open the door to an important and not yet solved question. Did monetary policy vary as a result of partisanship alone or did it require the presence of some kind of coordination with trade unions? In other words, were the monetary expansions of the 1970s the work of socialist parties or of social democratic corporatist institutions? Comparing the size and performance of the coefficients in model 3 in Tables 1 and 2, it appears that it was socialist governments governing in decentralized wage systems that pursued loose monetary policies. Still, before answering this question, it is necessary to describe the historical evolution of socialist cabinets and social democratic corporatist regimes over time. Figure 4 plots the proportion of portfolios held by socialist and communist parties in corporatist and noncorporatist countries from 1960 to 1993.[33] Except in

[32] The variable of social democratic corporatism (alone or controlled by partisanship and organization of the labor market) is not statistically significant. Results are not reported here.

[33] Corporatist countries are those that score more than 0.5 in the standardized index of the organizational power of labor (Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, Norway, and Sweden). The noncorporatist countries are those that score less than 0.3 in the standardized index (Australia before 1980, Canada, France, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Portugal, Spain, Switzerland, the U.K. after 1980, and the U.S.).

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TABLE 2
MONETARY POLICY, PARTISAN GOVERNMENTS, FINANCIAL INTEGRATION, AND U.S. INTEREST RATES: A CROSS-NATIONAL TIME-SERIES ANALYSIS OF SHORT-TERM REAL INTEREST RATES (1961–94)[a]

	Model 1	*Model 2*
Constant	−0.518	−0.757*
	(0.335)	(0.438)
Interest rate t−1	0.701***	0.690***
	(0.046)	(0.048)
Inflation rate t−1	0.144***	0.149***
	(0.034)	(0.035)
Decline in growth rate	−0.026	−0.197***
	(0.019)	(0.067)
Presence of restrictions	−0.600	0.956
	(0.869)	(1.629)
Flexible exchange rate	−0.090	−0.173
	(0.351)	(0.475)
Presence of restrictions *	−2.382*	−3.418**
Flexible exchange rate	(1.412)	(1.590)
U.S. real interest rates [a]	0.306***	0.277***
	(0.038)	(0.039)
Socialist control of government	1.575**	1.825*
	(0.786)	(1.120)
Socialist control of government *	−0.241***	−0.200
Decline in growth rate	(0.094)	(0.252)
Socialist control of government *	−3.888*	−4.992
Presence of restrictions	(2.316)	(4.195)
Socialist control of government *	−0.954	−0.190
Flexible exchange rate	(0.787)	(1.340)
Organizational power of labor		0.906
		(1.115)
Organizational power of labor *		0.054
Decline in growth rate		(0.128)
Organizational power of labor*		−3.599
Presence of restrictions		(3.894)
Organizational power of labor*		1.028
Flexible exchange rate		(1.197)
Socialist control of government		−1.049
*Organizational power of labor		(2.500)
Socialist control of government * Organizational power of labor *		0.300
Decline in growth rate		(0.230)
Socialist control of government * Organizational power of labor *		3.564
Presence of restrictions		(8.009)
Socialist control of government * Organizational power of labor *		−1.601
Flexible exchange rate		(2.905)
Chi2	836.43	818.97
Pr > ch2	0.0000	0.0000
Number of observations	556	526

* $p \leq 0.10$; ** $p \leq 0.05$; *** $p \leq 0.01$.
[a]Standard errors are in parentheses.

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

FIGURE 4
ALLOCATION OF SOCIALIST PORTFOLIOS IN CORPORATIST AND NONCORPORATIST COUNTRIES
(1960–63)

the mid-1970s, socialist parties controlled less than 10 percent of the cabinet portfolios in noncorporatist economies. By contrast, social democrats in corporatist nations controlled half of the cabinets in the 1960s and two-thirds of them in the 1970s. In short, before 1980 social democracy and corporatism were coterminous, whereas after 1980 they were not. The participation of socialist parties in the governments of corporatist countries declined to 47 percent—its average for the 1960s. Socialist electoral victories in several Southern European countries in the early 1980s raised the level of socialist participation in noncorporatist economies to 38 percent in the first half of the decade and to 27 percent for the 1980s as a whole. Accordingly, whereas before 1975 there were basically only two political-institutional regimes—socialist corporatist polities and nonsocialist noncorporatist regimes—after 1980 we can speak of at least three political outcomes: socialist corporatist regimes, nonsocialist decentralized economies, and socialist cabinets in decentralized wage settings.

In model 5 of Table 1 I include partisanship, the organizational power of labor, and its interaction, social democratic corporatism, divided by historical periods. All the coefficients for the 1970s and the 1980s turn out to be significant (separately or, in the case of the orga-

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

FIGURE 5
POLITICAL PARTIES, CORPORATISM AND THE EVOLUTION OF INTEREST RATES
(1961–93)

nizational power of labor in the 1970s, in a joint test). For the 1960s only the organizational power of labor is significant. To facilitate the interpretation of results, Figure 5 plots the values of this regression. Throughout the period under analysis social democratic governments in corporatist countries have maintained interest rates similar to those of conservative governments. In both cases real interest rates averaged slightly below 2 percent until the early 1970s. After dropping sharply to −2 percent in 1975–76, they returned to their historical level and then rose to about 4 percent. The behavior of socialist governments in decentralized economies has been more volatile. In the 1960s and in the 1980s they conducted a tighter monetary policy than conservative governments (by about 1.5 percentage points both before and after 1983). This was due to their incapacity to control inflation through incomes policy, the premium they have to pay to assert their credibility as left-wing governments, and the fact that they ran a looser fiscal policy than all other governments. In the 1970s, however, they reacted by lowering interest rates very sharply to about 4 percent. This exceptional period ended in the early 1980s. By 1983 real interest rates were again higher in left-wing decentralized political economies than in conservative-led countries.

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KEYNESIANISM, FINANCIAL OPENNESS, AND MONETARY EXPANSIONS

The fluctuating pattern of real interest rates and the different impact of partisan governments across time suggest that two factors have played a fundamental role in shaping monetary policy over time. On the one hand, variation in real interest rates was wide in the aftermath of the oil shock of 1973 and during the ensuing economic slowdown, but not before. It is therefore plausible that partisanship becomes relevant for explaining economic performance only under conditions of economic downturn. Whereas leftist cabinets responded to economic crisis in typical Keynesian fashion, by lowering interest rates, conservative cabinets (as well as countries with fully independent central banks) did not. To explore this hypothesis, I include the variable SOC*GDP-DECLINE (a term interacting socialist control of government and the decline in the growth rate) in the regressions presented in Table 2.

On the other hand, as already pointed out in Section I, the level of financial integration has risen over time, leading to a decline in the leverage governments have over monetary policy. Figure 6 shows the level of financial liberalization for four sets of countries over time. Cross-national variation remained wide until the 1970s. The average index of financial liberalization in the 1960s was 0.55 with a standard deviation of 0.23. Starting in the late 1960s there was a gradual decline in capital controls, induced by the growth of international financial markets.[34] By 1979 the index of financial liberalization averaged 0.72. In the early and mid-1980s convergence toward financial deregulation sped up, first in the core of the European Community and then, reinforced by the expansion and deepening of the European Union, in both Southern Europe and the Nordic countries.

To assess the impact of financial restrictions (alone and in interaction with the exchange-rate regime) on the autonomy of partisan governments, I include in Table 2, model 1:

(1) The interactive term SOC*FINANCIAL RESTRICTIONS to determine the extent to which parties differ whenever capital mobility is low and there is potential room for monetary expansions.

(2) FLEXIBLE or a variable that measures the exchange-rate regime under which the government operates; this variable takes the value of 1 if the currency is floating, 0.5 if it has been pegged unilaterally to any

[34] John B. Goodman and Louis W. Pauly, "The Obsolescence of Capital Controls? Economic Management in an Age of Global Markets," *World Politics* 46 (October 1993); Barry Eichengreen, *Globalizing Capital: A History of the International Monetary System* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1996).

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

FIGURE 6
EVOLUTION OF FINANCIAL OPENNESS
(1960–93)

other currency (or set of currencies), and 0 if it is part of a multilateral currency agreement (such as the European Monetary System).[35]

(3) The interactive term FLEXIBLE * FINANCIAL RESTRICTIONS to control for the fact that under conditions of full capital mobility and a fixed exchange rate, monetary policy autonomy disappears.

(4) The interactive term SOC*FLEXIBLE to ascertain the extent to which partisanship affects monetary policy under the permissive conditions created by a floating currency.

(5) Finally, a term to control for the evolution of real interest rates in the United States. As a consequence, the U.S. is excluded from the regression.

In model 2 in Table 2, I add the interactive terms LABORG*FINANCIAL RESTRICTIONS, LABORG*FLEXIBLE, SOC*LABORG*FINANCIAL RESTRICTIONS, and SOC*LABORG*FLEXIBLE to test for the impact of centralized labor markets and social democratic corporatism on monetary policy under different financial and exchange-rate regimes. Results in model 2 are strongly affected by multicollinearity. All interactive terms (with political or institutional variables) are not statistically significant. In a joint F-test, only socialist control of government (alone and in the interactive terms) achieves statistical significance. Accord-

[35] The data is from IMF, *Annual Report on Exchange Arrangements and Exchange Restrictions* (various years), appendix.

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ingly, I discuss the results reported in model 1. They show support for the presence of some moderate Keynesian behavior among left-wing governments. A 1 percent decline in the growth rate prompts a reduction of 0.24 percentage points in the interest rate under a socialist government but hardly any reduction under a nonsocialist cabinet.

The most important result, however, relates to the impact of financial liberalization and, to some extent, the exchange-rate regime. Figure 7 simulates how the interaction of different partisan governments with different levels of international integration and types of exchange-rate regimes modifies monetary policy.[36]

Financial restrictions emerge as a main variable shaping the conduct of monetary policy. In the first place and regardless of which party is in office, real interest rates are lower in a fully regulated economy than under a liberalized financial regime. The presence of capital controls, rather than generating higher interest rates by constraining the supply of capital, clearly allows governments to stimulate the economy. Second, only when there are capital controls do left-wing cabinets run much looser interest-rate policies than conservative cabinets. With high financial restrictions and a fixed exchange rate, the interest rate is 1.65 percent lower under a socialist cabinet than under a conservative government. It is 2.61 percent lower under a flexible exchange rate. In fact, under conditions of full capital mobility, interest rates become higher under a socialist government, especially if the currency is fixed to a multilateral currency agreement (1.58 percent higher). Higher interest rates are the premium that socialist governments had to pay in the 1980s to demonstrate their credibility in fighting inflation. Given the results of Table 2 and Figure 7 and the timing in the liberalization of capital markets (displayed in Figure 6), we must conclude that the reduction in capital controls constituted the fundamental factor behind the waning of partisan differences in the conduct of monetary policy since the mid-1980s.

The choice of exchange-rate system has only a moderate effect on monetary policy, conditional on the extent of capital mobility. Under complete capital mobility interest rates do not vary much across different exchange-rate regimes: the variation is minimal under conservative governments (0.09 percent) and very moderate under a socialist cabinet (1.06 percent). The reasons, which fit the Mundell-Fleming framework, are straightforward. Under a fixed exchange regime the interest-rate

[36] For the simulation I have set the control variables to their mean level in the period under analysis: Interest Rate $_{t-1}$ = 2.65%, CPI $_{t-1}$ = 6.55%, U.S. Interest Rates = 2.77%.

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Restrictions to Capital Controls	Exchange-Rate Regime: fixed	Exchange-Rate Regime: flexible
high	0.98 (1.23)	−2.04 (1.29)
none	4.71 (0.69)	3.66 (0.78)

(a) Interest Rates under a Socialist Cabinet

Restrictions to Capital Controls	Exchange-Rate Regime: fixed	Exchange-Rate Regime: flexible
high	2.63 (0.56)	0.57 (0.87)
none	3.13 (0.24)	3.04 (0.31)

(b) Interest Rates under a Conservative Cabinet

Restrictions to Capital Controls	Exchange-Rate Regime: fixed	Exchange-Rate Regime: flexible
high	−1.65	−2.61
none	1.58	0.62

(c) Differences in Interest Rates between Cabinets (Socialist − Conservative)

FIGURE 7
FINANCIAL LIBERALIZATION, EXCHANGE-RATE REGIMES, AND THE CONDUCT OF MONETARY POLICY[a]

SOURCE: Estimations based on Table 2, model 1.

[a]Standard error of the prediction is in parentheses. Restrictions to capital controls: none=0; high=0.83 (highest average yearly value). Control variables set at their mean: Interest Rate $_{t-1}$=2.65%, CPI $_{t-1}$=6.55%, U.S. Interest Rates=2.77%.

policy is geared to sustain the value of the currency. Under a flexible arrangement expansion, although possible, occurs via currency depreciations. By contrast, if capital movements are restricted, monetary policy through interest rates becomes sensitive to the exchange-rate regime in place; interest rates are between 2 and 3 percentage points lower (depending on the government in place) under a floating currency regime.

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IV. Fiscal Policies

In this section I consider the effects of parties and corporatist institutions on fiscal policy. The analysis examines the evolution of fiscal deficits of the public sector, measured as the change in the debt-GDP ratio, $d(DEBT_{it})$.

To examine the effects of parties and corporatist institutions on fiscal deficits, I model the economic dimension underlying fiscal policy after the structural model of budget deficits used by Roubini and Sachs and Alesina, Roubini, and Cohen.[37] This structural model includes the following independent variables:

(1) The lagged deficit, $d(DEBT_{it-1})$; according to the previous discussion, the coefficient should be positive and smaller than 1, representing the process of slow adjustment and persistence of budget deficits.[38]

(2) The change in the unemployment rate, $d(UNEM_{it})$;[39] the coefficient should be positive since an increase of the unemployment rate raises public spending on unemployment benefits and social transfers above its average level.

(3) The real GDP growth rate, $d(Y_{it})$; the coefficient should be negative since a decline in the growth rate depresses tax revenues below their average level.

(4) The change in the interest rate minus the growth rate, multiplied by the lagged debt–GDP ratio, $d(r_t-n_t)*DEBT_{it-1}$; the coefficient should be positive since a rise in the interest rate (over the output rate) should increase the costs of servicing the debt.

This baseline economic model provides a reasonable specification of the factors that led to a sharp increase in public deficits both after the oil shock of 1973 and during the economic recession of the early 1990s. It includes the effects of any economic slowdown resulting in higher fiscal deficits due to a fall in revenues, as well as to an increase in several areas of public spending, such as unemployment benefits and active manpower policies, that are inherently countercyclical.[40] It also takes into account that the adverse effects of the economic shocks of 1973

[37] Nouriel Roubini and Jeffrey D. Sachs, "Political and Economic Determinants of Budget Deficits in the Industrial Democracies," *European Economic Review* 33 (May 1989); Alesina and Roubini with Cohen (fn. 11).

[38] Data are from Roubini and Sachs (fn. 37) and are completed with material from *OECD, Economic Outlook* (various years), appendix.

[39] From OECD, *Economic Outlook* (various years).

[40] Accordingly, as pointed out in Roubini and Sachs (fn. 37), the specification of the structural model is consistent with both Barro's "tax smoothing" model and the traditional Keynesian approach to using fiscal deficits to smooth the business cycle. In both theories fiscal deficits are countercyclical. Robert J. Barro, "U.S. Deficits since World War I," *Scandinavian Journal of Economics* 88, no. 1 (1986).

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and 1979 were aggravated by an increase in real interest rates imposed across the world to quell inflationary expectations. U.S. real interest rates, for example, fell from an average of 2.3 percent in the 1960s to −3.5 percent in 1974 and then rose in the early 1980s to over 8 percent in 1984. This rise increased the costs of debt servicing substantially after 1979.

Politics may be then expected to enter in the following way. If the partisan model presented is correct, we should, on the one hand, expect conservative governments to adhere to an equilibrium approach to fiscal policy, that is, one that seeks to minimize the impact of distortionary taxation by keeping tax rates stable and, in the wake of an economic shock that induces a fall in revenues, running a budget deficit. On the other hand, given the effects on unemployment and income distribution of economic recessions, social democratic governments should be expected to follow a Keynesian approach to fiscal policy and intensify the countercyclical nature of fiscal policy. Accordingly, I add the following stack of political variables:

(5) Socialist control of government (SC_t), that is, the share of cabinet posts controlled by socialist and communist parties every year.

(6) The organizational power of labor, LABORG.

(7) The interactive term SC_t * LABORG to measure the effect of social democratic regimes.

Therefore, the basic structure of the complete political and economic model is the following (i denotes country, t denotes time, and d(x) denotes change in the variable x):[41]

$$\begin{aligned} d(DEBT_{it}) = {} & \alpha + \alpha_1 d(DEBT_{it-1}) + \alpha_2 (UNEM_{it}) + \alpha_3 d(Y_{it}) \\ & + \alpha_4 d(r_t - n_t)^{*}DEBT_{it-1} + \alpha_5 SC_{it} + \alpha_6 (LABORG) \\ & + \alpha_7 (SOC^{*}LABORG_{it}) + \varepsilon_t \end{aligned}$$

Model 1 in Table 3 reproduces the model that includes only the economic variables. The results are in line with the results of Roubini and Sachs, although the coefficient for the impact of interest rates is smaller and the one for unemployment is larger.[42] The lagged deficit has a co-

[41] The sample employed is based on Roubini and Sachs (fn. 37), extended with new OECD data when available. The countries (and sample periods) included are Australia (1967–88), Austria (1972–93), Belgium (1962–90), Canada (1962–93), Denmark (1971–93), Finland (1977–93), France (1970–92), Germany (1962–93), Greece (1984–90), Ireland (1962–93), Italy (1966–93), Japan (1971–93), the Netherlands (1972–93), Norway (1972–91), Sweden (1972–93), Spain (1985–93), Switzerland (1972–93), the United Kingdom (1962–93), and the United States (1962–93).

[42] Roubini and Sachs (fn. 37). This difference may be related to the sample employed here, which is two times the size of the Roubini and Sachs sample and which corrects for the bias in the latter's study due to its exclusion of several OECD countries.

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TABLE 3

ECONOMIC AND PARTISAN DETERMINANTS OF FISCAL POLICY: A CROSS-NATIONAL TIME-SERIES ANALYSIS OF CHANGE IN PUBLIC DEBT AS A PERCENTAGE OF GROSS DOMESTIC PRODUCT (1962–93)

	Model 1	*Model 2*	*Model 3*	*Model 4*	*Model 5*
Constant	0.946***	0.851***	1.024***	0.881***	1.252***
	(0.299)	(0.301)	(0.307)	(0.279)	(0.356)
Change in public debt t-1	0.514***	0.520***	0.502***	0.585***	0.586***
	(0.050)	(0.050)	(0.040)	(0.045)	(0.039)
Change in unemployment	0.754***	0.751***	0.734***	0.802***	0.722***
	(0.166)	(0.165)	(0.166)	(0.133)	(0.144)
Annual rate of growth	−0.079***	−0.081***	−0.089***	−0.078***	−0.088***
	(0.033)	(0.033)	(0.034)	(0.030)	(0.027)
Change in cost of	−0.001	−0.000	−0.000	−0.000	0.000
servicing debt	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)
Socialist control of government$_t$[a]		0.325			
		(0.415)			
Socialist control of government,			−1.528**		−1.419
1962–72[a]			(0.723)		(1.147)
Organizational power of labor,					−3.831***
1962–72					(1.309)
Socialist control of government				−2.035	4.634**
* organizational power of labor, 1962–72				(1.350)	(2.462)
Socialist control of government, 1973–82[a]			1.012*		−0.279
			(0.595)		(1.148)
Organizational power of labor, 1973–82					−0.106
					(0.909)
Socialist control of government				1.221*	1.254
* organizational power of labor, 1973–82				(0.725)	(1.699)
Socialist control of government, 1983–93 [a]			−0.185		0.777
			(0.613)		(0.780)
Organizational power of labor, 1983–93					−1.618***
					(0.740)
Socialist control of government				−0.600	0.265
* organizational power of labor, 1983–93				(0.716)	(1.413)
Chi2	176.48	182.05	205.09	284.97	415.35
Pr > Chi2	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000
Number of observations	436	435	435	417	417

* $p \leq 0.10$; ** $p \leq 0.05$; *** $p \leq 0.01$.

[a]Index goes from 0 to 1; standard errors are in parentheses.

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efficient of 0.514, suggesting that about 51 percent of the lagged budget persists in the following year. A rise of 1 percentage point in the unemployment rate increases the budget deficit by 0.75 percent of GDP. The change in service debt costs does not enter significantly into the results. By contrast, high growth rates lower the public deficit substantially. Each percentage point of output growth reduces the budget deficit by 0.08 percent of GDP. Notice that this result, taken jointly with the impact of unemployment, partly explains the evolution of the public deficit before and after the stagflation crisis. Before 1973 the OECD average annual budget balance was slightly in surplus. After 1973 it experienced an average deficit of 2.8 percent of GDP. The jump in the level of unemployment from about 3 percent in the 1960s to over 7 percent in the 1980s led to an increase in the public deficit of more than 3 points of GDP on average. The fall of the average growth rate from over 5 percent before 1973 to about 2.5 percent after 1973 in turn translated into a permanent increase in the average public deficit of 0.2 percent of GDP.

Model 2 introduces the variable partisan control of office to test for the impact of different parties in power. The coefficient is not significant, although it suggests that socialist governments tend to run a looser fiscal policy. After controlling for the economic determinants of fiscal balances, public debt is higher under a socialist government by about 0.325 percent of GDP—a moderate effect given that the OECD budget balance has averaged −1.37 percent of GDP with a standard deviation of 1.74 points from 1960 to 1990. Model 3 considers how partisanship has differed over time. The coefficient for left-wing cabinets is significant in the first two periods. During the 1960s they engaged in tighter policies. After 1973 they promoted instead rather substantial expansionary policies: the public deficit was on average 1 percent of GDP higher than under conservative cabinets. After 1982 (that is, when world interest rates peaked and Mitterrand's France abandoned its expansionary package) all previous differences between parties on countercyclical fiscal policies disappeared.

Model 4 examines the impact of corporatist institutions. Although not significant, the coefficient for the 1960s indicates a strongly orthodox fiscal policy. This is in line with previous historical analyses underlining the importance that socialist governments attributed to public savings as a means of increasing the rate of domestic investment. Fiscal policy became expansionary in the 1970s and differences disappeared in the following decade.

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

FIGURE 8
POLITICAL PARTIES, CORPORATISM, AND THE EVOLUTION OF THE PUBLIC DEFICIT
(1962–94)

Model 5 examines the joint impact of socialist cabinets and labor market organization by historical periods. The results are simulated in Figure 8.[43]

Before 1973 all governments ran a balanced budget. All the coefficients for the period 1962–72 are statistically significant in a joint F-test. Social democratic cabinets—all of them governing in corporatist (or semicorporatist) economies—pursued a tighter fiscal policy than did conservative cabinets. The budget surplus was about 0.6 percent of GDP higher in those cases. This fits well with historical descriptions of the Swedish Rehn-Meidner model, which was partly directed to maintain a fiscal surplus in order to expand the level of public savings.[44] After 1973 all OECD countries experienced a general trend of fiscal deterioration. In the wake of the first oil shock social democratic cabinets, particularly in corporatist countries, engaged in more expansionary policies: the public deficit was on average 1.5 percent of GDP higher than under conservative cabinets. Still a cautionary note is needed here: since coefficients for that period are not statistically significant (even in

[43] For the simulation I have set all the variables except partisanship at their mean levels.
[44] Martin (fn. 17).

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a joint test), we cannot conclude that partisan strategies were divergent in the 1970s. In the early 1980s fiscal consolidation was common across OECD countries. In 1988 the average OECD public debt declined as a proportion of the GDP for the first time in a decade and a half. The coefficients for the period 1983–93 are statistically significant in a joint F-test. They indicate that both social democratic cabinets in corporatist countries and all nonsocialist governments tightened their fiscal policy, although the recession of the early 1990s again eroded the balance of the budget. By contrast, socialist cabinets in noncentralized labor markets ran much looser fiscal policies, falling behind in the containment of public debt—the public deficit was about 1.5 percent higher than in corporatist polities.[45]

Table 4 explores the impact of capital mobility and different exchange-rate regimes, alone and in interaction with political variables, on the evolution of fiscal policies. Model 1 explores the impact of partisanship. Figure 9 simulates how the combination of partisanship, capital controls, and exchange-rate regime affects the size of the public deficit.[46]

In the presence of financial restrictions there are substantial partisan differences in the conduct of fiscal policy. Socialist cabinets run public deficits between 1.2 and 2.8 percentage points larger than those run by conservative governments. Under conditions of full capital mobility, partisan governments tend to converge in their fiscal policy, but, in line with the Mundell-Fleming model, the latter's sign is conditional on the exchange-rate regime. A regime of capital mobility and fixed exchange rates, which allows fiscal policy to affect output, leads both types of partisan cabinets to relax their fiscal policy: in the simulation the public deficit stands at 1.39 percent of GDP under a socialist government and at 1.24 percent of GDP under a conservative cabinet. By contrast, the combination of complete capital mobility and flexible exchange rates, under which a loose fiscal policy results in the appreciation of the domestic currency, is met by both partisan governments (and especially the socialist cabinets) with an approximately balanced budget.

Model 2 in Table 4 tests as well the impact of centralized labor markets and of social democratic corporatism on fiscal policy under differ-

[45] I find no empirical evidence to support the claim that public deficits rise both with cabinet fragmentation (Roubini and Sachs [fn. 37]) and under minority governments (Per-Anders Edin and Henry Ohlsson, "Political Determinants of Budget Deficits: Coalition Effects versus Minority Effects," *European Economic Review* 35 [December 1991]). The results are not reported in this article.

[46] For the simulation I have set the control variables to their mean level in the period under analysis: Deficit $_{t-1}$ = 0.738, Change in Unemployment Rate = 0.246, Change in Cost of Servicing Debt (DBR) = −1.78

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TABLE 4

FISCAL POLICY, PARTISAN GOVERNMENTS, AND ECONOMIC INTEGRATION: A CROSS-NATIONAL TIME-SERIES ANALYSIS OF CHANGE IN PUBLIC DEBT AS PERCENTAGE OF GROSS DOMESTIC PRODUCT (1961–94)[a]

	Model 1	*Model 2*
Constant	0.644	0.284
	(0.364)	(0.436)
Change in public debt t-1	0.592***	0.688***
	(0.040)	(0.041)
Change in unemployment	0.649***	0.725***
	(0.147)	(0.122)
Decline in growth rate	0.276***	0.455***
	(0.059)	(0.084)
Change of servicing debt	−0.002	−0.001
	(0.001)	(0.002)
Presence of restrictions	−3.349***	−3.192
	(1.555)	(2.586)
Flexible exchange rate	−0.864**	−0.423
	(0.475)	(0.478)
Presence of restrictions *	6.011***	4.551**
Flexible exchange rate	(1.978)	(2.293)
Socialist control of government	0.145	0.282
	(0.715)	(0.708)
Socialist control of government *	−0.324***	−0.757***
Decline in growth rate	(0.112)	(0.290)
Socialist control of government *	3.158	1.690
Presence of restrictions	(2.367)	(2.954)
Socialist control of government *	−1.590**	−0.275
Flexible exchange rate	(0.909)	(0.976)
Organizational power of labor		−0.069
		(1.272)
Organizational power of labor *		−0.304
Decline in growth rate		(0.191)
Organizational power of labor *		3.090
Presence of restrictions		(5.630)
Organizational power of labor *		−0.591
Flexible exchange rate		(1.678)
Socialist control of government *Organizational power of labor		1.192
		(1.467)
Socialist control of government * Organizational power of labor*		1.012**
Decline in growth rate		(0.484)
Socialist control of government * Organizational power of labor*		−3.669
Presence of restrictions		(7.317)
Socialist control of government * Organizational power of labor*		−5.107
Flexible exchange rate		(3.718)
Chi2	303.39	467.88
Pr > ch2	0.0000	0.0000
Number of observations	433	411

* $p \leq 0.10$; ** $p \leq 0.05$; *** $p \leq 0.01$

[a]Standard errors are in parentheses.

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Restrictions to Capital Controls	Exchange-Rate Regime: fixed	Exchange-Rate Regime: flexible
high	−1.23 (1.16)	−3.37 (1.40)
none	−1.39 (0.58)	1.06 (0.89)

(a) Fiscal Balance as Percentage of GDP under a Socialist Cabinet (Positive Value: Surplus; Negative Value: Deficit)

Restrictions to Capital Controls	Exchange-Rate Regime: fixed	Exchange-Rate Regime: flexible
high	1.54 (1.10)	−2.59 (0.98)
none	−1.24 (0.36)	−0.38 (0.39)

(b) Fiscal Balance as Percentage of GDP under a Conservative Cabinet (Positive Value: Surplus; Negative Value: Deficit)

Restrictions to Capital Controls	Exchange-Rate Regime: fixed	Exchange-Rate Regime: flexible
high	−2.77	−1.18
none	−0.14	1.44

(c) Differences in Fiscal Balance between Cabinets (Socialist vs. Conservative)

FIGURE 9
FINANCIAL LIBERALIZATION, EXCHANGE-RATE REGIMES, AND THE CONDUCT OF FISCAL POLICY[a]

SOURCE: Estimations based on Table 5, column 1.

[a]Standard error of the prediction is in parentheses. Restrictions to capital controls: none=0; high=0.83 (highest average yearly value). Control variables set at their mean: Deficit $_{t-1}$ =0.738, Change in Unemployment Rate = 0.246, Change in Cost of Servicing Debt (DBR) = −1.78.

ent financial and exchange-rate regimes. Partially due to multicollinearity, all interactive terms with political or institutional variables in model 2 are not statistically significant. A joint F-test indicates that only those interactions with the variable indicating the type of ex-

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change-rate regime are significant from a statistical point of view. With the caveat that the coefficients are not statistically robust, the following results arise from model 2 in Table 4: first, the differences between socialist governments in noncentralized economies and conservative governments are extremely similar to the differences reported in Figure 9; second, socialist governments in centralized labor markets systematically run much tighter fiscal policies than either conservative or noncorporatist socialist cabinets under flexible-exchange-rate regimes (regardless of the level of capital controls) as well as under fixed-exchange-rate regimes combined with high capital controls.

V. Interpreting Results

This article has looked at the impact of partisan, institutional, and international variables on fiscal and monetary policies from 1960 to the mid-1990s for a sample of nineteen OECD countries. The results can be put in simple terms: partisan and institutional differences have mattered in the conduct of macroeconomic policies but are also heavily constrained by the international context in which they are embedded.

Until the early 1970s policy was conducted under conditions of rapid growth, such that policymakers, who had considerable autonomy, hardly had to exercise it. Cross-national variation in the conduct of policy instruments was low. Real interest rates were relatively similar and fiscal surpluses common.

The oil shocks of the 1970s and the general economic slowdown that followed triggered a period of wide experimentation. The collapse of the Bretton Woods system led to a period of floating exchange rates (or rather flexible currency agreements, such as the European snake). With substantial legal restrictions on capital controls still in place, policymakers enjoyed considerable policy autonomy. Partisan preferences and institutional arrangement led to notable differences across countries. Even when they initially played with countercyclical policies, conservative governments quickly corrected themselves and imposed tight policies to choke off inflation. By contrast, socialist cabinets embraced Keynesianism in a more systematic fashion. The response varied, however, in accordance with the domestic institutions in place. Relying on encompassing and well-organized labor organizations willing to sustain income pacts, social democratic governments subdued inflationary shocks without resorting to drastic changes in monetary policy. In exchange for the wage moderation shown by unions and to weather the recession of the 1970s, social democratic corporatist governments ran a

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much more expansionary fiscal policy than before. Socialist governments in decentralized economies relied on both sharp cuts in interest rates and very loose fiscal policies.

The experimental period of the 1970s ended with the rise of U.S. rates in 1980–82 and the political fiascoes of British Labor, German social democracy, and Mitterrand's first government. International conditions had changed in the meantime. As is apparent from Figure 6, capital controls were relatively widespread in many OECD nations in the 1960s.[47] From the early 1970s onward OECD countries embarked on a gradual process of financial deregulation that peaked in the early 1990s, encouraged by the project of European monetary integration.

Although the purpose of this article is not to develop an exhaustive explanation of the causes of the process of financial liberalization, the erosion of capital controls in the advanced world can be seen as the sequential combination of three factors. The growth of capital markets and technological changes, which generated important opportunity costs for those maintaining a system of capital controls, and the early adoption of liberal policies by several key countries, which heightened the costs of financial closure to the remaining states, explain the generalized movement toward financial deregulation in the OECD world. In turn, domestic conditions, mainly partisanship, explain why the pace at which capital controls were abandoned differed across countries.

The process of financial liberalization had its origin in the rapid growth of capital flows that started in the 1960s. Both the expansion of the pool of international capital and parallel technological innovations in financial markets that reduced transaction costs imposed (or were perceived to impose) considerable opportunity costs on those countries that persisted in maintaining capital controls.[48] The growth of capital flows did not mechanically result in the deregulation of financial markets across the OECD area, however. Rather, it combined with a process of competitive liberalization that led in due time to complete capital mobility. In a process resembling a tipping model, the relaxation of controls at first in a small set of countries triggered accelerating pressures to deregulate elsewhere over time. In the early 1970s the United States moved close to abolishing its remaining regulatory mechanisms.

[47] The presence of capital controls was initially negatively correlated to the independence of the central bank. This result confirms the findings of Alberto Alesina, Vittorio Grilli, and Gian-Maria Milesi-Ferretti, "The Political Economy of Capital Controls," in Leonardo Leiderman and Assaf Razin, eds., *Capital Mobility: The Impact on Consumption, Investment and Growth* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1994). The degree of financial restrictions and of central bank independence in 1970 shows a Pearson's coefficient of −0.53. For 1993 this coefficient falls to −0.05.

[48] Goodman and Pauly (fn. 34); Eichengreen (fn. 34).

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Several small countries in Europe, such as Austria, Denmark, Finland, Ireland, and the Netherlands, and also Japan approved substantial reductions in their systems of capital controls throughout the 1970s. Above all, in one dramatic move in 1979 the United Kingdom abolished its full set of financial restrictions.[49] As the number of countries that had embraced a liberal regime in the financial arena grew, the opportunity costs of maintaining a system of capital controls escalated for those that had not yet deregulated. There was a generalized expectation that those countries that had chosen to exclude themselves from the (expanding) zone of full capital mobility would find themselves at an increasing disadvantage in the economic arena in two ways. First, they would fail to attract foreign investment. Second, they would be perceived as unreliable in their fight against inflation. The European Single Market project, built mainly around the idea of free factor mobility, would intensify the race toward financial deregulation. To avoid forfeiting the advantages of capital mobility and a single market, both the Southern European and Scandinavian countries embraced the liberalization strategy in the late 1980s and early 1990s—including even Norway, a country that was not a member of the European Union.[50]

Fostered by technological changes and a shift in the expectations of policymakers, the process of financial liberalization would eventually take place in all OECD nations, though at a different pace from country to country. Nonsocialist cabinets quickly liberalized capital markets. By

[49] Simmons (fn. 7).

[50] This interpretation borrows heavily from Gruber's concept of "go-it-alone power" to explain the formation of international institutions. In Gruber's account international institutions need not be the result of straightforward Pareto-improving cooperative agreements among equal partners. Instead, they may emerge as a set of core countries that establish agreements or embark on strategies that, modifying the status quo, force the remaining countries to join the same institution or engage in the same pattern of behavior to minimize the losses that may occur from not doing so. The process of capital deregulation (and, in particular, its institutionalization in continental Europe through the European Union project) fits this explanation particularly well. See Lloyd Gruber, "Rationalist Approaches to International Cooperation: A Call for Theoretical Reorientation," Working Paper Series 14 (Irving B. Harris Graduate School of Public Policy Studies, August 1999); idem, "Interstate Cooperation and the Hidden Face of Power: The Case of European Money," Working Paper Series 16 (Irving B. Harris Graduate School of Public Policy Studies, September 1999). Notice then that this account differs equally from two other interpretations. First, it differs from those that directly link the process of deregulation to changes in international financial markets. See Richard B. McKenzie and Dwight R. Lee, *Quicksilver Capital: How the Rapid Movement of Wealth Has Changed the World* (New York: Free Press, 1991); Richard O'Brien, *Global Financial Integration: The End of Geography* (London: Pinter, 1992); and Goodman and Pauly (fn. 34). Second, it is also distinct from those that attribute the decision to liberalize to purely domestic conditions, such as the hegemony of center-to-right governments in Ton Notermans, "The Abdication from National Policy Autonomy: Why the Macroeconomic Policy Regime Has Become So Unfavorable to Labor," *Politics and Society* 21 (June 1993); or such as the internal balance of power among sectoral interests in Jeffry A. Frieden, "Invested Interested: The Politics of National Economic Policies in a World of Global Finance," *International Organization* 45 (Autumn 1991).

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contrast, socialist governments, anticipating the constraining effects of dismantling capital controls on their own policy choices, retarded the process of financial deregulation. France and Spain abolished capital controls only in the late 1980s. Greece did it in the 1990s.[51] The correlation coefficient between the average level of capital controls in 1980–90 and socialist control of government in that decade is 0.41.

With complete capital mobility, an autonomous monetary policy became extremely hard to pursue. Socialist governments of all stripes bet on high interest rates. The importance of financial markets becomes clearer when we consider the socialist governments' much weaker commitment to budgetary discipline. It is true that social democratic governments strove to balance the budget, but the pace of fiscal consolidation (less affected by capital mobility) and the overall rate of success varied substantially. Whereas social democratic countries made quick progress in balancing the budget, fiscal policy remained loose in decentralized economies. The Swedish net public debt was 4.2 percent of GDP in 1982, when the SAP came into power, and −5.2 percent of GDP, when it was defeated at the polls in 1991. By contrast, the Spanish net public debt grew under the PSOE government from 13 percent of GDP in 1982 to 33.4 percent in 1991.[52]

The role of the international environment in the shift of macroeconomic policies in the 1980s contrasts with the minor weight of two other explanatory variables that have been frequently invoked to account for the collapse of Keynesianism in the early and mid-1980s: the role of ideas and the change in the social basis of the socialist electorate.[53] A purely ideational explanation, such as the diffusion of mon-

[51] For a discussion of how several European socialist governments perceived (and justified) the deregulation of financial markets as the only possible response to a change in the external environment brought about by the policies of other (key) countries, see Carles Boix, *Political Parties, Growth and Equality: Conservative and Social Democratic Economic Strategies in the World Economy* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1999).

[52] This combination of loose fiscal policies and tight monetary policies was not coincidental. It was related to the structure of electoral incentives confronted by socialist parties in rather different political and institutional environments. Socialist governments in noncorporatist countries could not count on organized labor movements to achieve wage moderation and also carry over broad electoral coalitions. Without a labor movement holding blue-collar workers together and delivering their votes to the Socialist Party, social democratic governments could hardly attract simultaneously both pro-high-spending left-wing voters and moderate middle-class voters concerned with taxes. A natural (and in the short term politically not costly) way to reconcile their competing claims involved running a higher budget deficit. In countries where unions are strong and parties are well-organized political machines, those political dilemmas were less pressing. For a historical account of the Spanish case, see Boix (fn. 51), 105–55.

[53] For an analysis of the impact of ideas, see Peter A. Hall, "Policy Paradigms, Social Learning, and the State: The Case of Economic Policymaking in Britain," *Comparative Politics* 25 (April 1993).

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etarism among elites, discounts the standard calculations politicians make about the electoral benefits of alternative economic strategies. Politicians do not abandon their ideal policies unless they anticipate (rightly or not) the negative consequences of sticking to their partisan promises. The adoption of monetarist policies by socialist cabinets followed the realization that the strategy of Keynesian demand management (and closed capital markets) was heavily punished by financial markets and, as a result, by the electorate. Similarly, it is hard to correlate the demise of Keynesian expansions with any significant change in the electoral socialist coalition. First, whereas the reduction of the working-class electorate had been a gradual process, policy shifted rather quickly (tracking changes in the extent of financial regulation). Second, it was as purely working-class-based parties that socialist cabinets actually pursued neutral or even procyclical policies in the 1960s. Finally, the growing support for socialist parties among public employees—and thus among a nontradable economic sector less sensitive to the trade effects of higher inflation—should have led the left to a stronger commitment to Keynesianism over time, yet it did not.[54]

Two concluding remarks are worth making in the light of the results of the article. First, the results belie the extended notion that social democratic corporatism is characterized by a particular pattern of macroeconomic policy. For several scholars the 1970s were the heyday of social democratic corporatism, that is, of expansionary macroeconomic management.[55] Accordingly, the 1980s have been its tomb. In turn, for other researchers, social democracy amounts to a policy mix of income pacts plus fiscal conservatism of the kind that was found in the 1960s.[56] Both policy regimes define social democratic corporatism equally well. In the 1960s democratic corporatism developed a budgetary policy in consonance with the Swedish Rehn-Meidner model: fiscal policy was tied to long-term structural policies (to build capital) that had little to do with smoothing the business cycle. In the 1970s it resorted to budget deficits in a way that minimized the employment costs of adjusting to the new conditions of the 1980s. To put it differently, more than being the equivalent of a particular policy pattern, such as Keynesianism, social democratic corporatism may be better de-

[54] Robert J. Franzese,"Monetary Policy and Wage/Price Bargaining: Macro-Institutional Interactions in the Traded, Public, and Sheltered Sectors," in Peter Hall and David Soskice, eds., *Varieties of Capitalism: The Institutional Foundations of Comparative Advantage* (forthcoming).

[55] Scharpf (fn. 5, 1987 and 1991).

[56] Martin (fn. 17)

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scribed as an institutional regime (encompassing labor movements and a socialist government) capable of adjusting reasonably well to fluctuations in the economic cycle. For this reason, the results of this article actually serve as a cautionary note to the common interpretation of the effects of corporatism. It is standard to claim that social democratic corporatist countries avoided the high rates of unemployment that noncorporatist economies were forced to endure in order to overcome the inflationary shocks of the mid- and late 1970s because they could count on a pattern of coordination between workers and the state. But wage moderation and macroeconomic adjustment are short-term remedies that require a corresponding loss in real income that cannot be imposed permanently. The policies that have characterized corporatist social democratic countries (and differentiated them from noncorporatist conservative cases) and that have led to their low levels of unemployment lie beyond the area of macroeconomic policy-making (or, at most, complement it): rather, they consist in a long-term commitment to human capital formation and fixed investment.[57]

Finally, the results of this article on the impact of unrestricted capital flows on monetary policy shed light as well on the ultimate causes of the process of European integration. Conforming to the Mundell-Fleming framework, the empirical results show that, in the presence of capital controls, countries could pursue an autonomous monetary policy and maintain relatively stable exchange rates until the early 1980s. Yet as capital mobility increased (and the opportunity costs of hindering it went up), monetary authorities could engage in expansionary policies only if they accepted corresponding currency depreciations. The benefits of an accommodating monetary policy probably outmatch the costs of having a volatile exchange rate for large economies with low levels of trade openness, such as one finds in the United States. But divergent monetary policies and differential levels of currency volatility simply become too costly for highly integrated trading partners. In the highly interwoven economies of Europe, the rapid erosion of one-country expansions via higher import prices and domestic wage pressures disuaded politicians from adopting the Keynesian recipes of the 1970s. In the context of deregulated international markets, the introduction of a multilateral currency area or even a monetary union became a rational response in optimal or quasi-optimal currency areas. Since interest-rate differentials were washed out by the threat of capi-

[57] At this point, it is not difficult to see, however, that a policy of public investment is not restricted to the domain of corporatism. It is an economic strategy that any social democratic government will pursue regardless of how coordinated the domestic labor market is. See Boix (fn. 51).

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tal flows, exchange-rate stability became a strictly Pareto-improving decision. In other words, the creation of the euro was the natural last step to be taken by European countries on the historical path toward powerful international financial markets, the decline of capital controls, and the demise of one-country Keynesian policies.

APPENDIX: DATA ON LABOR MARKETS AND CENTRAL BANK INDEPENDENCE

	Organizational Power of Labor[a]			*Central Bank Independence*[b]		
	1960s	*1970s*	*1980s*	*1960s*	*1970s*	*1980s*
Australia	0.27	0.27	0.45	0.305	0.305	0.305
Austria	0.86	0.86	0.91	0.675	0.581	0.581
Belgium	0.63	0.63	0.77	0.176	0.189	0.189
Canada	0.10	0.10	0.12	0.457	0.457	0.457
Denmark	0.62	0.62	0.66	0.471	0.471	0.471
Finland	0.63	0.63	1.00	0.269	0.269	0.269
France	0.05	0.05	0.03	0.398	0.279	0.279
Germany	0.30	0.30	0.35	0.657	0.657	0.657
Greece	0.17	0.17	0.17	0.499	0.510	0.510
Ireland	0.18	0.18	0.30	0.386	0.386	0.386
Italy	0.16	0.16	0.20	0.218	0.218	0.218
Japan	0.03	0.03	0.14	0.157	0.157	0.157
Netherlands	0.32	0.32	0.34	0.423	0.423	0.423
New Zealand	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	0.269	0.269	0.269
Norway	0.93	0.93	0.81	0.228	0.137	0.137
Portugal	0.22	0.19	0.19	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.
Spain	0.03	0.03	0.03	0.101	0.101	0.207
Sweden	1.00	1.00	0.92	0.273	0.273	0.273
Switzerland	0.23	0.23	0.27	0.553	0.553	0.680
U.K.	0.30	0.30	0.15	0.476	0.309	0.309
U.S.	0.08	0.08	0.06	0.502	0.502	0.502

[a] Average of the average proportion of the unionized labor force and the sum of the measures of organizational unity and labor confederation power in collective bargaining. For the period before 1980, data are based on Cameron (fn. 26). For the period after 1980 data are based on Golden and Wallerstein (fn. 27); Lange, Wallerstein, and Golden (fn. 27); OECD (fn. 27); and Traxler (fn. 27). Standardized index from 0 to 1.

[b] Cukierman's Legal Variables Unweighted Index; Cukierman (fn. 25), chaps. 19–21.

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THE EVOLVING ARMS CONTROL AGENDA
Implications of the Role of NGOs in Banning Antipersonnel Landmines

By KENNETH R. RUTHERFORD

No other issue in recent times has mobilized such a broad and diverse coalition of countries, governments and nongovernmental organizations (NGOs). Much of this momentum has been the result of the tremendous efforts made by NGOs to advance the cause to ban AP mines. Their commitment and dedication have contributed to the emergence of a truly global partnership.

—*Lloyd Axworthy, Minister of Foreign Affairs, Canada*
"AP Mine Ban: Progress Report," February 1997

I. INTRODUCTION

THE twentieth century ended with the entry into force of the Ottawa Treaty to ban antipersonnel landmines.[1] The signing of the treaty was an incredible accomplishment marking, as noted at the time by Canadian Prime Minister Jean Chretien, the "first time, the majority of the nations of the world will agree to ban a weapon which has been in military use by almost every country in the world."[2] However, it also did not have the support of many major powers, which is contrary to most multilateral disarmament agreements.[3] Even as late as 1994, there was a consensus among all states that landmines were legal. In March 1995, Belgium became the first state to pass a domestic law pro-

[1] Ottawa Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Anti-Personnel Mines and on Their Destruction, 1997. Unless noted, all references to landmines refer to antipersonnel landmines and not other forms of landmines, such as antitank mines, antivehicle mines, and sea mines.

[2] Statement by Canadian Prime Minister Chretien at the signing conference for the Ottawa Convention, December 2, 1997.

[3] For further information on the unique features of the Ottawa Convention, see Ken Rutherford, "The Hague and Ottawa Conventions: A Model for Future Weapon Ban Regimes?" *Nonproliferation Review* 6 (Spring–Summer 1999).

World Politics 53 (October 2000), 74–114

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viding for a comprehensive landmine ban.[4] Less than thirty-two months later, on December 2, 1997, Belgium was joined by 122 states in signing the comprehensive ban convention. Currently 138 states have signed the convention, and 101 have ratified it. The convention entered into force on March 1, 1999, becoming the quickest major international agreement ever to enter into force in history.[5] Academics, diplomats, and NGO representatives called the Ottawa Treaty's genesis and negotiations an innovative model for the future development of international law.[6] Even the Nobel committee recognized this unique coalition by awarding the International Campaign to Ban Landmines (ICBL) and its coordinator, Jody Williams, the 1997 Nobel Peace Prize, in part for helping create a fresh form of diplomacy.[7]

Plotting the process through which NGOs set the international political agenda to bring certain issues to the fore has important substantive and theoretical implications. Substantively, this article shows how NGOs can play important roles in getting landmine and various other issue areas, such as the environment and human rights, onto the international political agenda.[8] Furthermore, landmines are a key policy problem, as they cause many injuries and deaths in regional conflicts, hinder postconflict reconstruction, seriously undermine infrastructure, and deny land for civilian use thereby leading to the overuse of existing land.[9]

The article has broader significance for the study of comparative foreign policy in that it may help predict the success or failure of current NGO efforts to address other security issues, such as banning child soldiers, ratifying the international criminal court, and restricting the use of small arms and light weapons. If NGOs indeed play a significant role in getting the international community to address the landmine issue,

[4] International Campaign to Ban Landmines, "Report on Activities: Review Conference on the Convention on Conventional Weapons," Vienna, Austria (September 25–October 13, 1995), 6.

[5] International Campaign to Ban Landmines, http://www.icbl.org, April 30, 2000.

[6] Richard Price, "Reversing the Gun Sights: Transnational Civil Society Targets Land Mines," *International Organization* 52 (Summer 1998); and Maxwell A. Cameron, Robert J. Lawson, and Brian W. Tomlin, "To Walk without Fear," and Jody Williams and Stephen D. Goose, "The International Campaign to Ban Landmines," in Cameron, Lawson, and Tomlin, eds., *To Walk without Fear: The Global Movement to Ban Landmines* (Toronto: Oxford University Press, 1998).

[7] The campaign consists of over fourteen hundred arms-control, development, environmental, humanitarian, human rights, medical, and religious NGOs representing some ninety countries. Liz Bernstein, coordinator, ICBL, letter to *Landmine Monitor 2000* researchers, October 1999.

[8] Paul J. Nelson, "Deliberation, Leverage or Coercion? The World Bank, NGOs, and Global Environmental Politics," *Journal of Peace Research* 34, no. 4 (1997); William Korey, *NGOs and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights: A Curious Grapevine* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1998); Paul Wapner, "Politics beyond the State: Environmental Activism and World Civic Politics," *World Politics* 47 (April 1995).

[9] U.S. Department of State, Bureau of Political-Military Affairs, Office of Humanitarian Demining Programs, *1998 Hidden Killers: The Global Landmine Crisis*, September 1998, pp. 8–9, 11.

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an examination of the conditions under which NGOs controlled and initiated the landmine issue on the international political agenda becomes more relevant. By comparison, several scholars, including Margaret E. Keck and Kathryn Sikkink, address agenda setting through norm diffusion facilitated by NGOs. They show how networks of NGOs persuaded governments to address the value of new norms, such as ensuring human rights in Latin America, protecting the environment, and eliminating violence against women.[10] Reflecting this norm creation process, Richard Price's excellent study of the NGO role in the campaign to ban landmines shows how NGOs were able to delegitimize landmine use by relocating authority away from states.[11] In these analyses, socialization occurs through intensive norm promotion.[12]

In this article, I focus specifically on the role of NGOs in setting the agenda for the landmine-banning issue on the international political agenda. It makes two interrelated arguments. First, NGOs initiated the landmine ban by placing the issue on the international political agenda resulting in intense media and public attention. The term 'agenda' is defined in this essay as "objects accorded saliency in the media content or in people's consciousness."[13] Second, NGOs helped articulate and codify the landmines issue into international law by changing how governments perceived the legality of landmines and the effects of landmine use. Addressing both these arguments helps to explain better why the Ottawa Treaty was initiated by NGOs, who in turn helped change state behavior toward landmines. One of the implications is that under certain conditions NGOs contribute to setting the international political agenda, especially legal prohibitions on weapons that cause humanitarian harm, have a dubious military utility, and in turn effect state behavioral changes. In comparison most other major arms control and disarmament treaties, such as the Biological Weapons Convention (BWC), Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC), and Nuclear Weapons Treaty (NPT), are typically negotiated at the behest of major powers, and agenda-setting processes, including the negotiations, do not incorporate NGOs.[14]

[10] Margaret E. Keck and Kathryn Sikkink, *Activists beyond Borders: Advocacy in International Politics* (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1998).

[11] Price (fn. 6).

[12] Kathryn Sikkink, "Transnational Politics, International Relations Theory, and Human Rights," *Political Science and Politics* 31 (September 1998), 519.

[13] Toshio Takeshita, "Exploring the Media's Roles in Defining Reality: From Issue–Agenda Setting to Attribute–Agenda Setting," in Maxwell McCombs, Donald L. Shaw, and David Weaver, eds., *Communication and Democracy: Exploring the Intellectual Frontiers in Agenda-Setting Theory* (London: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, 1997), 20.

[14] Rutherford (fn. 3), 38–39, 45.

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These arguments address the agency question concerning the role of NGOs in international politics by showing how NGOs instigated governments to address the landmine issue in a particular way, which eventually culminated in international law. In explaining this proposition, the article demonstrates how NGOs affected international legal rules on landmine use by changing the debate from a political to a humanitarian issue, drawing media and public attention to the issue, and ultimately educating states about the limited military utility and dramatic negative humanitarian effects of landmines. This article's tentative conclusion suggests that the landmine case illustrates how NGOs can introduce a norm and translate it into a powerful instrument with lasting influence by initiating an issue and then controlling it on the international political agenda.

While this article examines the NGO role in the agenda-setting process, it does not seek to evaluate the contents or effectiveness of the Ottawa Treaty.[15] Nevertheless, it does briefly examine alternative explanations to the article's main arguments. Part III examines alternative explanations for landmines agenda setting, and Part IV examines alternative theoretical explanations for why the ban was achieved.

Theoretically, the article explicitly demonstrates and explains the process of creating and initiating norms and how they are placed and addressed on the international political agenda. Understanding agenda-setting dynamics is central to understanding the achievement of the landmine ban specifically and contemporary international politics more generally. In the landmine agenda-setting process, noticeable attention is transferred in varying degrees to governments, which, in turn, helps to influence policy. Recent agenda-setting studies show that media coverage can shape how the public thinks about American domestic politics.[16] This article utilizes recent agenda-setting research to explain how and why the landmine issue arrived on the international agenda and attracted state attention.[17] Specifically, it shows that NGO advocacy and policy work helped generate international attention by frequently and prominently featuring landmine victims. It also highlights how working with high profile individuals, NGOs were able to change state conception of landmine use in a very short time.

[15] For an evaluation of the potential effectiveness of the Ottawa Treaty, see Richard Price, "Compliance with International Norms and the Mines Taboo," in Cameron, Lawson, and Tomlin, eds. (fn. 6).

[16] Joseph N. Cappella and Kathleen Hall Jamieson, *Spiral of Cynicism: The Press and the Public Good* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1997); Matthew Robert Kerbel, *Remote and Controlled: Media Politics in a Cynical Age* (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1995); McCombs, Shaw, and Weaver (fn. 13).

[17] McCombs, Shaw, and Weaver (fn. 13).

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The article is divided into two sections. The first focuses on level-one agenda setting, labeled "cognitive agenda setting," because NGOs brought the landmine issue to international attention. It investigates how NGOs placed the landmine issue on the governmental and public agenda. The second section addresses level-two agenda setting, labeled "norm agenda setting," because of the NGO role in changing state conception of landmines. It discusses the influence of the particular elements of the landmine issue on the governmental and public agenda. For example, a first-level question might address a statement by governments and the public that landmines are an important issue facing the nation, while a second-level question might look at how governments and the public describe ways of addressing the problem.

Three other important components of agenda setting are also addressed in both sections: framing, schema, and priming. Framing is the selection of elements within a particular issue. These elements are used "to promote a particular problem definition, causal interpretation, moral evaluation, and/or treatment recommendation for the item described."[18] The thesis is that people will think about an issue in a particular way depending on how that issue is presented. This transference of the salience of attributes is the core of second-level agenda setting, while at the same time it holds some implications for level-one agenda setting. Schema is a concept closely linked to framing, but it focuses more on how people organize their thinking.[19] It reduces complicated information into a manageable number of frames in order to handle and process it.[20] Priming is "the process by which the schemas are activated."[21] It assumes that frequency, prominence, or features of a stimulus activates previously learned cognitive structures and influences interpretations of an ambiguous stimulus. Its key factors are frequency and intensity of media exposure.

The article also examines neorealist explanations for the ban's achievement, especially focusing on the strategic interests of signatories versus nonsigners and the behavior of landmine-producing states.[22]

[18] R. Entman, *Democracy without Citizens: Media and the Decay of American Politics* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1989), quoted in Salma Ghanem, "Filling in the Tapestry: The Second Level of Agenda Setting," in McCombs, Shaw, and Weaver (fn. 13), 6.

[19] Ibid., 8.

[20] D. Graber, *Mass Media in American Politics*, 4th ed. (Washington, D.C.: Congressional Quarterly Press), quoted in Ghanem (fn. 18), 8.

[21] J. McLeond, S. Sun, H. Chi, and Z. Pan, "Metaphor and the Media: What Shapes Public Understanding of the 'War' against Drugs" (Paper presented at the Association for Education in Journalism and Mass Communication, Minneapolis, Minn., August 1990), quoted in Ghanem (fn. 18), 9.

[22] This article does not address neoliberalism because the neoliberalists have very little to say about security. Specifically, neoliberal scholars argue that international regimes change state behavior in low

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While neorealism can explain why states either did or did not sign the convention, they cannot explain the placement of the landmine-ban issue on the international agenda. According to this approach, states would not have incorporated NGO actions or a ban on a weapon-retaining military utility into its behavioral calculations. This article takes a constructivist approach because it contends that norms are socially constructed and therefore allow for an NGO role in educating and pressuring other international actors and in establishing the landmine-ban issue on the international political agenda. Furthermore, unlike neorealism, this approach allows nonmaterial relationships, such as discourse about agenda setting, to develop among a variety of international actors, including individuals and NGOs. Thus, this article's explanation for the ban is that it resulted from the NGO agenda-setting role in establishing the landmine-ban issue on the international political agenda and in educating and pressuring states to address the issue in a particular way.

II. Agenda Setting

A thorough evaluation of the NGO role in creating and establishing the Ottawa Convention is critical to the study of international politics because that role is at the heart of constructivist arguments. A clear understanding of the NGO role in initiating the landmine-ban norm through an agenda-setting framework sheds light on the construction of the norm itself (see Table 1).

Level One: Cognitive Agenda Setting

Level-one agenda setting addresses the NGO role in getting governments and the public to think about landmines as an important issue. This level deals with transferring landmines from the NGO to the international political agenda and specifically with getting governments to think about landmine use as a major international humanitarian problem. Moreover, one of the article's findings is that NGOs helped expedite the enforcement of the convention by condensing negotiations from the usual decades to about fourteen months. The broader argument is that the greater the governmental and public attention created by the NGOs toward a particular issue, the quicker an issue gets on the international political agenda and, most importantly, addressed by states.

political issues, such as economics and the environment. Robert O. Keohane, *After Hegemony: Cooperation and Discord in the World Political Economy* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1984), 49–109; Stephen D. Krasner, "Sovereignty, Regimes, and Human Rights," in Volker Rittberger, ed., *Regime Theory and International Relations* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1993).

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TABLE 1
NGO AGENDA SETTING AND THE LANDMINE ISSUE

Agenda-Setting Components	*Level One: Cognitive Agenda Setting*	*Level Two: Norm Agenda Setting*
Framing	landmines as a new issue: getting people to think about landmines as a humanitarian issue	horrible effects and disproportionate consequences
Schema	outrageous landmine statistics	leadership games to control the landmine issue
Priming	landmine victim stories	incoherent arguments among anti-ban states

FRAMING: NEW ISSUE

As a new issue, landmines attracted tremendous international attention. According to one government diplomat central to the treaty negotiations, the international arms control agenda was bare and therefore arms control negotiators were undistracted by the NGO call for a landmine ban.[23] Even critics of the landmine-ban movement credited NGOs with bringing the landmine issue to international attention. One critic writes that "despite its considerable history, little has been recorded about the use of these weapons [landmines]," until they "attracted the attention of the media and humanitarian groups."[24]

Compared with other controversial weapons, such as biological and chemical weapons, poison gas, and nuclear weapons, the legality of landmine use remained an obscure issue for governmental policymakers until the early 1990s. For example, according to Lieutenant Colonel Burris M. Carnahan, there was only one U.S. military manual regarding the use of landmines and international humanitarian law by the early 1980s.[25] Moreover, most of the literature on the legality of landmines was published after the creation of the ICBL in 1992.

Initial NGO interest in the landmine issue began in the 1970s when the International Committee for the Red Cross (ICRC) determined that some weapons should be prohibited both "by customary and treaty-

[23] Statement made by Mark Gwozdecky, coordinator of the Mine Action Team in the Canadian Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade, at the Ottawa Process Forum, Ottawa, Canada, on December 5, 1997. Author's notes.

[24] Mike Croll, *The History of Landmines* (Barnsley, U.K.: Leo Cooper, 1998), x–xi.

[25] U.S. Department of the Air Force, *The Conduct of Armed Conflict and Air Operations*, pamphlet no. 110-31, 1976, quoted in Lieutenant Colonel Burris M. Carnahan, "The Law of Land Mine Warfare: Protocol II to the United Nations Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons," *Military Law Review* 105 (Summer 1984), 73.

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based international humanitarian law because landmines cause superfluous injury and unnecessary suffering (damaging effects disproportionate to the military purpose) and that they are of an indiscriminate nature (no distinction between civilians and combatants)."[26] These legal discussions will be reviewed at greater length in the next section, but here it suffices to say that the ICRC discussions in the 1970s eventually resulted in minimal international legal restrictions being placed on landmine use through the Landmines Protocol of the 1980 Convention on Conventional Weapons (CCW). This particular protocol was strengthened as the Amended Protocol II adopted at the final CCW Review Conference in Geneva on May 6, 1996, when it became apparent that NGOs had the public will to push through a ban.[27] Subsequent to the CCW, landmine use was not a topic of concern for the media, NGOs, or policymakers. There are several proposed reasons why the landmine issue finally attracted international attention in the last decade of the twentieth century; these reasons are discussed below. While reasons are legitimate, this paper argues that the NGO role in getting states to address the landmine problem provides a more comprehensive reason why landmines emerged on the international political agenda.

Introduction to landmines. State militaries traditionally used landmines for defensive purposes, primarily to protect strategic locations or channel enemy forces into specific fire zone areas. Restricted to these particular military uses, landmine casualties were confined primarily to military personnel during combat engagement or related operations. Beginning with the Vietnam War, however, landmines have become more widely used by poorly trained militaries and more offensive in military practice. Many of today's wars are now "long-running, internal, and low intensity, often involving cash starved militaries for whom low-technology, low-cost landmines are a weapon of choice. . . . Consequently, in wars today, mines are frequently placed in areas of high civilian concentration rather than being confined to discrete battlefields of limited size."[28] The result has been an increasing level of destructiveness to civilian communities. For example, the top three states with

[26] Ariane Sand-Trigo, ICRC Delegation to the UN, letter to the author, March 3, 1997.

[27] The Landmines Protocol is attached to the CCW as Protocol II and is officially known as the Protocol on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Mines, Booby Traps and Other Devices. The two other Protocols were Non-detectable Fragments (Protocol I) and Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Incendiary Weapons (Protocol III).The CCW Review held in Vienna in September 1996 adopted Protocol IV, which called for restrictions on the use of laser weapons, while the landmines protocol was amended at the third and final CCW review held in Geneva. The four protocols are regulated by the provisions of the Weapons Convention.

[28] Arms Project of Human Rights Watch and Physicians for Human Rights, *Landmines: A Deadly Legacy* (New York: Human Rights Watch and Physicians for Human Rights, 1993), 9.

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landmine-disabled populations are recently emerging from decades of internal conflict that entailed the use of mines by all parties.[29] According to the U.S. State Department, 59 to 69 million landmines are currently deployed, making them "one of the most toxic and widespread pollution[s] facing mankind."[30] The State Department finds further that landmines exacerbate regional conflicts, hinder postconflict reconstruction, seriously undermine infrastructure, and deny land-to-civilian use, thereby leading to overuse of existing land.[31] Additionally each year landmines kill more than twenty-four thousand people, most of whom are civilian.[32]

Landmine use among most state professional forces has declined recently.[33] There are exceptions, however, the most notable being the use of landmines by Russia in Chechnya, Dagestan, and Georgia, and by Eritrea in its conflict with Ethiopia.[34] During the 1990s, there were also a few cases of landmines being deployed by professional troops in which civilians were purposely targeted. In Bosnia during 1993–94, Bosnian Croatian and Serbian forces used mines to discourage the return of refugees by other ethnic groups, and Serbian forces used them in Kosovo in 1999 to harm returning Kosovarian refugees. Nevertheless, many nonstate military forces still rely upon landmines to achieve their objectives. Recent and current internal wars in Afghanistan, Bosnia, Cambodia, Rwanda, Somalia, and Uganda show further that landmines are not being used to conquer the opposing force. Rather the goal is economic and social destabilization or the prevention of the return of refugees. For example, in Afghanistan "guerrilla forces used

[29] The U.S. State Department has estimated that Afghanistan, Angola, and Cambodia host the largest numbers of landmines in the world. U.S. Department of State, *1994 Hidden Killers: The Global Landmine Crisis*, pub. no. 10225, December 1994, 1.

[30] *1998 Hidden Killers* (fn. 9) 9. In *1994 Hidden Killers* the U.S. Department of State estimated that there were 80 to 110 landmines in sixty-four countries; *1994 Hidden Killers* (fn. 29), v. U.S. Department of State, *1993 Hidden Killers: The Global Problem with Uncleared Landmines*, July 1993, 2.

[31] *1998 Hidden Killers* (fn. 9), 8–9, 11.

[32] International Committee for the Red Cross, *Landmines Must Be Stopped* (Geneva: ICRC, 1998), 16. *1998 Hidden Killers* (fn. 9), 1.

[33] International Campaign to Ban Landmines, *Landmine Monitor Report 1999: Toward a Mine-Free World* (New York: Human Rights Watch, 1999), 3.

[34] Chechnya: Olivia Ward, "Empire of Ruin: The Corrupt Russian Army Can't Think of Giving Up Its Mines," *New Internationalist* (September 1997), 16–17; and Daniel Williams, " Brutal Retreat from Grozny Led to a Killing Field," *Washington Post*, February 12, 2000, p. A1, A17. Dagestan: "Islamic Extremists in Dagestan Are Also Using Landmines," ICBL press release, Geneva, September 13, 1999; and "Russian Troops Clearing Dagestan Rebel-Planted Mines," FBIS transcribed text, Moscow *Interfax*, no. LD2508105399, August 25, 1999. Georgia: In November 1999, Russian military forces dropped mines in northern Georgia hoping to block potential escape routes of Chechen militants, "Russians Drop Mines in Georgia," *Washington Post*, November 18, 1999, p. A36. Ethiopia: It should be noted that the Ethiopian defense forces claim not to have used anti-personnel landmines in the conflict. According to the ICBL, "there is no evidence to the contrary." *Landmine Monitor Report 1999* (fn. 33), 147, 196–97.

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mines to force populations off the land and reduce potential support for their opponents," while in Cambodia the Khmer Rouge used landmines "to destabilize contested areas."[35] Thus these countries host some of the highest concentrations of landmines in the world. It is estimated, for example, that Afghanistan currently hosts between 5 and 7 million landmines while Cambodia hosts between 4 and 6 million.[36]

Explanations for landmines agenda setting. Currently there are three explanations for landmines agenda setting: terrorism and nonstate actor (NSA) use, technology, and the end of the cold war. Some claim that the initial legal interest in restricting landmine use was driven in part by the U.S. military who wished to limit terrorist access to landmines and other time-delayed weapons, such as booby traps.[37] Landmines traditionally were used by state militaries for defensive purposes, primarily to protect strategic locations. In the last few decades, however, landmine use has become more offensive in military practice and destructive in humanitarian cost. The practice has been compounded by landmine proliferation to substate militaries, who use them to create social chaos to bring down states and to target particular groups. While millions of deployed mines "were randomly laid, with limited tactical rationale, and often deployed simply to terrorize and demoralize local populations," terrorists did not deploy them on United States soil or that of its allies.[38] In reality, most current landmines are not used for terrorist purposes but indiscriminately by inadequately trained soldiers or undisciplined militias. The fact that minefield mapping and marking and mine-awareness education are practically nonexistent increases the landmine threat to civilians in these areas.

These facts, however, do not provide a complete answer for why the landmine issue got onto the international political agenda. The Soviets used landmines irresponsibly in Afghanistan in the 1980s and in greater numbers than all the professional militaries in the 1990s. Yet the landmine issue did not generate international attention. Cambodia, moreover, was also the scene of massive landmine deployment in the 1980s, but no international steps were taken to curtail its use. Finally in the early 1990s, state behavior toward landmine use changed when NGOs raised the landmine-ban issue.

[35] United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Assistance to Afghanistan (UNOCHA), *Mine Action Programme: Afghanistan* (New York: United Nations, 1999), 10. Robert Eaton, Chris Horwood, and Norah Niland, *Cambodia: The Development of Indigenous Mine Action Capabilities*, report to the United Nations Department of Humanitarian Affairs (New York: United Nations, n.d.), 6.

[36] *1998 Hidden Killers* (fn. 9), 58; Eaton, Horwood, and Niland (fn. 35), 38.

[37] Carnahan (fn. 25), 74.

[38] *Landmine Monitor Report 1999* (fn. 33), 14.

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The second purported reason why the landmine issue is now an object of international attention is that technological developments have made the acquisition and deployment of landmines much simpler. By purchasing better technology, more states are now able to produce landmines readily. In addition, aerial dispersal instruments, such as airplanes and artillery, can not deploy a greater number of landmines in a shorter time. Some of the more advanced remote-delivery systems can now deploy thousands of landmines in minutes.[39] Thus, not only has technology increased both the number of landmines being deployed and the speed of deployment, but it has also spurred more indiscriminate deployment of the mines since accurate recording is not possible with aerial-delivery systems.[40] Such use, it is claimed, is increasing because many militaries, especially of the United States, fear casualties among their own forces and therefore put greater emphasis on air power.[41] As one American reporter writes, Americans have "placed extraordinary value on preserving lives of our pilots, sometimes at the possible expense of civilians on the ground."[42] Therefore we can conclude that in the future, aerially delivered mines will increasingly replace manually deployed mines, especially in those states fearing casualties.

Besides reducing casualties, militaries believe that mines deployed by air in large numbers "have the ability to deploy rapidly and to position a considerable obstacle to enemy movement."[43] During the last few decades, the American military expanded this technology by packaging antipersonnel (AP) and antitank (AT) mines together because studies showed that by sowing AP mines with AT mines significantly slows down enemy minefield breeching and protects the AT mines from enemy lifting.[44]

While the NGOs complained that such packages blur "the already thin line between antitank and antipersonnel systems," these packages

[39] One is example is the United Kingdom's "Ranger" that "can fire 1296 mines in one minute." Lt. Col. C. E. E. Sloan, *Mine Warfare on Land*, (Washington, D.C.: Brassey's Defense Publishers, 1986), 38, quoted in Shawn Roberts and Jody Williams, *After the Guns Fall Silent: The Enduring Legacy of Landmines* (Washington, D.C.: Vietnam Veterans of America Foundation 1995), 7. Another example would be the Italian SO-AT system that allows a helicopter to drop 2496 landmines. This is in contrast to minefield laying, which "only a few years ago . . . might have required up to eight hours work by a full company of troops." Quoted in Carnahan (fn. 25), 79.

[40] Peter J. Ekberg, "Remotely Delivered Land Mines and International Law," *Columbia Journal of Transnational Law* 33, no. 1 (1995), 151; Carnahan (fn. 25), 74.

[41] Ekberg (fn. 40), 153.

[42] Michael Dobbs, "A War-Torn Reporter Reflects," *Washington Post*, July 11, 1999, B1.

[43] Ekberg (fn 40), 156.

[44] Statement by Captain Michael Doubleday, U.S. Department of Defense, press regular briefing, August 19, 1997.

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are not the primary cause of landmine casualties or land denial problems.[45] Contrary to the claim that technology is the prime mover of the landmine issue, mines deployed aerially are not a significant percentage of currently deployed mines or a cause of landmine victims.[46] Regardless, the Clinton administration in 1997 still felt public and international pressure regarding U.S. mixed systems, so it attempted to change the definition of the antipersonnel landmines sowed in the mixed systems by reclassifying them as submunitions and antihandling devices for antitank mines.[47] Again, these mixed systems and other aerially deployed mines are not the main reason for the humanitarian disaster caused by mines. Such technology is therefore not the main explanation for the landmine issue getting on the international political agenda.

A realist explanation for the placement of the landmine issue on the international agenda could be the end of the cold war. Its end has enabled state policymakers to focus on less strategic weapons, such as landmines, and allowed many states to pursue unilateral military policies, sometimes in opposition to the major powers. Realists could assert that the end of the cold war has led to irresponsible behavior by nonmajor states because they no longer feel beholden to major powers and/or have concern for their security. They would argue that these states are acting foolishly and will eventually be punished for weakening their own security by giving up a weapon that retains a military utility on the battlefield. Kenneth Waltz predicts that a post–cold war multipolar system is more unpredictable than a bipolar system because major powers have less flexibility to balance the system and weaker states have greater flexibility to act irresponsibly concerning their security interests.[48] According to this neorealist principle, it would have been difficult to achieve the Ottawa Convention because relative gains would have been more important than they are now. In a multipolar world, for example, weaker states fear war less and "all of them can more freely run the risk of suffering a relative loss."[49] Thus even though Russia, the United States, and other great powers did not sign the

[45] *Landmines: A Deadly Legacy* (fn. 28). The "mixed mine" systems are one of the major obstacles to the United States signing the Ottawa Convention.

[46] The majority of today's deployed landmines were laid by hand and not delivered aerially. Ekberg claims that remotely delivered landmines are significant contributors to "the landmine crisis." Ekberg (fn. 40), 149.

[47] United States Campaign to Ban Landmines, "When Is an Antipersonnel Landmine Not a Mine?—When It Is American," press release, September 9, 1997.

[48] Kenneth N. Waltz, "The Origins of War in Neorealist Theory," in Richard K. Betts, ed., *Conflict after the Cold War: Arguments on Causes of Peace* (Boston: Allyn and Bacon, 1994), 92–95.

[49] Kenneth N. Waltz, *Theory of International Politics* (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1979), 71.

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Ottawa Convention, most of the NATO and former Warsaw Pact allies have signed.[50]

Moreover, NGO representatives themselves argue, "Governments remained largely unaware of the degree of the landmine epidemic until the end of the Cold War. Yet the devastating, long-term consequences of AP mines were becoming all too apparent to those NGOs who were putting prosthetic limbs on victims, removing the detritus of war from the ground, providing aid and relief to war-torn societies, and documenting violations of human rights and the laws of war."[51] During the cold war, many NGOs did not have access to landmine-infested areas because of instability and politics and accordingly were either unaware of the landmine problem or unable to properly assess the effects of landmine use.

While it is true that the end of the cold war allows governments to focus on less strategic issues, and humanitarian NGOs to operate in previously closed areas, that fact does not provide a complete explanation for the rise of landmines on the international political agenda. It does not explain, for example, why landmines rather than many other worthwhile issues, such as environmental degradation and child soldiers, remain low-priority items for governments.

Emboldened NGOs setting the international agenda. Even though the landmines protocol of the CCW was signed in 1980, it remains relatively unnoticed by the international community as reflected by the fact that after fifteen years only fifty-two states have ratified it.[52] Upset at the lack of universal support for the CCW and the effects of landmines, the ICBL was created in 1991, when the Vietnam Veterans of America Foundation (VVAF), based in Washington, D.C., and MEDICO, the German medical NGO, decided to form a broad-based international campaign to speak with one voice supporting the ban. It was officially launched in October 1992 when six NGOs took "a number of individual and joint steps in the direction of the ban campaign by issuing a 'Joint Call to Ban Antipersonnel' landmines and hosting the first NGO-sponsored international landmine conference in May of 1993."[53]

[50] Pre-1997 NATO states that signed the Ottawa Treaty were Canada, Belgium, Denmark, France, Germany, Greece, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, The Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Spain, United Kingdom; NATO states that did not sign were Turkey and the U.S. Ex-Warsaw Pact states that signed the treaty were Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia (both the Czech and Slovak Republics), Hungary, Poland, Romania; the only Ex-Warsaw Pact state that did not sign was Russia.

[51] Willliams and Goose (fn. 6), 21.

[52] Christopher S. Wren, "U.N.-Backed Drive to Restrict Land Mines Fails at Talks," *New York Times*, October 13, 1995.

[53] The six NGOs were Handicap International (France), Human Rights Watch (United States), Medico International (Germany), Mines Advisory Group (United Kingdon), Physicians for Human Rights (United States), and the Vietnam Veterans of America Foundation (United States) in Williams and Goose (fn. 6), 22.

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The ICBL knew that it needed to draw international attention to the landmine issue in order to be successful. They made "this appeal on a moral basis; on a position of political morality,"[54] thus shifting the landmine debate from a political to a humanitarian issue. Issue transformation in other areas that puts "the subject into one category rather than another" helps bring the problem to the attention of those in and around government. The landmine-ban's transformation from a political to a humanitarian issue began when, in January 1991, the Women's Commission for Refugee Women and Children called for a ban in its testimony before the United States Senate about the plight of landmine survivors in the Cambodian border refugee camps.[55] It is interesting to note that this is the first time that landmine use was addressed publicly as a humanitarian concern and not a security issue in the United States.

SCHEMA: OUTRAGEOUS STATISTICS

NGOs promoted statistics as systematic indicators in a schema to get states to recognize the landmine problem. These statistics resonated with the media, the public, and policymakers because they were so outrageous that the problem could no longer be ignored. This strategy to garner attention is similar to the assumption that new issues need to encourage action by promoting systematic indicators, such as crises and disasters or by feedback from ongoing programs. Changes in these indicators usually highlight that there is a problem in the system because "a steady state is viewed as less problematic than changing figures." Policymakers use these indicators to decide whether to address an issue, first by assessing the magnitude of the problem and, second, by becoming aware of changes in the problem.[56]

The prime indicator used by NGOs as part of this schema is that landmines kill and maim more than twenty-six thousand people per year of whom an estimated 80 percent are civilian.[57] The claim is also made that this carnage will not end anytime soon because there "may be 200 million landmines scattered in at least sixty-four countries,"

[54] Statement by Kenneth Anderson, director, Arms Project, Human Rights Watch, Global Landmine Crisis Hearing before a Subcommittee of the Committee on Appropriations, United States Senate, May 13, 1994.

[55] Williams and Goose (fn. 9), 20–21.

[56] John W. Kingdon, *Agendas, Alternatives, and Public Policies* (Glenview, Ill.: Scott, Foresman and Company, 1984), 20–21, 96.

[57] Gino Strada, "The Horror of Land Mines," *Scientific American* (May 1996), 42. Most landmine victims are women and children. Donovan Webster, "One Leg, One Life at a Time," *New York Times Magazine*, January 23, 1994, p. 33.

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making them "one of the most toxic and widespread pollution[s] facing mankind."[58]

Moreover, NGOs emphasized that for many civilian communities the nature of war had recently changed from targeting the professional military of the enemy to targeting its civilians. According to UNICEF, for example, more children die from landmines after a war for which those landmines were deployed than do soldiers during the war. Due to the nature of the landmine injury—usually amputation, if not death—those countries infested by landmines have the largest amputee populations in the world. For example, a 1991 study of Cambodia's amputee population found that over thirty thousand of the country's 8.5 million inhabitants were amputees and another five thousand amputees lived in refugee camps along the Thai border.[59] A 1998–99 study found that while Cambodia's population had grown to 10 million people, twenty-four thousand had survived mine injuries and more than fourteen thousand had died.[60]

Furthermore, according to UN demining expert Patrick Blagden, a fifty-fold increase in the world's mine-clearing capability is needed to "stabilize" the current situation. Such an effort would require training 170,000 to 200,000 new mine clearers worldwide costing $1.02 billion to $1.2 billion per year. He warned, however, that accidents happen at a rate of one out of every 1,000 to 2,000 mines destroyed: "a fifty fold increase in manual mines clearance would probably cause a death and injury toll among mine clearers of about 2,000 per year, a rate that in the long term may not be supportable."[61] Kuwait is a case in point. Within the first week after the war, all five Kuwaiti mine-clearing experts were killed attempting to clear landmines. Additionally nearly one hundred international-mine-clearance experts have been killed since the end of the Gulf War.[62]

In another schema that helped policymakers process the landmine issue and encourage the media and the public to get involved, the effects of landmine use were compared with more commonly despised

[58] Patrick M. Blagden, UN demining expert, estimates that there may be more than 200 million landmines. Blagden, "Summary of United Nations Demining," *Symposium on Anti-personnel Mines* (Geneva: ICRC, 1993), 117. *1993 Hidden Killers* (fn. 30), 2.

[59] Eric Stover and Dan Charles, "The Killing Minefields of Cambodia," *New Scientist*, October 19, 1991, p. 27.

[60] *Landmine Monitor Report 1999* (fn. 33), 405.

[61] Patrick Blagden, "The Use of Mines and the Impact of Technology," in Kevin M. Cahill, ed., *Clearing the Fields: Solutions to the Global Land Mines Crisis* (New York: Basic Books and Council of Foreign Relations, 1995), 114–15.

[62] Webster (fn. 57).

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and feared weapon systems: biological, chemical, and nuclear weapons. NGOs currently estimate that more people have been killed and maimed by landmines than by biological, chemical, and nuclear weapons combined.[63]

Many of the statistics generated by NGOs, however, are inflated and, more significantly, regurgitated by the media and policymakers without proper fact-checking and research. Some of the overinflated figures have become so widely used that original sources and methodological data-collection techniques are unknown, and "some land mine figures are repeated so often that they are now regarded as fact."[64] The more common, inflated claims center on the number of currently deployed landmines, such as in Afghanistan where 35 million was the initial estimate, which was later reduced to 10 million "as a conveniently round figure." Even that figure is suspicious because it would have required that the Soviets deploy "3,000 mines per day, every day of the nine-year occupation, which, given the mountainous nature of the terrain and the style of conflict, was unrealistically high."[65] The high estimate of landmines in Angola is also questionable. As one Red Cross deminer stated, "For there to be so many mines in Angola would have required four jumbo jets of mines arriving daily for 20 years."[66] The deployment of mines during the Gulf War provides another example of grossly inflated statistics. It was initially estimated that 9 million landmines were laid by Iraqi forces immediately preceding and during Operation Desert Storm.[67] A few years after the war, however, a survey showed only around 1.7 million mines had been emplaced.[68]

These statistics were promoted via the Internet and through conference mechanisms such as speeches and prepared reports. They were immediately picked up by the media, which, in turn, provided the information to the public and governments. As recently as September 1999, CNN was still quoting NGO estimates that more than forty thousand landmines were being deployed each week,[69] even though the figure had no factual basis and was no longer used by NGOs, especially the ICBL. Since CNN reports are broadcast around the world and are impor-

[63] America's Defense Monitor, PBS-TV, Spring 1994.

[64] Laurie H. Boulden, "A Mine Field, Statistically Speaking: The Dangers of Inflating the Problem," *Washington Post*, February 8, 1998, C2.

[65] Croll (fn. 24), 131.

[66] Christina Lamb, "Number of Land Mines Challenged: Report Calls U.N. Global Estimate of 110 Million Exaggerated," *Washington Times*, November 30, 1998, A1.

[67] ICRC, *Anti-personnel Landmines Friend or Foe? A Study of the Military Use and Effectiveness of Anti-Personnel Mines* (Geneva: ICRC, March 1996), 37.

[68] *Landmine Monitor Report* 1999 (fn. 33), 15.

[69] Bernard Shaw, CNN's *World News Tonight*, September 6, 1999.

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tant sources of information for many people, the report is sure to become a major resource for more people learning about landmines. In fact, while Bernard Shaw, the anchor for CNN television's *World News*, attributed the statistic to the ICRC, the less-used CNN website did not refer to the deployment rate. The CNN report used outdated ICRC statistics, which were rough estimates at best. Today's estimates of the weekly rates of deployment are significantly less than the initial estimates of eighty thousand per year, in which more mines were being emplaced than taken out.[70] The CNN report used the unverified statistic as the lead-in to the news story to grab the viewer's attention. This example highlights how information and media technologies were used to get the public to pay attention to the landmine issue by highlighting dramatic statistics, whether or not they were truthful.[71]

These statistics were not seriously questioned until late in the agenda-setting process, primarily in the months leading up to the signing of the Ottawa Treaty in December 1997,[72] when it was too late to distract attention from the landmine issue. By this time, the issue was already on the international political agenda and had attracted tremendous media and public attention. An ICBL critic wrote that the campaign continually used "powerful images of dreadfully wounded civilians." Those images called "attention to the (exaggerated) scale of the problem," which, in turn, "rapidly galvanized public opinion and prompted a number of countries to restrict or prohibit the use of antipersonnel mines unilaterally."[73]

PRIMING: LANDMINE VICTIM STORIES

The schema to get people to think about landmines was primed primarily by landmine-victim stories. If policymakers and the public did not completely understand the statistics that were publicized to awaken the memory of a horrible humanitarian disaster, many of them finally did comprehend the magnitude of the situation when they were confronted with the stories of thousands of landmine victims. More often than not, most governmental statements concerning the landmine-ban issue discussed the plight of landmine victims. The ICBL and the ICRC continually featured these stories, which were picked up by the media and pro-ban governments. One of the key points that the campaign

[70] *Landmine Monitor Report 1999* (fn. 33), 3.

[71] See Kenneth R. Rutherford, "Internet Activism: NGOs and the Mine Ban Treaty," *International Journal on Grey Literature* 1, no. 3 (2000).

[72] Croll (fn. 24), 151.

[73] Ibid., 35.

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emphasized was the dismemberment of people by landmines, which is due to design features that stress maiming, not killing. The resulting injuries are horrifying. The conventional wisdom behind this strategy is that a wounded enemy soldier is less costly to the enemy than a dead one. NGO health workers continually highlighted the effects of landmines on people. For example, landmine victims usually require amputation and long hospitalizations.[74] A study of blood use by ICRC hospitals "found that, overall, for every 100 wounded, 44.9 units of blood were required, while every 100 mine injuries required 103.2 units."[75]

In addition, many media stories and NGO reports discussed the negative social impact that landmines have on many marginalized populations.[76] In addition, the ICBL and ICRC continually featured landmine victims prominently in their educational, fundraising, and promotional literature and sponsored their participation in international conferences.[77] They mounted an effective public-education and media campaign that made it politically difficult for governments to ignore the landmine issue. According to two of the major ICBL leaders, Stephen D. Goose of Human Rights Watch (HRW) and Jody Williams of the ICBL, "most of the early news on AP mines was focused on the victim side of the equation and the tremendous difficulties faced by humanitarian deminers."[78] Another ICBL leader, Rae McGrath of the Mines Advisory Group (MAG), argued that the "deaths and injuries caused to innocent people, and the denial of ground for agricultural and other civilian purposes as a result of the presence of mines, made it inevitable that the aid community must face up to the issue."[79]

The Canadian Government and other core group policymakers—as representatives of the main state sponsors for the landmine ban—also featured landmine victims prominently in their policy speeches in order

[74] J. Rautio and P. Paavolainen, "Afghan War Wounded: Experience with 200 Cases," *Journal of Trauma* 28 (April 1988); and D. Johnson, J. Crum, and S. Lumjiak, "Medical Consequences of the Various Weapons Systems Used in Combat in Thailand," *Military Medicine* 146 (1981); quoted in Chris Giannou, and J. Jack Geiger, "The Medical Lessons of Land Mine Injuries," in Cahill (fn. 61), 141.

[75] B. Eshaya-Chauvin and R. M. Coupland, "Transfusion Requirements for the Management of War Injured: The Experience of the International Committee of the Red Cross," *British Journal of Anesthesia* 68 (1992), quoted in Giannou and Geiger (fn. 74), 140.

[76] For example, see Paul Davies, *War of the Mines: Cambodia, Landmines and the Impoverishment of a Nation* (Boulder, Colo.: Pluto Press, 1994); Roberts and Williams (fn. 39); Phillip C. Winslow, *Sowing the Dragon's Teeth: Land Mines and the Global Legacy of War* (Boston: Beacon Press, 1997).

[77] For examples, see International Committee for the Red Cross, *ICRC Overview 1998: Landmines Must Be Stopped*; International Campaign to Ban Landmines, *Landmine Monitor Report 1999* (fn. 33); ICBL brochures.

[78] Williams and Goose (fn. 6), 23.

[79] Rae McGrath, *Landmines: Legacy of Conflict: A Manual for Development Workers* (Oxford: Oxfam, 1994), 2.

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to attract more states to signing the Ottawa Treaty. Such a priming strategy is perhaps the most significant reason that the movement to ban landmines garnered so much international political action and attention so fast. In essence, the forces who favored a landmine ban used landmine victims as the priming tool with the assumption that the frequency, prominence, or feature of the international community's humanitarian impulse would lead to increased international attention to the issue. Even an anti-ban commentator stated that the strategy worked, saying that "the misery and suffering caused by mines in developing countries caught the imagination of the media and the Western World."[80]

Level Two: Norm Agenda Setting

NGOs successfully placed the landmine issue on the international political agenda, the first level of agenda setting. It was then their task to change how governments viewed landmines, the next agenda-setting level.

Level-two agenda setting addresses the influence of attribute salience of the NGO landmine activities among governmental policymakers and the public. The level's main theme is the NGOs' promotion of the landmine ban and how it changed policymakers' perceptions about landmine use. At this level discussions focus on how NGOs got governmental policymakers to understand landmines in a new way and subsequently why state landmine policies changed. The main thesis is that the more NGOs could convince governments of the horrible effects of landmine use, especially the disproportionate civilian casualties, the greater the possibility of changing state perception and use of landmines.

Framing: Horrible Effects and Disproportionate Consequences

The main framing mechanism to encourage policymakers to view landmines differently was to label them as illegal under *current* international humanitarian law, primarily because their use was causing disproportionate casualities among noncombatants and unnecessary suffering to both the military and civilians. NGOs based their landmine-ban arguments on already established norms and principles. Their key agenda-setting argument in support of the landmine ban concerned proportionality. The 1977 Protocol I to the 1949 Geneva Convention requires belligerents to weigh the expected military utility of a particu-

[80] Croll (fn. 24), 129.

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lar weapon against the humanitarian costs.[81] Essentially, the law says that an attack, which may cause more harm to noncombatants than necessary to fulfill the military objective, is illegal. The use of landmines violates this principle in two ways: (1) when the proportionality rule is applied to the whole landmine system, the humanitarian costs outweigh the military demands; and (2) the time-delay feature of the landmine does not allow the military commander to make the calculations for proportionality.[82]

The NGOs also used the international humanitarian legal argument that landmines are inherently indiscriminate because once deployed they cannot target its victims. Anti-ban forces were able to dispute this argument much more than the proportionality argument. For example, the U.S. position was that landmines could be discriminately used in the right circumstances because landmines were like other "legal" weapons, such as artillery shells, missiles, and air delivered bombs, whose targets may include civilians. Robert Sherman from the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (ACDA) responded to the indiscriminate argument in the following manner:

> I frequently hear it said that landmines are indiscriminate; they can't tell the difference between a child or a soldier. That's true, but it's also true of other weapon[s] of war. The shell, bomb, missile that can tell the difference between a child and a soldier has yet to be invented. The military would love it if it were but it doesn't exist and won't in the foreseeable future.[83]

In contrast, even the most ardent critics of the landmine ban admitted that they were causing a humanitarian problem as evidenced by the great *proportion* of civilian casualties among the landmine victims. In his book, *The History of Landmines*, Mike Croll claims that the movement to ban landmines is "unlikely to be beneficial" but that the landmine issue itself came about because of the ICBL's success in attracting international attention to it as a moral issue.[84] Croll and Sherman, ardent ban opponents, defend their positions by admitting to a humanitarian problem caused by landmines. While Sherman compares the humanitarian problem induced by landmines as "not a unique humanitarian problem" when compared with the effects of other weapons, he goes on to say that unlike other weapons, the "time factor" of landmines

[81] 1977 Additional Protocol 1, Geneva Convention, Article 51 (4), 1949.
[82] Ekberg (fn. 40), 166.; "The Arms Project," quoted in Roberts and Williams (fn. 39) 490–91.
[83] Robert Sherman, "Banning Anti-Personnel Land Mines: The Ottawa Process and Beyond," *Disarmament: The Future of Disarmament*, April 16, 1997, 106.
[84] Croll (fn. 24), xi, 151.

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makes them last a very long time after the war, resulting in "a lot of mines left behind and a lot of civilian casualties."[85] Similarly, Croll says

> that today it is impossible to cover this subject without reference to the humanitarian perspective and without having one's morals scrutinized. It certainly has not been my objective to glorify what is surely one of the most insidious weapons ever developed nor to condone the suffering of the many innocent people killed and injured by them.[86]

By transforming the landmine-use issue from a strictly political-military problem to a humanitarian question, NGOs provided themselves with the diplomatic space to play important roles in disseminating information about landmines to the media, policymakers, and the public. Even governmental arms-control negotiators considered it a humanitarian issue; as Sheridan stated, "I'm going to make a plea that we treat this not as a political issue but as a humanitarian issue."[87] While the laws of armed conflict will always wrestle with the unclear balances between military demands and humanitarian standards, NGOs argued that a complete prohibition of landmines is the only political and practical way to eliminate the harm caused by landmines to civilian populations and the environment.

Noticeably, the ICBL "never denied the utility of the antipersonnel landmine in certain situations," albeit the United States Campaign to Ban Landmines (USCBL) recently stated that landmines "have no military value."[88] The USCBL misstatement is perhaps due more to ignorance on the part of recent landmine-ban activists of the genesis of the issue and of previous arguments to get states to discuss landmines as a humanitarian issue than to keeping the discussion in the military domain. The indirect consequence, however, is that such statements indeed shift the landmine debate back to the military realm, exactly what the NGOs wanted to avoid.

Contrary to recent USCBL claims that landmines do not have military utility, many of the ICBL leaders, pro-ban state diplomats, and others acknowledge that landmines are used for many reasons, such as to protect strategic locations, channel enemy forces, deny certain positions to the enemy, and slow down enemy movement.[89] In attempting to

[85] NGO Committee on Disarmament, UN forums, April 10, September 23, and October 21–23, 1997 (Edited transcripts, 1998).

[86] Croll (fn. 24), xi.

[87] NGO Committee on Disarmament, (fn. 85).

[88] Statement by Jody Williams, Duke University Conference on Land Mines, May 1, 1998. USCBL, "Statement of the United States Campaign to Ban Landmines Condemning Yugoslav Landmine Aggression in Kosovo," April 15, 1999.

[89] Williams (fn. 88).

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steer away from landmine-utility arguments, Canadian and other pro-ban state policymakers emulated the NGO strategy of focusing strictly on the humanitarian and legal aspects of the debate rather than of engaging militaries in it. The pro-ban states leading the interstate negotiations also wanted to avoid debating the utility of landmines on the battlefield, which they thought would derail the treaty's development by shifting landmine discussions to the consensus-based negotiating forums of the CCW and Conference on Disarmament (CD).[90] Because landmines are considered a useful military tool, the major powers and many military leaders believed that taking the landmine issue to these alternative forums—the only international forums to address disarmament issues—was more appropriate and conducive to discussing further use restrictions and/or a ban.[91]

The downside to negotiating the ban in the CCW or CD was significant. Both forum processes are lengthy, primarily because they are consensus-based, usually taking decades of negotiations to reach an agreement. In 1997, for example, Mexico blocked the attempt to put the landmine issue on the CD agenda. Since several other states in the CD are also opposed to putting landmines on the agenda or to issuing an immediate landmine ban, the landmine issue currently cannot be discussed within the CD. Similarly, getting a landmine ban on the CCW agenda was impossible because many states, "such as Russia, India, China and the United States, say they still need landmines to protect international borders, and therefore preferred to discuss landmines in the context of restrictions rather than implementing a ban."[92]

While the ICBL did not question the military utility of landmines, they questioned whether their "limited" utility proportionally outweighed the humanitarian costs. To provide political cover for governmental policymakers, several NGOs sought to collaborate with military leaders and argue that the military utility of landmines was minimal. On April 3, 1996, the Vietnam Veterans of America Foundation (VVAF) sponsored a full-page letter in the *New York Times* to President Clinton, which was signed by fifteen retired military leaders, including

[90] The Conference on Disarmament (CD) was created by the United Nations to negotiate arms-control agreements. The CD usually discusses weapons of mass destruction rather than conventional weapons, which is why the UN created the CD outside the auspices of the CCW.

[91] Robert J. Lawson, Mark Gwozdecky, Jill Sinclair, and Ralph Lysyshyn, in Cameron, Lawson, and Tomlin, eds. (fn. 6), 165. For an explanation of the negative consequences of consensus-based negotiating for weapon issues, see Stephen D. Goose, "Antipersonnel Landmines and the Conference on Disarmament," http://www.icbl.org, Home>Resources>Documents; Rutherford (fn. 3).

[92] Philippe Naughton, "Landmine Pact to Go Ahead after Pakistan Backs Down," *Reuters*, May 3, 1996.

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General Norman Schwarzkopf, Commander of Operation Desert Storm, that supported a ban. One month earlier, the ICRC had released "a study of the military use and effectiveness of anti-personnel mines," which was endorsed by more than ten active and retired international leaders from nine countries and concluded that

> "the military utility of AP mines is far outweighed by the appalling humanitarian consequences of their use in actual conflicts. On this basis their prohibition and elimination should be pursued as a matter of utmost urgency by governments and the entire international community."[93]

Furthermore, the ICBL assisted Canada and other pro-ban states in the treaty-negotiating process by developing and delivering public support for the ban and by providing valuable information and analytical reports based on that information. In particular, the ICBL held conferences in Asia, Africa, Europe, and Latin America to help generate public and governmental support for the ban and to draft recommendations for the leading pro-ban states that were drafting the treaty. It also participated as an active member in conferences that took place in 1996 and 1997 in Austria, Belgium, and Sweden. The ICBL was allowed to do so primarily because the conferences "had not been held hostage to rule by consensus," which, in turn, allowed "for the first time, smaller and middle-sized powers" to "come together, to work in close cooperation with NGOs" to achieve, for the first time, "a ban on a weapon in widespread use."[94] Axworthy recognized the importance of the help of NGOs in creating the regime when he stated at the conference in Ottawa in October 1996 that the NGOs "are largely responsible for our being here today. The same effective arguments you used to get us here must now be put to work to get foreign ministers here to sign the treaty."[95]

Human-rights NGOs, such as HRW and Physicians for Human Rights (PHR), have also invoked human-rights treaties, many of which are considered customary law[96] and highlight the proportionality argument. The use of human-rights arguments for banning landmines follows the recent expansion of international NGO human-rights activities from the early 1990s to include economic and social rights.[97] Partially a

[93] ICRC (fn. 67).
[94] Williams and Goose (fn. 6), 45.
[95] Statement by Lloyd Axworthy, International Strategy Conference, "Towards a Global Ban on Anti-Personnel Mines," Ottawa, Canada, October 5, 1996.
[96] Susan Benesch, Glenn McGory, Christina Rodriguez, and Robert Sloane, "International Customary Law and Antipersonnel Landmines: Emergence of a New Customary Norm," *Landmine Monitor Report 1999* (fn. 33), 1032.
[97] Korey (fn. 8), 16.

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result of an increased focus on social and economic rights by developing states, it also helped bridge a North-South coalition atypical for arms control and disarmament treaties. Moreover, grafting norms, such as human rights, that previously had been agreed to universally also helped to ensure that the landmine issue would receive sustained attention, unlike more complex international issues.[98]

SCHEMA: LEADERSHIP GAMES

The main schema used in the policy agenda-setting level entailed games concerning who was taking the leadership role in addressing the humanitarian aspects of the landmine issue. The main players were the major powers, especially the United States, and NGOs and their state allies such as Canada and South Africa. NGOs continually argued that major powers were not necessary to achieve the treaty, although they pressured states to join the treaty. While there were other leadership games taking place within the ICBL, between the ICBL and the ICRC and among the pro-ban states to direct the movement, the major game took place between the United States and the pro-ban coalition. Eventually the media joined this particular leadership "game schema" because they had once supported the concept of a landmine ban; they "increasingly recognized the compelling story behind the global humanitarian crisis and the 'David and Goliath' nature of NGOs taking on governments and militaries to ban a weapon used by armies for decades."[99]

The leadership schema presented contrasted the major powers. At the initiation of NGOs, the leadership turning points for each of the states was directly tied to individuals to get their governments to ban landmines. The main point of this section is to highlight the false games played by states initially to oppose a landmine ban and then to support a ban in an effort to gain public-opinion credibility at the initiative of individuals who carry the support of NGOs. Each of these relationships is addressed briefly below.

United States: Senator Leahy and the Vietnam Veterans of America Foundation. The United States came too late to the Ottawa Treaty negotiations, having joined the conference for the final drafting of the treaty in Oslo in September 1997. This conference took place less than three months before the date of the treaty signing scheduled for early December in Ottawa. By coming to the conference with a series of requests that it wanted to incorporate into the treaty, the U.S. delegation

[98] Price (fn. 6), 627–31.
[99] Williams and Goose (fn. 6), 23.

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attempted to break the treaty package that had already been assembled and presented to the state delegates in Oslo.[100] Its proposal was not well received by states and completely rejected by the ICBL primarily because the Americans wanted a treaty exception for mixed antitank and antipersonnel landmine systems. Subsequent to the rejection, President Clinton explained U.S. opposition to the treaty by saying that the United States "implored the people there [at the Oslo Final Drafting Treaty Conference] to give us the exceptions we needed."[101]

One of this essay's major arguments is that nonsignatory states, such as Russia and the United States, are having difficulty developing a coherent landmine policy because both the transformation of the landmine debate on the international political agenda from a security to a humanitarian issue and the speed of the issue rising to the top of the international political agenda took them by surprise. Opening up the debate to humanitarian issues invites nontraditional decision-making actors in foreign and security policy, such as refugee, religious, and human-rights activists who support a ban, into the public policy-making process. Transforming the debate expands the scope of conflict about landmine policy, thereby helping to increase the visibility of the issue to the American public and, in turn, involving them more actively in policy discourse.[102] The effect is a weakening of the monopoly held by certain government agencies on security and tactical weapon policy. For example, Defense Secretary William Cohen wrote that "the mass media's coverage of the recent talks in Oslo on land mines could easily leave the impression that the United States is largely responsible for this humanitarian tragedy, or at least stands in the way of international efforts to stop the dying and maiming. Such an impression is simply wrong."[103] The debate's transformation to an area where civilians and nonmilitary decision makers have more influence, and therefore are more vulnerable to NGO pressure, has important implications.

The main force behind the U.S. need to address continually the humanitarian aspects of the landmine debate is Patrick Leahy, Democratic senator from Vermont, and the VVAF. Leahy became interested in

[100] The U.S. demands were presented in a take-it-or-leave-it package and consisted of five interlocking components: exception for landmine use in Korea, deferral of the date when the treaty would enter in force, changes in the definition of an antipersonnel landmine, more intensive verification measures, and a withdrawal clause from the treaty in cases of national emergency.

[101] Lineuvid Gollust, "Clinton/Canada/Landmines," *Voice of America*, November 23, 1997.

[102] Schattschneider argues that the expansion of conflict signifies a healthy democracy because it allows for increased public participation, usually through "responsible leaders and organizations," in the policy process. Schattschneider, *The Semisovereign People: A Realist's View of Democracy in America* (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1976), 142.

[103] William S. Cohen, "Necessary and Right," *Washington Post*, September 19, 1997, p. A23.

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the humanitarian aspects of the landmine issue in the early 1990s, when he and his wife visited Central America and met several landmine-disabled children. Soon thereafter, he became the first U.S. public official to label landmines as illegal. Since then, he has been the key legislator to introduce measures against landmines. Leahy ultimately moved the United States into a leadership role between 1992 and 1994, when he worked closely with Bobby Mueller, VVAF's executive director, to help push landmine legislation forward. Speaking about Mueller and the VVAF's efforts at the first ever U.S. Senate hearing on landmines, Leahy said, "I think he has done more and had more responsibility for the global campaign against landmines than anybody I know. . . . So, I just want to say publicly that without not only the constant inspiration but the constant push from Bobby Mueller I do not know if we would be even having this hearing today."[104]

In 1992 the VVAF and other NGO allies, such as HRW, encouraged the Senate to pass Leahy's amendment to ban the export of all landmines.[105] The following year the Senate passed (100–0) a three-year extension, which is now permanent. In 1994 President Clinton was the first international leader to address the United Nations about the need for a ban. As part of establishing landmines on the international agenda, Leahy held the "The Global Landmine Crisis"[106] on May 13, 1994, inviting several American landmine victims and representatives of humanitarian NGOs to testify about the effects of landmines. Since then he has introduced new landmine legislation every year working closely with the ICBL to push the United States position closer to a ban and encouraging other states, such as France, to take their own steps toward a ban.[107]

Since these early victories, however, Leahy and his NGO allies have failed to stop the Clinton administration from backtracking in its leadership role to enact international and domestic legislative measures to alleviate landmine use. Subsequent to the Clinton administration's declared opposition to the treaty, Leahy argued that holding states to different standards would defeat the stigmatization force that a

[104] Patrick Leahy, "The Global Landmine Crisis," Subcommittee of the Committee of Appropriations, U.S. Senate, May 13, 1994, 66–67.

[105] "The Scourge of Landmines," Vermont's U.S. Senator Patrick Leahy, http://www.senate.gov/~leahy.

[106] Leahy (fn. 104). The author provided testimony along with representatives from international NGOs, domestic interest groups, and the Department of State. The DOD declined Leahy's invitation to attend.

[107] Senator Patrick Leahy letter to Handicap International encouraging the French government to call for a review of the landmines protocol to the CCW, January 18, 1993. Handicap International, *For the Banning of Massacres of Civilians in Time of Peace: Facts and Chronologies*, 2d ed. (Lyon, France: Impression MEDCOM, June 1997).

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comprehensive treaty could deliver. He said during the final treaty negotiations that "an effective international agreement that is based on stigmatizing a weapon cannot have different standards for different nations."[108]

Great Britain: Diana, Princess of Wales, and the British Red Cross, the Mines Advisory Group, and the Landmine Survivors Network. Until mid-1997 Great Britain was among the treaty's strongest opponents, so it came as a surprise to anti-ban supporters that its landmine policy completely reversed in a matter of months. The landmine issue in Great Britain initially gathered attention in January 1997 when Princess Diana visited Angola as a guest of the British Red Cross and Halo Trust, a British NGO working to clear landmines. She called on the British government to ban landmines as the only humanitarian option. At the time of this statement, the British landmine position was similar to that of the U.S. and supported the continued use of landmines. Her remarks "produced a telling conflict with some decision-makers in the government, since her position in favor of a total ban on land mines deviated from official policy." After condemning her remarks, one governmental official called her a "loose cannon."[109] The effects of her Angolan visit with the British NGOs created more publicity about British policy toward landmines than ever before.

Before her trip, British official David Davis stated that supporting a ban would sacrifice "the effectiveness of our armed forces on the altar of political correctness." Several months after Princess Diana's trip to Angola, Davis announced that Great Britain would support a ban. Furthermore, in a complete reversal of policy, the British government started to praise Princess Diana's positive influence on the issue. The newly appointed International Development Secretary, Clare Short, stated that "we need a worldwide ban and the more the Princess can do to bring that about, the better. The Princess has drawn the world's attention to this problem." Responding to past Conservative Party criticism about her involvement into what was then perceived to be a security issue, the Princess said, "I am not a political figure. I'd like to reiterate now, my interests are humanitarian. That is why I felt drawn to this human tragedy. That is why I wanted to play my part in working towards a worldwide ban on these weapons."[110]

[108] Patrick Leahy, "Seize the Moment," *ICBL Ban Treaty News*, September 9, 1997, 1, quoted in Robert J. Lawson, Mark Gwozdecky, Jill Sinclair, and Ralph Lysyshyn, "The Ottawa Process," in Cameron, Lawson, and Tomlin, eds. (fn. 6), 178.

[109] Fred Barbash, "Royal Spin" *Washington Post*, February 14, 1997, A23.

[110] Robert Hardman, "Princess Calls for Greater Efforts to Clear Landmines," *Daily Telegraph*, June 13, 1997, 10.

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Great Britain's opposition to the ban disappeared relatively soon after the rise to power of Tony Blair's Labor Party, which had made banning landmines one of its election-campaign-platform goals. However, it was British NGOs, especially through Princess Diana as patron of the British Red Cross and through her association with British demining NGOs, such as the Halo Trust and MAG, and her visit to Bosnia with the American humanitarian NGO Landmine Survivors Network (LSN), who encouraged the British public to support a ban and Blair to follow through on his campaign pledge. Upon taking office, the Blair government did announce a ban but with significant reservations, including the "the right to use mines in exceptional circumstances."[111] This directly contravened the ICBL's goal to allow no exceptions. It is not surprising therefore, that Blair's government announced a complete ban soon after British NGOs and Princess Diana wanted his government to follow through on its campaign promise. His government rightly feared that once the landmine issue was placed squarely on the political agenda as a humanitarian issue, British policy for continued landmine use would be unsustainable.

In conclusion, Princess Diana's involvement with the NGOs helped encourage a change in British landmine policy, which, in turn, ensured the Ottawa Convention's success two ways. First, it helped bring about Great Britain's support for a ban. This move damaged the position of the U.S., the most vocal of the treaty's opponents, because until then Great Britain and the United States had similar positions. Losing Great Britain as an ally on the ban issue helped isolate the U.S. from landmine discussions, and, more importantly damaged its credibility vis à vis other allies on the issue. More specifically, Great Britain's change in policy resulted in the United State's isolation from its allies and all NATO members, except Turkey, who also did not support the convention.

Second, Princess Diana's support of NGOs and their arguments to ban landmines helped transfer the issue from a political to a humanitarian problem. Moreover, she was able to leverage the media into covering the landmine issue from locations such as Angola and Bosnia and thereby helped to marshal public support for the ban and against the British anti-ban position. Each of her trips to landmine infested states was organized and planned by humanitarian NGOs. Several days after her death on August 31, 1997, the Oslo Conference began to finalize the treaty. In recognition of her influence in the landmine issue, the prime minister of Norway stated at the conference's opening session

[111] Tim Butcher, "Labour Bans Landmines from 2005," *Electronic Telegraph*, May 22, 1997.

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that the treaty should be titled the Diana, Princess of Wales Treaty, highlighting the fact that she helped the NGO movement to bring attention to the landmine issue, promote assistance to landmine victims, and focus on the landmine ban.

South Africa: Nelson Mandela and the South African Campaign to Ban Landmines. In February 1997, on the eve of the ICBL conference in Maputo, Mozambique, the South African government announced that it would impose an immediate ban on the use, production, export, and transit of landmines, thereby becoming one of the first African states to declare a unilateral ban.[112] This announcement soon led many other African states to support the Ottawa Process.[113] The South African government's decision was brought about through pressure from the South African Campaign to Ban Landmines (SACBL), a coalition of more than 100 South African NGOs.

The SACBL was able to achieve its government's support for a ban by placing the issue on the agenda as a humanitarian problem via several approaches. First, humanitarian NGOs and student associations started campaigning for a ban in 1993. This racially diverse coalition, coupled with the rise to power of Nelson Mandela and the first democratically elected government in 1994, allowed "unprecedented access to senior political and bureaucratic officials" that "greatly facilitated the eventual symbiosis of governmental and nongovernmental activities and policy positions." There were many common bonds and friendships between SACBL members and governmental officials, including Nelson Mandela, because they were "historical partners" in the antiapartheid struggle.[114] Secondly, even foreign NGOs influenced the South African government's decision to act on the landmine issue. South African Defense Minister Joe Modise said that South Africa's decision was greatly impacted by United States General Norman Schwarzkopf's support of a landmine ban, which was demonstrated publicly in the April 1996 full-page letter in the *New York Times* to President Clinton sponsored by the VVAF.[115]

Canada: Lloyd Axworthy and Mines Action Canada. In 1993, pressured and supported by Canadian NGOs, especially human-rights

[112] Cameron, Lawson, and Tomlin (fn. 6), 172.

[113] In addition to encouraging other African states to join the treaty, South Africa's position on banning landmines was significant for two other reasons. First, it was the major producer of arms, including landmines, in Africa, which is the most heavily mined continent in the world. Second, South Africa used mines extensively in neighboring states, helping the southern African region to become the most mined-infested region in the world.

[114] Noel Stott, "The South African Campaign," in Cameron, Lawson, and Tomlin, eds. (fn. 6), 68, 72, 74.

[115] Joe Modise, interview with the author, Northern Cape Province, South Africa, May 21, 1997.

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groups, the newly elected liberal government in Canada transformed its foreign policy decision-making process to include more NGO consultations.[116] This change in policy allowed a coalition of NGOs working under the auspices of Mines Action Canada (MAC) to influence Canada's landmine position directly by placing it on the government's agenda. They also encouraged Canadian Foreign Minister Lloyd Axworthy to take the lead in helping to alleviate its effects as an international social problem. Initial meetings between the NGOs and the government "produced little common ground from which discussions could progress" once it was placed on the agenda.[117] These meetings, however, gave the NGOs an opportunity to educate government officials about the humanitarian problem caused by landmines and thereby gain legitimacy for their arguments and detract from military and strategic arguments for opposing a ban.

Canadian NGOs continued to promote the landmine issue after it was placed on the government's agenda by instituting a toll-free telephone number that people could call for information, recruiting Canadian celebrities, such as singer Bruce Cockburn, to the cause, instituting a letter writing campaign to government officials, and giving landmine victims an opportunity to present personal testimonies. As some members in the government, especially the foreign ministry, became more open to the idea of a ban, they invited MAC representatives to join the Canadian CCW negotiating teams in 1995 and 1996. Subsequently, Axworthy took the lead internationally in banning landmines by initiating and encouraging the Ottawa Process, which precipitated a dramatic transformation of Canada's international role from a faithful NATO arms-control follower during the cold war to a disarmament leader in the post–cold war world. However, Axworthy needed the support of MAC and other Canadian NGOs in order to mobilize pubic opinion and motivate Canadians to press for this foreign policy change.[118] In particular, MAC and the other Canadian NGOs provided the political cover for Axworthy to put the landmine issue on the agenda and to take the initiative to encourage state action at the international level.

In summary, even though the work of Axworthy, Leahy, Mandela, and the Princess of Wales are excellent examples for highlighting the

[116] Canadian Government of Foreign Affairs and International Trade, "Canada in the World: Government Statement," 1995, 48–49, quoted in Maxwell A. Cameron, "Democratization of Foreign Policy: The Ottawa Process as a Model," in Cameron, Lawson, and Tomlin, eds. (fn. 6), 433; Valerie Warmington and Celina Tuttle, "The Canadian Campaign," in Cameron, Lawson, and Tomlin, eds. (fn. 6), 49.

[117] Warmington and Tuttle (fn. 116), 49.

[118] Ibid., 51, 54.

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need for state action, these individuals needed NGOs to help pressure states on a number of fronts. The issue of whether or not landmines were legal touched many constituencies, such as environmental, human-rights, and refugee NGOs. These NGOs provided information, public-opinion support, and resources to these individuals to highlight the landmine issue and pressure states into changing their landmine policies.

Also helping NGOs get the landmine issue transformed from a policy to a normative issue was the cynical view that many people have of governments. It may have contributed to the muting of landmine-ban opposition. Some media scholars imply that rising levels of mistrust and cynicism in the public is correlated with growing consumption of more information from the media, especially television.[119] Unknowingly, NGOs capitalized on those cynical views by using the media to promote landmine-victim stories and point a finger at the "bad guys" to embarrass and isolate governments not supporting the ban. For example, the ICBL developed a "good guy" list as part of a strategy to move the landmine-ban issue forward at the CCW conferences.[120] This list was circulated to the media, which, in turn, pressured governments. Moreover, data from media coverage show "that whereas mine incidents were rarely reported upon before the campaign to ban landmines reached prominence, since that time they have been treated increasingly as newsworthy events deserving of political attention."[121]

In sum, the leadership-game schema influenced how the landmine issue was perceived by many governments and the public. From the NGO perspective, the landmine issue was a humanitarian problem that should be addressed at the international level. In contrast, major powers, such as the United States, argued that landmines were strategically useful tools on the battlefield. For example, the United States argued that retaining their use was essential for maintaining peace in the Korean peninsula and ridding Kuwait of Iraqi occupation. Regardless, the NGOs continually argued that such reasoning was incoherent when examining the landmine issue at the humanitarian level.

NGO support of key individuals, such as Leahy, Princess Diana, Axworthy, and Mandela, through information and political support, guaranteed that the landmine issue would be addressed once it was on the agenda. While Leahy may not have been successful in obtaining a U.S.

[119] Capella and Jamieson (fn. 16); Kerbel (fn. 16).
[120] Williams and Goose (fn. 6), 31.
[121] Richard Price and Daniel Hope, "Media Coverage of Landmines," in *Landmine Monitor Report 1999* (fn. 33), 1048.

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signature on the treaty, he did move policy closer to a ban and, most importantly, much of his domestic legislation, such as the export moratorium, was modeled by other states and the United Nations. The personal experiences of Leahy, Princess Diana, Axworthy, and Mandela, working with humanitarian NGOs, such as LSN, MAC, MAG, SACBL, and VVAF, attest that individuals can truly make a difference in policy agenda setting. Some international relations theorists argue that transnational entrepreneurs need to be important decision makers themselves or have the ability to influence such decision makers to move an issue into the international arena.[122] These individuals seem to fit the description explained above, but they could not have achieved the landmine-policy results without NGO advice, encouragement, and support.

PRIMING: INCOHERENT ARGUMENTS

In essence, the forces in favor of a landmine ban used landmine victims as the priming tool, not only to get the landmine issue on the international agenda but also as a moral argument to stigmatize the weapon and anyone that supported its continued use. This strategy proved extremely helpful in countering anti-ban arguments that landmine use was a legitimate military activity under international humanitarian law. By featuring landmine victims frequently and prominently in their promotional literature and reports and in speeches and conferences, the NGO strategy consisted primarily of emotional arguments brought by and on behalf of victims. They were right. There was no real attempt by states opposed to the ban to dispute the humanitarian arguments. Instead, these anti-ban states made strong military and political arguments as to why landmines should not be banned but at the same time expressed humanitarian concern for the landmine victims. These strategies produced incoherent policies that were not compatible with how and why the landmine issue was established on the international agenda.

Governmental policymakers were hesitant to state their opposition to a ban because of media and public opinion condemning landmine use as the main cause of the humanitarian problem. A 1996 poll showed that the international public was increasingly united in their belief that landmines were horrific and indiscriminate killers and should be banned. The response to the question, "would you personally be in favor of or against your country signing the landmine ban treaty?"

[122] Ethan Nadelmann, "Global Prohibition Regimes: The Evolution of Norms in International Society," *International Organization* 44 (Autumn 1990).

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was overwhelming. Of the twenty-one states surveyed, Japan and the United States scored the lowest in approval at still the relatively high rates of 58 percent and 60 percent respectfully, while Denmark at 92 percent and Spain at 91 percent scored the highest. Even the citizens of other major power states, such as Russia (83 percent) and India (82 percent) favored their country signing landmine-ban treaty.[123]

III. Alternative Explanation

Neorealism

Neorealists would explain the international norm for banning landmines as epiphenomenal because they believe that such norms do not have an independent effect on state behavior. For example, neorealist scholar John Mearsheimer argues that states do not follow international norms that do not serve their self-interests.[124] Since anarchy remains constant and the units of an anarchic system are functionally undifferentiated, neorealists focus on material capabilities as the most identifiable characteristics of the states rather than on sociological influences, such as norms. Therefore, according to neorealist principles, we can assume that states ban landmines because they perceive some relative gains in prohibiting landmine use. Similarly, states that do not use mines simply agree not to use them. In other words, some states did not sign the ban because continued landmine use is a means to ensure further their own survival, while other states signed because it signals merely an easy way for them to help achieve their goal of survival. The explanation for why states either signed or did not sign the treaty simply reflects the interests of states adhering to the ban.

Another neorealist explanation for why states signed the landmine ban could be that landmines have no military utility to enhance or threaten a state's security interests. Since it asserts that the primary actors in international relations are states, this particular explanation would explain the ban as a process derived from a state-centered perspective. Neorealists could argue that many states banned landmines because these weapons no longer have the utility that they once had; therefore, their prohibition does not affect state interests.[125] According

[123] "Ban of Use Land Mines in Favour or Against," Gallup International Opinion Research, Spring 1996.

[124] John Mearsheimer, "The False Promise of Institutions," in Michael E. Brown, Sean M. Lynn Jones, and Steven Miller, eds., *The Perils of Anarchy: Contemporary Realism and International Security* (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1995), 334.

[125] Price implies the same. Price (fn. 6), 614.

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TABLE 2
REGIONAL OPPOSITION FOR THE OTTAWA TREATY[a]

Region	*Total Nonsignatory States*	*Total States in Region*	*% of States Not Signing*
Africa	8	48	17
Americas	2	35	6
Asia-Pacific	21	35	60
Europe/Central Asia	4	43	8
Middle East/North Africa	12	17	71

[a] State support for the treaty as of March 1999. ICRC, *Landmine Monitor Report 1999: Toward a Mine-Free World* (New York: Human Rights Watch, 1999).

to neorealists, it is easy to achieve an international agreement when no one's interests are threatened or when states do not care deeply about relative gains.[126] They would argue that perhaps the main reason for the ban is the simple fact that landmines do not win wars and are not essential to many states' national security. Many states did not sign the treaty because they still employ landmines for national security purposes, while many signatory states have relatively little security concerns and thus do not require landmines. Table 2 highlights regional opposition to the ban. In regions where security tensions are high, a greater percentage of states oppose the treaty. For example, in the Middle East, 71 percent of the states oppose the treaty. In comparison, less than 7 percent of states in the Americas, where security tension is relatively low, oppose the treaty. A neorealist would assert that this divergence most likely reflects more stable governments and recognized borders. Furthermore, neorealists do not have to highlight only the general pattern of regional support for the ban. They can point out that South Korea and the United States are hesitant to join the ban because of landmine use in the DMZ.

Neorealists could also argue that since the major powers did not sign the convention, it is meaningless. While most of the smaller and midsize states support the ban regime, major powers, such as China, India, Pakistan, Russia, and the United States, did not sign because it is not in their interest to do so.[127] Waltz says that "a general theory of interna-

[126] Mearsheimer (fn. 124), 346–51.

[127] Five major states did not sign the Ottawa Treaty for the following reasons—China: to prevent foreign military interference, to maintain national unity, and to protect the well-being of its people; India: to maintain security; Pakistan: to maintain security; Russia: to protect nuclear plants and borders; and U.S.: to preserve security in Korea and to maintain mixed landmine systems. The sources for

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tional politics is necessarily based on great powers" and that "so long as major states are major actors, the structure of international politics is defined in terms of them. States set the scene in which, they, along with non-state actors, stage dramas or carry on their humdrum affairs."[128]

Critique of Alternative Explanations

The neorealist ontology skirts a key issue in international relations: when and under what conditions do issues not originating from states get on the international political agenda? Because neorealism's ontology privileges states over other international actors, it cannot explain the NGO role in agenda setting, controlling the landmine issue, and encouraging states to sign. Neorealists believe that NGOs themselves are dependent upon underlying power distributions. This article's main theoretical point is taken from the contructivist approach: state interest and identity formation on the landmine issue are due to the placement of the ban-landmine norm on the international political agenda, and NGOs are able to control and sustain the issue independent of existing state power distributions. Moreover, the reason that states addressed the landmine issue is because NGOs placed it on the international political agenda. In other words, the implication is that if NGOs did not place and control the landmine issue on the international political agenda, states would not even be discussing a ban let alone actually following through with action. Since Waltz posits that the NSA role in international affairs is marginal,[129] he and other neorealists are unable to explain why states were confronted with the landmine issue in the first place.

People, however, may question the ban's effectiveness because the major producers did not sign. While it is true that China and Russia did not sign, most of the other major landmine producers have stopped production, belying criticism that only states that did not produce landmines agreed not to sell them. Specifically, in the past few years the number of states producing landmines has:

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each respective country are: China: "The Issue of Anti-Personnel Landmines," China National Defense White Paper, Information Office of the States Council, Peoples Republic of China, July 27, 1998, quoted in *Landmine Monitor Report 1999* (fn. 33), 455; India: "India Calls for International Consensus on Banning Landmines," *Xinhua English Newswire*, November 15, 1998; Pakistan: BBC Worldwide Monitoring Source, Radio Pakistan, external source, March 17, 1999; Russia: Timothy Heritage, "Russia Rebuffs Calls to Sign Landmine Treaty, *Reuters*, May 27, 1998, and Michelle Kelemen, "Russia/Landmines," *Voice of America*, May 27, 1998; U.S.: President Bill Clinton, letter to Marissa A. Vitagliano, acting coordinator, U.S. Campaign to Ban Landmines, August 31, 1998.

[128] Waltz (fn. 49), 73, 94.

[129] Ibid., 94–95.

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dropped dramatically from 54 to 16. The 38 who have stopped production include a majority of the big producers in the 1970s, 1980s, and early 1990s—those who bear much of the responsibility for the tens of millions of mines now in the ground. Eight of the twelve biggest producers and exporters over the past thirty years have signed the treaty and stopped production: Belgium, Bosnia, Bulgaria, Czech Republic, France, Hungary, Italy, and the United Kingdom. Other significant producers that have signed include Germany, Croatia, Chile and Brazil."[130]

Even though the major states did not sign the treaty, NGO pressure, enforced by public opinion, encouraged them to implement certain landmine-policy changes unilaterally. Despite their opposition to the treaty, they have instituted policy changes that closely reflect the treaty's objectives.[131] Such unilateral policy announcements reflect a nonconventional approach to international law, and, in particular, seem to bode well for the potential effectiveness of the regime to ban landmines. These actions, especially from major powers, such as the United States, Russia, and China, are caused by "the failure of the international legal system, coupled with fundamentally changed circumstances since the time when the relevant texts were agreed."[132] In the case of the landmine ban, the major powers thought they had unique military responsibilities requiring landmine use; after the signing of the treaty, however, they implemented more restrictive landmine policies thus signaling movement toward supporting the treaty's objectives.

Another charge against the convention's effectiveness could be that it does not include extensive verification provisions. While the convention does allow for some minimal compliant procedures in case of state violation, it is a long and torturous process.[133] NGOs supported the exclusion of intensive verification provisions in the convention in order to

[130] *Landmine Monitor Report 1999* (fn. 33), 5.

[131] Five major states changed their landmine policies since the founding of the ICBL in 1991: China instituted a unilateral landmine export moratorium; India supports a ban on all landmine transfers; Pakistan carefully regulates landmine use; Russia instituted a unilateral landmine export moratorium; and the U.S. instituted a unilateral landmine export moratorium, put a cap on landmine stockpiles, and will cease to use landmines in 2006 if alternatives to APLs and mixed munitions are identified and fielded. The sources for each respective country are: China: China National Defense White Paper (fn. 127); India: *Xinhua English Newswire* (fn. 127); Pakistan: Radio Pakistan (fn. 127); Russia: "Yeltsin Affirms Support for Ban on Mines," *Reuters*, October 29, 1997; and U.S.: "Suspension of Transfers of Anti-Personnel Mines," U.S. National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1993, U.S. Federal Register, vol. 57 November 25, 1992, p. 228, and Clinton to Vitagliano (fn. 127).

[132] Rosalyn Higgins, *Problems and Process: International Law and How We Use It* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995), 252.

[133] Article 8 of the Ottawa Convention addresses "facilitation and clarification of compliance," but its verification provisions are minimal. Setting aside the arguments that Article 8 may actually entail verification provisions, this essay takes the ICBL point of view regarding the lack of verification in the convention. Jody Williams, "Talk to America," *Voice of America Radio Service*, December 4, 1998.

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attract more states to sign the ban.[134] NGOs developed and implemented a strategy that called for bringing as many states as possible into the regime to counter major-power opposition. Eliminating verification provisions was intended to reduce states' fears of meddlesome inspections.

The lack of verification provisions in the ban convention could have disadvantages. In a verification-free convention, states may believe that prohibitions can be easily circumvented by cheating and, therefore, might sign the ban but not worry about compliance. Some scholars believe that the lack of verification provisions is the principal problem in many arms-control and disarmament agreements. Without verification provisions, "legal prohibitions of weapons are mere ploughings of the sand."[135]

Despite this argument, however, the Ottawa Convention holds several important advantages for states that do sign. Most states that sign give up nothing they need to defend themselves. State security does not depend on landmines. The existence of a landmine prohibition, however, gives signatory states a solid moral and political basis for criticizing other states' ownership or use of these weapons. While the ban convention cannot ensure that states will abide by the prohibition, it will increase the economic and political costs of using them. States that do not wish to be internationally isolated may thus be dissuaded from producing and using landmines and from maintaining landmine stockpiles.

The fact that so many states signed the verification-free ban convention also indicates a level of universal agreement on banning landmines. It may also suggest that state attraction to signing the ban is contingent upon the destructiveness of the weapon system. For example, states may not be as vulnerable to the negative effects of defection from bans on lower-level conventional weapons, such as landmines, as they would be to bans on nuclear weapons.

IV. Conclusion

By transforming the landmine-ban debate from a military and security issue to a humanitarian problem, NGOs created an opportunity to negotiate the landmine issue differently from previous arms-control and disarmament treaties. Changing the issue category also helped NGOs to increase state attention and action toward the landmine issue. For example, noted public policy scholar John W. Kingdon says that that by

[134] Ibid.
[135] Geoffrey Best, *War and Law since 1945* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1994), 308.

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"putting the subject into one category rather than another" helps bring the problem to the attention of those in and around government.[136] Moreover, opening up the debate to humanitarian issues allows significant access to nontraditional foreign and security policy actors, such as humanitarian and religious groups, into the public policy-making process. Lastly, the debate transformation expanded the scope of conflict about landmine policy, thereby helping to increase the visibility of the issue to policymakers and the public and, in turn, involving them more actively in policy discourse.[137]

At the agenda-setting level of norms, opening the debate to nonmilitary experts, such as Axworthy, Leahy, Mandela, and Princess Diana, allows civilians to become more involved in the process and to engage military leaders directly. It is not surprising, therefore, that President Clinton decided to remain outside the Ottawa Convention process for national security reasons, while addressing the humanitarian aspects of the landmine issue with increased funding for landmine-victim assistance and demining programs.

The article's broader implication is that under certain conditions NGOs can contribute to creating international law, especially legal prohibitions on weapons that are strategically dubious and humanitarianly suspect, which, in turn, can effect state behavioral changes. Several unique conditions of the Ottawa Convention process are potentially revealing of the role that NGOs can play in this process. First, the role that victims played in NGO strategies to achieve the ban was a significant factor in drawing international attention to the landmine issue that eventually resulted in state action. Landmine victims, whether in their role as part of statistics and NGO stigmatization strategies or through their personal testimonies at international conferences and in media profiles, were a powerful instrument for NGOs to frame the issue. In fact, the first line of the Ottawa Convention's text says that the purpose of the treaty is "to put an end to the suffering and casualties caused by anti-personnel mines, that kill or maim hundreds of people every week, mostly innocent and defenceless civilians and especially children."

Looking at other weapons that were banned or severely restricted by the international community, such as biological, nuclear, and chemical weapons, the role of victims in accomplishing the conventions was not as significant, especially when compared with the NGO role in high-

[136] Kingdon (fn. 56), 21.

[137] Schattschneider argues that the expansion of conflict signals a healthy democracy because it allows for increased public participation, usually through "responsible leaders and organizations," into the policy process. Schattschneider (fn. 102), 142.

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lighting landmine victims to help achieve the Ottawa Treaty.[138] It should be noted here that the 1925 Geneva Protocol on Poisonous Gas also partially resulted from "popular demands for a ban" in light of the more than one million gas victims from World War I, albeit victims were not a major factor in achieving the more recent Chemical Weapons Convention, which was "prompted by the use of herbicides and riot control agents during the Viet Nam War."[139]

The lack of victim participation in the great NGO effort to ban nuclear weapons may explain why it has not been as successful as the landmine campaign in attracting international attention.[140] NGO initiatives in the nuclear weapons campaign were composed primarily of experts arguing from specific legal and medical points of view, which resonated less with public and state representatives than did a parade of civilian victims of that particular weapon *and* NGO experts. Another possible explanation for the failure of the movement to ban nuclear weapons is that banning landmines may not be as important to states as banning nuclear weapons. Violations of a landmine ban would not fundamentally threaten national security, while an undetected violation of a nuclear weapons ban could pose a serious threat.

NGOs primarily focused on the humanitarian aspects of the mine issue, addressing the plight of victims rather than focusing on the military and security implications of the ban. This emphasis is reflected in the convention's call for state signatories to "provide assistance for the care and rehabilitation, and social and economic reintegration, of mine victims."[141] Since including victim assistance into an arms control or disarmament convention is not standard practice, strong arguments had to be made to include language that "would require states to accept certain affirmative duties toward individuals injured by mines."[142] For the treaty to accomplish its goal of providing a complete response to the

[138] While victims were the main framing issue in the Ottawa Landmine Treaty, for biological, nuclear, and chemical weapons, the central framing issues were repugnance, proliferation, and environmental threat, respectively. Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction, 1972, preamble; Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, 1968; Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons, *Chemical Weapons: Basic Facts* (The Hague: Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons), 5; Ottawa Treaty (fn. 1), preamble.

[139] Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (fn. 138), 2, 5. The 1925 Geneva Protocol is officially known as the Geneva Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or Other Gases, and Bacteriological Methods of Warfare.

[140] There are currently three efforts by NGOS to ban nuclear weapons: (1) Abolition 2000: A Global Network to Eliminate Nuclear Weapons, c/o Waging Peace, www.napf.org/abolition2000; (2) Middle Powers Initiative (MPI)—Fast track to Zero Nuclear Weapons, www.napf.org/mpi; and (3) IALANA—Nuclear Weapons: Dismantling by Law, www.ddh.nl/org/ialana.

[141] Ottawa Convention (fn. 1), article 6, para. 3.

[142] While the Ottawa Landmine Treaty contained provisions for victim assistance, arms control treaties for biological, nuclear, and chemical weapons did not.

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threats presented by landmines, the inclusion of mine-victim assistance was necessary "to prevent mine victims' permanent inability to function, work, or otherwise participate as productive members of society."[143]

The NGO role in setting and controlling the landmine issue on the international political agenda also provides a distinctive form of world politics that this article assesses: a collaborative process between moderate states and transnational NGOs—"a new internationalism" that is evident in other settings. This form of world politics provides a process model that could be useful in current and future efforts to promote security, prohibitions, and restrictions. For example, the Coalition to Stop the Use of Child Soldiers is currently attempting to attach to the Convention on the Rights of the Child an optional protocol banning the recruitment and participation of child soldiers. After eight years of negotiations, on January 21, 2000, governments, including the United States, agreed to ban the use of soldiers under the age of eighteen in armed conflicts but not ban the recruitment of soldiers under eighteen.[144] Because the issue is being negotiated in a consensus-negotiating forum, the United States and other states are able to block the adoption of eighteen as the minimum age for voluntary recruitment. United States opposition is based on "concerns over whether setting the minimum recruitment age at 18 would compromise national security or limit sovereignty."[145] Most likely, the NGO coalition and state allies will be forced to mirror the NGO landmine campaign by taking the issue out of a consensus forum and creating a negotiating forum more open to NGO agenda control.

Another effort that evinces this distinctive form of world politics is the Global Campaign on Small Arms and Light Weapons. The campaign is composed of NGOs and seeks to address the problems caused by the proliferation and misuse of small arms and light weapons. The distinctive form of world politics evidenced by the landmine campaign "provided the foundation" for this effort to alleviate the effects of "the widespread availability of light weapons."[146] Again, because of concerns among states, NGOs may also have to take these negotiations out of any state consensus-based forum.

The article's findings provide an explanation both for why the landmine-ban issue was absent from the international political agenda

[143] Jerry White and Ken Rutherford, "The Role of the Landmine Survivors Network," in Cameron, Lawson, and Tomlin (fn. 6), 113.

[144] U.S. Campaign to Stop the Use of Child Soldiers, http://www.us-childsoldiers.org>U.S. Policy.

[145] Mike Wessells, "Child Soldiers," *Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists* 53 (November–December 1997), 39.

[146] Liz Clegg, "NGOs Take Aim," *Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists 55 (January–February 1999), 49.*

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before the ICBL's founding in 1991 and for why it drew the rapid attention once it materialized. Its findings are significant for larger concerns in political science. It sheds light on a few conditions under which NGOs can affect state behavior in an area traditionally at the heart of state sovereignty—security and weapons. Importantly, it shows why many states were attracted to the landmine-ban issue. In this article, any arguments that states signed the treaty because of the NGO agenda-setting role are hypothetical. Nevertheless, the article shows why states were motivated and pressured by NGOs to address the landmine issue.

Meanwhile, the international legal community should be interested in the article's findings because it provides a process model for current and future NGO-state collaborative efforts to alleviate the negative effects of certain weapons, especially those with a dubious military utility. Since the landmine-ban norm originated at the substate level and not with major state powers, the rise of the landmine-ban norm may help explain why particular issues take off. This point leads us to probe further and ask if the emergence of the landmine-ban issue says something more generally about international law and relations.

The article also suggests that that NGOs can be productive players in the evolving arms-control agenda by identifying weapons or other security practices that are contrary to humanitarian principles. For example, NGOs can help target weapons currently in development in order to reduce political opposition and lower implementation costs. Perhaps there also should be a clearer obligation for states to review their weapons currently online. NGOs can be integral to this process by identifying these weapons, and placing and controlling the issue on the international political agenda. Finally, the NGO role in placing the landmine issue on the international political agenda and controlling it once it got there suggests ways that international society can address uncontrolled weapons proliferation and use in a timely and unified manner.

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NOT WITH ONE VOICE
An Explanation of Intragroup Variation in Nationalist Sentiment

By DMITRY GORENBURG*

IN recent years support for nationalism among minorities in multiethnic countries has received a great deal of scholarly attention.[1] Few of these studies, however, have delved into the social bases of support for nationalism within a particular ethnic group. Scholars who study nationalism usually assume that support for nationalism among the members of an ethnic group is either randomly distributed or identical for all members of the group. I argue that both assumptions are implausible and seek to show that the opposite is the case—support for nationalism among members of a minority ethnic group is neither constant nor random. Furthermore, I argue that the extent to which members of social subgroups within the ethnic group come to support nationalism is predictable and is based on a particular sequence of mobilization. This sequence depends on the extent to which members of each subgroup possess a sense of common collective identity and on the strength of their social ties to those at the forefront of the mobilization effort. Both of these factors in turn depend largely on the extent to which state institutions promote ethnic identification among the minority population and create links that increase the density of intragroup social ties. I hypothesize that ethnic institutions are key to explaining the sequence through which social groups within an ethnic minority population come to support nationalism.

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[1] Rogers Brubaker, *Nationalism Reframed* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996); Donald Horowitz, *Ethnic Groups in Conflict* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1985); David D. Laitin, *Identity in Formation* (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1998); Joseph Rothschild, *Ethnopolitics: A Conceptual Framework* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1981).

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Specifically, I investigate the social bases of support for nationalism among minorities in the Russian Federation and show that state institutions channel support for nationalism by structuring collective identities and social networks within society. The first part of the article discusses the limitations of existing explanations of the nature of support for nationalist movements and describes some alternative explanations for the spread of nationalist sentiment. After a short discussion of the data sources and methodology, I offer an example of how institutions foster nationalist feeling among particular social groups in Tatarstan. Although this case is meant to illustrate the institutionalist explanation, rather than to provide conclusive proof of its validity, it provides an excellent test of the model because of the moderate levels of support for nationalism among Tatars. By contrast, regions where support for nationalism is low are not a useful test—because so few individuals support nationalism, it is difficult to distinguish differences between social groups within the population. Similarly, in regions where support for nationalism is quite high, members of virtually all social groups are likely to express nationalist sentiments. But a region like Tatarstan, where support for nationalism among Tatars is approximately 50 percent, is ideal for determining which social factors are more likely to encourage individuals to support nationalism under conditions in which nationalism is not certain either to become dominant or to disappear. The article concludes with a discussion of the implications of this theory for the study of nationalism.

Theoretical Explanations of Intragroup Variation in Nationalism

Recent academic studies of ethnic mobilization have considered why certain ethnic groups mobilize against the state or against other ethnic groups inhabiting the same territory. These explanations have variously attributed intergroup ethnic conflict to (1) cultural differences between ethnic groups, (2) differences in relative levels of economic development, (3) state institutions that promote hostility or competition among groups, (4) security dilemmas facing group members living in a collapsing state, and (5) ethnic entrepreneurs who encourage group members to mobilize.[2] These studies share an assumption that ethnic

[2] Brubaker (fn. 1); Horowitz (fn. 1); V. P. Gagnon, Jr., "Ethnic Nationalism and International Conflict: The Case of Serbia," *International Security* 19 (Winter 1994–95); Samuel P. Huntington, *The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1996); Barry R. Posen, "The Security Dilemma and Ethnic Conflict," *Survival* 35 (Spring 1993).

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conflict may be explained entirely at the level of the whole ethnic group.

Scholars whose work focuses on electoral outbidding or on the actions of ethnic entrepreneurs assume that all of the members of a particular ethnic group face identical incentive structures. This assumption is made explicit in Rabushka and Shepsle's *Politics in Plural Societies*, which argues that "the members of an ethnic community perceive and express preferences about political alternatives identically. Thus all members may be represented by identical 'ethnic preference functions.'"[3] The authors make this assertion because they believe that plural societies are made up of highly cohesive communities in which preferences of all community members are "narrowly distributed about the modal preference ordering of the community."[4] Horowitz implicitly makes a similar assumption, since he bases the likelihood of ethnic conflict on the extent to which ethnic groups have experienced modernization and on the level of economic development of the regions in which they live.[5] And in his discussion of the structure of ethnic party systems, he assumes that all voters within a single ethnic group have an equal preference for ethnonationalism. In arguing that ethnic parties will tend toward radical policies because of the danger of being outflanked if they pursue moderation, he ignores the possibility of multiple preferences among members of the ethnic group.[6] If there were intragroup variation in the level of support for ethnonationalism, then ethnic parties would face the danger of being outflanked on the side of moderation as well, and we would expect to find multiple parties representing the various viewpoints on ethnonationalism within the ethnic group. Although Rothschild focuses on the strategies used by ethnic leaders to mobilize their followers, he, too, neglects the role of differences among individuals in support for nationalist leaders. He assumes that once the tactics and strategies of nationalist mobilization have been determined by the leaders, the members of the ethnic group will uniformly support these strategies and carry out the leaders' instructions.[7] These scholars all make the implausible assumption that all members of a single ethnic group will have identical preferences for ethnonationalism.

[3] Alvin Rabushka and Kenneth Shepsle, *Politics in Plural Societies: A Theory of Democratic Instability* (Columbus, Ohio: Charles E. Merrill Publishing Company, 1972), 67.

[4] Ibid.

[5] Horowitz (fn. 1), 234–35, 259.

[6] Ibid., 346.

[7] Rothschild (fn. 1), 168.

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Scholars who base their explanations of support for nationalism on game theory, such as David Laitin, do recognize that individual members of an ethnic group vary in their propensity to support ethnonationalism. However, since they do not have a theory to account for this variation, they assume that support for nationalism is distributed randomly within the ethnic group. Laitin, for example, argues that some individuals will have particularly high incentives to lead a cultural revival and thus become "cultural heroes." After mentioning that this difference in payoffs among individuals is the driving force in initiating cultural revivals, Laitin does not discuss either why some individuals would have higher than average incentives to pursue such a strategy or which individuals would have such a payoff structure.[8] As will be shown in this article, this assumption of random distribution of preferences is as implausible as the previous one, since support for nationalism correlates with a host of socioeconomic, cultural, and institutional variables in a manner that allows for insights into the manner in which nationalism spreads through a population.

Instrumentalists are one group of scholars who have focused on the role of individual preferences in determining support for nationalism. They start from the rational choice perspective that ethnic mobilization and conflict result from people acting in their self-interest. This allows them to avoid the tendency to treat ethnic groups as unitary actors. According to the instrumentalist argument, therefore, "ethnic groups represent, in essence, coalitions which have been formed as part of rational efforts to secure benefits."[9] Likewise, ethnic mobilization is initiated by elites who seek to acquire material benefits or power. In order to attract followers, they provide prospective supporters with selective benefits. Ethnic mobilization thus occurs when elites are able to provide their followers with sufficient benefits so that individuals gain more from the benefits than they risk losing if the mobilization fails.[10]

To avoid circularity, the instrumentalist argument needs to identify the actors' preferences ex ante. Most instrumentalists argue that individuals engaged in ethnic mobilization are primarily seeking material goods.[11] Even scholars who acknowledge psychological and other nonmaterial benefits, such as Hardin and Hechter, clearly believe that ma-

[8] Laitin (fn. 1), 248–50.

[9] Robert Bates, "Modernization, Ethnic Competition, and the Rationality of Politics in Contemporary Africa," in Donald Rothchild and Victor Olorunsola, eds., *State versus Ethnic Claims: African Policy Dilemmas* (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1983), 152.

[10] Russell Hardin, *One for All: The Logic of Group Conflict* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1995), 49–50.

[11] For example, see Bates (fn. 9), 153.

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terial interests are the most important factor in determining the extent of ethnic mobilization.[12] The instrumentalist argument thus usually reduces ethnic conflict to the result of competition between neighboring groups for more material goods.

Hypotheses about ethnic mobilization based on instrumentalism may be based on either the rationality of group self-interest or the rationality of individual self-interest. Hardin shows that arguments based on group self-interest do not contradict the instrumentalist assumption of individual rationality. This is because group success will help these individuals gain access to patronage jobs and increase their sense of security and comfort. Actions that benefit the group will benefit all of the individuals who constitute it, so all members of the group will support group mobilization as long as it is in the group's interest to mobilize. Hence it is rational for individuals to take action for the benefit of the group even when there are personal costs involved.[13] In attempting to integrate group self-interest and individual rationality, this argument thus returns to the assumptions that ethnic groups may be treated as unitary actors for the purpose of determining the extent of support for nationalism.

Other instrumentalist scholars have been more reluctant to treat ethnic groups as unitary actors when discussing the emergence of nationalism. Hechter, for one, argues that individuals join nationalist movements only when they will personally receive economic benefits either from simply joining the organization or from a nationalist victory.[14] Based on this theory, we should expect that those individuals who are most likely to receive jobs or other patronage benefits should be the strongest supporters of nationalist mobilization. These individuals, according to Hechter, are likely to be found primarily among the middle class, in particular, among professionals and government employees. He argues that since the supply of patronage resources is limited, such benefits will be distributed to those who are able "to master the social skills necessary to function in a bureaucratic environment." Furthermore, since secession is likely to damage economic links between the region and the rest of the state, supporters of minority nationalist movements are also likely to be those who are less dependent on markets outside the region, such as professionals and government workers.[15] If Hechter is

[12] Hardin (fn. 10), 76–77, 179; Michael Hechter, "Dynamics of Secession," *Acta Sociologica* 35 (1992), 275, 280.
[13] Hardin (fn. 10), 70.
[14] Hechter (fn. 12), 276.
[15] Ibid., 275.

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right, we should expect professionals and government employees to be more supportive of nationalism than workers, peasants, or students.

Cultural explanations of ethnonationalism have made their mark in the comparative literature on ethnicity. In the 1960s and 1970s these explanations took their lead from the theory of cultural pluralism, which argues that cultural differences inevitably lead to intergroup conflict because they render different groups fundamentally incompatible.[16] Geertz expressed a similar view in arguing that the immutable nature of ethnic identities made them particularly amenable to use in political mobilization. This culturally based mobilization would then inevitably bring ethnic groups into conflict with each other and with the state.[17]

Recently, cultural explanations for conflict have been resurrected by Samuel Huntington, who argues that cultural differences are more important than differences in ideology, politics, or economics in determining where conflict may occur.[18] He further argues that cultural commonalities facilitate cooperation and cohesion, whereas cultural differences promote cleavage and conflict. He notes that disagreements over culture are particularly likely to become conflictual because they are zero sum in nature and therefore highly resistant to compromise solutions. Like most Sovietologists who studied ethnic politics before the collapse of the Soviet Union, Huntington argues that the most common type of intercivilizational conflict occurs between Muslims and non-Muslims, particularly Christians. In arguing that differences between civilizations are the preeminent cause of conflict in the modern world, Huntington has returned cultural explanations to the center of the debate on ethnic conflict.

His theory would imply that the extent of ethnic mobilization may depend on the extent of cultural differences between two groups that inhabit the same space. If this argument is correct, then ethnic mobilization will be strong when two ethnic groups belonging to different civilizations share the same territory. This point has little bearing on explaining variation in support for nationalism within a particular ethnic group, however, since presumably its members are culturally very similar.

[16] See Leo Kuper, "Plural Societies: Perspectives and Problems," in Leo Kuper and M. G. Smith, eds., *Pluralism in Africa* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1969); and M. G. Smith, *The Plural Society in the British West Indies* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1974).

[17] Clifford Geertz, "The Integrative Revolution: Primordial Sentiments and Civil Politics in the New States," in Geertz, *The Interpretation of Cultures* (New York: Basic Books, 1973). My understanding of cultural pluralism is shaped in large part by its presentation in Rabushka and Shepsle (fn. 3) and in Paul Brass, *Ethnicity and Nationalism* (Newbury Park, N.J.: Sage, 1991).

[18] Huntington (fn. 2).

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The Effect of Institutions on Cultural Identity and Ethnic Mobilization

An alternative explanation for the strength of nationalism among minority ethnic groups focuses on the strength of a group's cultural identity. This direction of argument seems potentially more useful in explaining intragroup variation in support for nationalism, which may be the result of variation in the strength of cultural identity of individuals belonging to the group.[19] According to this argument, the likelihood that a subgroup will support nationalist goals depends strongly on how connected its members feel to the rest of their ethnic group. The nationalist agenda is more likely to appeal to individuals who feel that they share a common identity with the rest of their ethnic community. And the spread of nationalism may be particularly rapid among population groups that have dense intragroup social networks and close connections with the intellectual and academic community within which the movement originated.

But what factors determine the strength of an individual's sense of cultural identity? One argument is that cultural identity is supported by the use of one's native language, the practice of traditional customs, and the holding of strong religious beliefs and that it is therefore gradually dissolved by modernization, as people who move to urban areas and take industrial jobs are more likely to stop using their native language, to forget traditional customs, and to deemphasize their religious beliefs.[20] If this argument holds true, we should expect greater support for nationalism among the rural population, especially among individuals who are firm believers in their religion.

A second possibility—indeed, the one that appears to be borne out by the data—is that the strength of an individual's cultural identity is mediated by state institutions. While both shared ethnic identity and social networks exist independently of institutional arrangements, institutions can play a key role in determining the depth of the sense of common identity and the exact nature of social networks among the minority population. The establishment of new institutions may fundamentally transform the identities and social networks of a particular society, especially in cases where the new institutions are imposed without regard to the traditional patterns of social interaction and/or

[19] The strength of cultural identity may be expressed as a combination of several factors, including knowledge and use of the native language, religious belief, and adherence to national traditions and customs.

[20] Karl W. Deutsch, *Nationalism and Social Communication*, 2d ed. (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1964).

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government structure.[21] The construction of ethnic institutions by the Soviet government in the 1920s is a particularly clear example of institutions being imposed on a society according to academic and political considerations that do not take into account existing social networks and identities. In many cases ethnic homelands were created for political expediency or according to the beliefs of Russian social scientists about minority ethnic identities.[22] In the Soviet case the transformation of social networks and ethnic identities brought about by the imposition of new ethnic institutions is particularly evident.[23] Although many of the explanatory variables discussed in this article are influenced by both cultural and institutional factors, an institutionalist explanation is more useful in explaining the reasons for variation in support for nationalism among different population groups because the institutional factors are, in this case, prior to the cultural factors.

Instilling a strong sense of ethnic community in individuals requires them to be exposed early and frequently to information about their ethnic identity. This exposure often comes primarily through the educational system. By establishing separate systems of native-language education for most of the minority ethnic groups that had their own ethnoterritorial administrative units, the Soviet government created an institution dedicated to instilling a common and separate identity among minority students. The school system fostered the development of a separate identity by physically separating students belonging to the titular ethnic group from their ethnic Russian counterparts. The identity was further reinforced in the classroom, where titular students were taught the culture and history of their ancestors, who were portrayed as having a direct genetic link to the members of the modern ethnic group.[24] Other aspects of institutionalized ethnicity, such as museums of local history and titular-language periodicals dedicated to the spread of knowledge about the ethnic group's history, can further cement the importance of the shared ethnic identity among those educated in the native language. These institutions have played a key role in the formation of nationalist movements among minority groups. Because of the importance of ethnic identity in determining attitudes toward nation-

[21] For a discussion of this argument in the context of the effect of electoral systems on party systems regardless of preexisting social cleavages, see Gary W. Cox, *Making Votes Count: Strategic Coordination in the World's Electoral Systems* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1997).

[22] Terry D. Martin, "An Affirmative Action Empire: Ethnicity and the Soviet State, 1923–1938" (Ph.D. diss., University of Chicago, 1996).

[23] Similar factors may have been at work in Yugoslavia during the 1980s. I am grateful to an anonymous reviewer for pointing this out.

[24] This was based on the strongly primordialist view of ethnicity prevalent in Soviet social science.

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alism, social groups that are more likely to be exposed to native-language education are more likely to be among the first supporters of the nationalist movement. Such groups usually include the older population, inhabitants of rural areas, and people who grew up in the countryside and later migrated to the city.

Although native-language education is particularly important in promoting nationalism, the level of education in general is likely to be positively correlated with support for minority nationalism because individuals with higher levels of education are more likely to retain a strong sense of common ethnic identity. Highly educated people, regardless of the language in which they received this education, are more likely to be interested in history and culture generally, leading to greater exposure to information about the ethnic group and its history. In many cases this exposure can lead to a sense of community with other members of the ethnic group that is similar to that imparted by being educated in the native language. Individuals with a more extensive education are also more likely to follow current political events closely, leading to more knowledge of the local nationalist movement's activities.[25] For these reasons, support for nationalism should correlate positively with education level, although the effect should not be as significant as that of native-language education.

The spread of support for any political movement depends to a large extent on the spread of knowledge about the movement's existence and activities. Mass media typically provide some exposure, but for opposition groups in societies with only partially free media, this coverage is a mixed blessing, since most of it is negative. In such a setting social networks become particularly important for spreading the message and for attracting new supporters. Because they increase the speed of information exchange and the degree of intragroup trust, dense networks of social ties within a group accelerate the spread of activism within the group. In the Soviet Union the formation of close ties within particular social groups was encouraged by state-run organizations such as academic institutes, Communist Party cells, youth organizations, factories, and collective farms. The density of social ties is also closely linked to the strength of collective identity. Members of a social group who also share a sense of common ethnic identity are that much more likely to trust each other and therefore to be willing to join causes supported by other members of their cohort.

[25] This finding does not hold true for majority ethnic groups, since the well-educated elites that belong to such groups are more likely to focus on national politics and the history of the entire state, rather than on the specific history of their ethnic group.

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At the same time as dense social networks facilitate the recruitment process within a social group, connections between members of different groups foster the spread of support for the movement from one group to another. These connections are the key factors determining the sequence in which groups come to support nationalism. In urban areas such connections between members of different groups may occur through contact at places of work and educational institutions. After a critical number of members of a new social group have been recruited by outsiders, the significantly more rapid process of intragroup recruitment begins.

The initial formation of nationalist movements often takes place among ethnic intellectuals closely linked to each other through the academic institutions at which they were trained and at which they work. Because their work focuses on the history and culture of the ethnic group, these intellectuals have a clear sense of the importance of ethnic community. This sense of ethnic identity leads them to organize an ethnic revival movement, a project that is made more feasible because of their closely knit community.

Many of these intellectuals teach at state universities and pedagogical institutes, where they are positioned to have a strong influence on the student population. Students in turn maintain close ties with each other through youth organizations, which also serve to build connections with students at other universities. Indeed, after the collapse of the Communist Youth League (Komsomol) in the Soviet Union, many unassimilated students joined ethnically based youth organizations, which gradually took on the role of youth wings for the nationalist movements. Because of their strong organizational links and their ties to movement organizers, such students are particularly likely to support nationalist movements.

Students are also instrumental in spreading the nationalist message to regions outside the capital cities where the movements are based. Those from rural areas recruit sympathizers in their home regions during university vacations. After completing their studies, some students take positions as teachers in rural areas, where they act as links between the local community and the urban ethnic elite. The many migrants to cities, who maintain close contact with their home villages, also connect the urban and rural communities and, like students, provide channels by which the movement spreads from its initial stronghold among the intellectual elite back to rural villagers.

Inhabitants of rural areas are sympathetic to the nationalist movement because of their strong belief in tradition, much of which is based

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on their ethnic identity. Even when native-language education is almost nonexistent in the cities, a majority of the rural population often attend schools where they are taught in their native language, further strengthening their ethnic identity. Finally, social ties among villagers are particularly dense, with most knowing the other members of the community quite well. Levels of trust are quite high in this population, allowing new ideas to spread rapidly. At the same time the spread of nationalism among this population may sometimes be hindered by the local administration. If important local officials such as the collective farm chairman or the chairman of the local council declare themselves opposed to the nationalist movement, the high density of social ties means that dissenters can be easily discovered and punished. In this environment, therefore, the likelihood of villagers joining the nationalist movement depends in large part on the position taken by the local governing elite.

Migrants from rural areas are not unlike the rural population in terms of their sense of ethnic identity and dense networks of social ties. But because they live in the cities, they are less constrained by the threat of punishment by local leaders. For this reason, migrants should be among the strongest and earliest supporters of nationalist movements in ethnic regions.

Urban industrial workers, also like rural inhabitants, have dense social networks and high levels of intragroup trust. They are much less likely to have been educated in their native language, however, and they have a weaker sense of their ethnic identity and usually do not have strong links to the intellectuals who founded the movement. Their reaction to the nationalist movements is therefore likely to be mixed and highly path dependent. In areas where nationalist ideas gain support early on among at least a few workers, these workers are quite likely to persuade other workers to join as well. In regions where nationalism does not penetrate the worker community early on, they are far more likely to become hostile to the movement.

Purely cultural theories would predict that in a country that was predominantly antireligious, religion would foster a sense of distinct ethnic identity and, in turn, support for nationalism. In the Soviet case this could be particularly true for those ethnic groups whose traditional religion was substantially different from Russian Orthodoxy. Islam, a religion whose adherents were treated for centuries as Russia's main enemies, might be particularly conducive to strengthening a sense of common ethnic identity distinct from that of the majority population. And one might expect Muslims to be more likely than others to support

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the nationalist movement. However, an institutionalist argument such as the one being made here would be skeptical of the mobilizing potential of religious difference absent institutions that could channel religious differences into ethnic claims. I would predict that the relationship between religion and support for nationalism would depend on the extent to which religion was used as a proxy for nationalist claims during the Soviet period and thus on the extent to which it was directly linked to ethnicity in the minds of members of each ethnic group.

The potential reaction of various social groups to the emerging nationalist movement thus depends largely on the extent to which they perceive ethnicity as the most important component of their identity. Their group cohesiveness, as measured by the density of social ties and degree of mutual trust among the members of the group and by the presence of links between them and other social groups, determines the extent to which potential supporters are actually mobilized in support of the nationalist movement. The strength of this sense of collective identity and the extent of group cohesiveness and intergroup links are in turn determined largely by state institutions, which play a mediating role between tradition and culture and the members of the ethnic group.

Data and Methods

To test this explanation of differences in support for ethnic mobilization, I use data from two surveys of the population conducted in Tatarstan in 1993. Most of the data come from the Colton/Hough preelection survey, which was conducted in the sixteen former autonomous republics of the Russian Federation in November and December 1993.[26] It asks a broad set of questions about electoral preferences, attitudes toward economic reform, and ethnic politics. Because this survey does not include measures of the language in which respondents received their education, it is supplemented by the "Language and Nationality in the Former Soviet Union" survey designed by David Laitin and Jerry Hough and conducted by the same team of investigators that conducted the Colton/Hough survey.[27] The latter survey, which in-

[26] The survey interviewed one thousand randomly selected respondents in each region, covering both urban and rural areas. Principal investigators included Timothy Colton of Harvard University, Jerry Hough of Duke University, Susan Lehmann of Columbia University, and Mikhail Guboglo of the Institute of Ethnology and Anthropology of the Russian Academy of Sciences.

[27] For the sake of brevity, this survey is hereafter referred to as the Laitin/Hough survey. For more information on the survey and its results, see Laitin (fn. 1).

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cludes a detailed set of questions on language knowledge and learning, was conducted in Tatarstan, Bashkortostan, and Estonia in 1993, in Kazakhstan and Ukraine in 1994, and in Latvia in 1995. It includes approximately three thousand respondents from urban areas, divided equally between the major ethnic groups in each region and randomly selected on the basis of voting lists. Because it includes only urban respondents, the survey provides only a partial picture of the sources of ethnic mobilization in these regions. By using data from the two surveys in combination, we can gather sufficient data to show which social groups were particularly supportive of the nationalist movements in their regions and thus the extent to which the data support the institutionalized political process theory of ethnic mobilization. I use least-squares (OLS) regression to isolate the effect of belonging to each of various social groups on support for nationalism. The OLS method has the advantage of producing easily interpretable coefficients and may be used when the dependent variable is continuous. Because I am interested in the spread of support for the nationalist movement among the titular ethnic group, I restrict the sample to those respondents who, according to their survey responses, consider themselves to be members of that group.

Explanatory and Control Variables

Most of the explanatory and control variables used in this study are measured directly by questions in the Colton/Hough survey. In addition to variables that measure belonging to the social groups described by the theory,[28] I include several social groups that are likely to be opposed to nationalist mobilization, including former and current members of the Communist Party and people holding leadership positions in government and industry. Finally, I include gender as a demographic control variable. These variables thus include all of the social groups discussed in the theory except for those who received a native-language education. The variables used are not meant to represent a complete breakdown of society into either occupational or status categories. Since the purpose of the analysis is to determine the accuracy of the hypotheses about which groups may support the nationalist movement's agenda, only groups that are relevant to the theory and groups that are necessary as control variables are included in the analysis.

[28] These include intellectuals, students, migrants from rural areas, industrial workers, agricultural workers, and Muslims. I also include variables that measure the respondent's education level, religiosity, and age. For an explanation of how these variables were created, see Dmitry Gorenburg, "Nationalism for the Masses: Minority Ethnic Mobilization in the Russian Federation" (Ph.D. diss., Harvard University, 1999), methodological appendix.

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The effect of native language education is measured by using composite indexes from the Laitin/Hough survey. All three indexes range in value from 0 to 1. The native language education index is a composite of four questions that determine whether the respondent studied in Russian or the native language in kindergarten, primary school, secondary school, and institutions of higher education. The greater the extent of native-language schooling, the higher the value of this index. The index of language-use homogeneity is designed to reflect the extent to which respondents speak their native language with family members, at work, and with friends. The higher the index value, the more homogeneous the respondent's language use. Finally, the index of language fluency reflects how well respondents know their native language. It includes questions about which language the respondent learned to speak first and which language the respondent uses to think, read, write letters, and watch television. The higher the value of the fluency index, the greater the respondent's facility with his or her native language and the greater the range of activities for which it is used.[29]

Most of the social-group indicators used in regressions using the Colton/Hough data are also used with the Laitin/Hough survey. Because the latter survey was conducted only in urban areas, the variables "community size" and "agricultural worker" are omitted. Also excluded from the analysis are religion and membership in the Communist Party, since the Laitin/Hough survey did not ask respondents about those variables.

Dependent Variables

The survey data include a series of questions about respondents' attitudes toward nationalist demands. These questions may be grouped into two indicators, each of which measures a particular aspect of nationalist mobilization. Both of the indicators are scaled from 0 to 1, with higher values indicating greater support for nationalism. The first indicator represents attitudes toward the establishment of a privileged status for the titular language of their ethnic region. In the Colton/Hough data set the language status index is based on three questions:

[29] Factor analysis was used to confirm that these indexes are in fact measuring a single underlying tendency. One factor was detected for the indexes of native-language education and the language-knowledge index. For the language-use index, in addition to the dominant factor that describes language knowledge, two additional factors were detected. These factors grouped the partners in the communication according to their status relative to the respondent. The second factor included elder relatives, while the third factor included conversations with nonrelatives. The factor loadings and other technical information, as well as the exact wording of the questions used to construct these indexes, may be found in the methodological appendix in Gorenburg (fn. 28).

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two measure the respondent's support for proposals to make the titular language the sole official language of the region and to make it a required subject in the republic for schoolchildren irrespective of their ethnicity, and a third asks whether the respondent agrees that all inhabitants of an ethnic republic should speak the titular language. Although the Laitin/Hough data set focuses specifically on language politics and therefore includes a wide variety of measures of attitudes toward language status, in the interest of ensuring maximum comparability across surveys, the only questions used for constructing the language status index for this survey are ones that correspond exactly to the questions used in the Colton/Hough survey. A comparison of regression results for this index with a broader index of ethnic exclusivism, which includes questions on both language issues and ethnopolitical questions, shows virtually identical results. Attitudes toward the status of the titular language can therefore be viewed as indicators of attitudes toward ethnic exclusiveness more generally.

The other indicator of support for nationalism, the index of regional separatism, represents attitudes toward an increase in republic sovereignty. In the Colton/Hough data set it includes questions on whether respondents support the ethnic republics' declarations of sovereignty, whether they would support the transfer of control over the army, police, and security forces to the ethnic republics, and whether they believe that ethnic republics should have the right of self-determination up to and including secession from the Russian Federation. In the Laitin/Hough data set it includes questions on whether respondents would support the establishment of an independent Volga-Ural confederation that would include their republic and whether they would support the transfer of control over the army, police, and security forces to their republic. A final question in each survey asks respondents whether they support the sovereignty of Bashkortostan, a neighboring region.

These two indexes measure two distinct aspects of support for nationalist mobilization. Tables 1 and 2 show that the six questions used to construct these indexes represent two underlying factors that are largely uncorrelated in both surveys. This statistical finding makes sense theoretically. Support for ethnic exclusiveness and privileged status for the titular language does not necessarily correlate with support for increasing the status and power of the ethnic republic. The first corresponds to a purely ethnic vision of nationalism that seeks to increase the status of a particular ethnic group, while the second corresponds more to a state-civic nationalism that seeks to gain benefits for all in-

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TABLE 1
FACTOR MATRIX FOR INDEXES OF SUPPORT FOR NATIONALISM: COLTON/HOUGH SURVEY

Survey Question	*Sole State Language*	*Language Required in School*	*All Must Know Titular Language*	*Support Sovereignty*	*Local Control of Army*	*Support Secession*
Language status	**.596**	**.813**	**.783**	.160	.053	.095
Regional separatism	.311	−.069	.156	**.703**	**.744**	**.749**

habitants of a particular region irrespective of their ethnicity. While supporters of the first type of nationalism focus primarily on cultural issues that are important for preserving the status of their ethnic group, supporters of the second type focus more on power politics in their quest to change the balance of power between their region and the central government in Moscow. In some cases social groups that are strongly predisposed toward supporting one of these types of nationalism strongly oppose the other type.

SUPPORT FOR ETHNIC MOBILIZATION IN TATARSTAN: A TEST OF THE MODEL

In Tatarstan the multivariate regression results show that the strongest supporters of nationalism included Muslims, intellectuals, migrants, and inhabitants of rural areas. Support for nationalism also increased with greater use of and fluency in the Tatar language. At the same time women, industrial workers, and agricultural laborers were less likely to support nationalism. Among the people who identified themselves as Muslim, support for nationalism varied inversely with religiosity.

Before analyzing these results in depth, I examine (without controlling for overlap with other categories) the propensity of the key social categories to support nationalism. This task is accomplished through a series of bivariate regressions of each explanatory variable on each of the two dependent variables. The results are presented in Table 3. Not surprisingly, this analysis shows that the strongest across-the-board support for nationalist demands in Tatarstan is found among intellectuals, who, in comparison with nonintellectuals, are between 5.9 per-

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TABLE 2
FACTOR MATRIX FOR INDEXES OF SUPPORT FOR NATIONALISM: LAITIN/HOUGH SURVEY

Survey Question	*Sole State Language*	*Language Required in School*	*All Must Know Titular Language*	*Support Neighbor's Sovereignty*	*Local Control of Army*	*Support Independent Ural-Volga Confederation*
Language status	**.592**	**.777**	**.786**	.054	.247	.236
Regional separatism	.323	.076	.167	**.762**	**.760**	**.717**

cent and 8.5 percent more likely to support cultural nationalism and between 6.9 percent and 10.9 percent more likely to support regional separatism. Both surveys agree that migrants are also likely to support both linguistic and separatist demands, with the size of the positive effect varying between 5.8 percent and 13.2 percent. Although educational level does not significantly affect the level of support for cultural nationalism, each step in the eight-step education measure increases support for regional separatism by 2.7 to 4.6 percent. By contrast, older respondents and those who consider themselves Muslims strongly support measures to promote the Tatar language but are more ambivalent about regional separatism. Each unit change in the age of the respondent increases support for language status by approximately 0.2 percent, while Muslims are 7.3 percent more likely than non-Muslims to support cultural nationalism. Finally, agricultural and industrial workers are the strongest opponents of nationalism in Tatarstan, although women are also highly opposed to separatism. Some of the results, however, contradict the expectations of the institutionalist explanation. Most significantly, both people in leadership positions and people who at some point belonged to the Communist Party are more likely than the average respondent to support nationalist demands. Also, although the theory predicts that students would be among the strongest supporters of nationalism, the analysis shows that they are not significantly more likely than average to support nationalist demands and perhaps even somewhat more likely than not to oppose them.

Table 4 shows that the standard socioeconomic variables cannot account for a large part of the variation in support for nationalism. As shown by the adjusted R^2 indicator, the model explains between 5 and

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TABLE 3
ETHNIC MOBILIZATION IN TATARSTAN: BIVARIATE ANALYSIS[a]

	Language Status Index		*Regional Separatism Index*	
Independent Variables	*Colton Data*	*Laitin Data*	*Colton Data*	*Laitin Data*
A. Occupational groups				
Intellectual[b]	.085 (.033)***	.059 (.019)***	.109 (.034)***	.069 (.018)***
Student[b]	−.058 (.047)	−.029 (.025)	−.013 (.049)	−.023 (.023)
Leader[b]	.105 (.041)***	.061 (.033)*	.044 (.043)	.097 (.031)***
Industrial worker[b]	−.058 (.032)**	−.047 (.022)**	−.052 (.034)	−.044 (.020)**
Agricultural worker[b]	−.094 (.047)**	—	−.126 (.049)***	—
B. Social Characteristics				
Migrant[b]	.058 (.033)*	.132 (.017)***	.058 (.034)*	.088 (.016)***
Community size[c]	.011 (.012)	—	−.008 (.012)	—
Education[d]	.008 (.012)	.012 (.009)	.046 (.012)***	.027 (.008)***
Sex (1 = female)	−.039 (.028)	.003 (.017)	−.139 (.029)***	−.028 (.016)*
Age[e]	.196 (.090)**	.178 (.057)***	−.022 (.094)	.042 (.053)
C. Beliefs				
Muslim[b]	.073 (.029)***	—	.035 (.030)	—
Religious[d]	.008 (.009)	—	−.006 (.009)	—
Communist[b]	.074 (.041)*	—	.151 (.042)***	—

***p <.01; **p <.05; *p <.10

[a]OLS coefficients. Standard errors are in parentheses.

[b]Variable is dichotomous and equals 1 when respondent belongs to the group.

[c]A proxy variable for rural. Value inversely related to community size and measured on a 4-point scale.

[d]Measured on a 6-point scale.

[e]Variable scaled to measure from 0 to 1.

11 percent of the variation. This finding does not mean that the exercise is fruitless, however. While many factors other than the socioeconomic ones discussed here play a role in persuading individuals to support the nationalist agenda, the results show that a great deal can be learned from examining the effect of social group on preferences for nationalism.

The multivariate regression results confirm most of the bivariate results. The most significant difference is the disappearance of a significant relationship between having a leadership position and support for language preferences. Stepwise analysis of the regression results shows that in the bivariate regression, the leader variable was serving as a proxy for other significant factors, primarily being a migrant from rural to urban areas. The positive bivariate relationship between leadership and the language status index is primarily the result of the dispropor-

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TABLE 4
ETHNIC MOBILIZATION IN TATARSTAN: MULTIVARIATE ANALYSIS[a]

	Language Status Index		*Regional Separatism Index*	
Independent Variables	*Colton Data*	*Laitin Data*	*Colton Data*	*Laitin Data*
A. Occupational groups				
Intellectual[b]	.055 (.036)	.052 (.020)***	.059 (.037)*	.062 (.019)***
Student[b]	−.010 (.053)	.012 (.028)	−.031 (.053)	.051 (.026)**
Leader[b]	.044 (.045)	.030 (.034)	−.063 (.046)	.070 (.032)**
Industrial worker[b]	−.108 (.040)***	−.037 (.025)	−.098 (.040)**	−.016 (.024)
Agricultural worker[b]	−.185 (.061)***	—	−.109 (.062)*	—
B. Social characteristics				
Migrant[b]	.072 (.037)**	.129 (.018)***	.082 (.038)**	.093 (.017)***
Community size[c]	.035 (.015)**	—	.022 (.015)	—
Education[d]	−.009 (.017)	.007 (.009)	.022 (.017)	.019 (.009)**
Sex (1 = female)	−.076 (.031)**	−.011 (.018)	−.165 (.031)***	−.032 (.017)*
Age[e]	.166 (.117)	.104 (.063)*	−.002 (.118)	.043 (.059)
C. Beliefs				
Muslim[b]	.166 (.052)***	—	.176 (.052)***	—
Religious[d]	−.032 (.017)**	—	−.034 (.017)**	—
Communist[b]	−.009 (.047)	—	.061 (.048)	—
Constant	.521 (.130)***	.324 (.052)***	.561 (.131)***	.205 (.049)***
Adjusted R^2	.070	.054	.111	.047
N	478	1,259	478	1,259

***p <.01; **p <.05; *p <.10

[a]OLS coefficients. Standard errors are in parentheses.

[b]Variable is dichotomous and equals 1 when respondent belongs to the group.

[c]A proxy variable for rural. Value inversely related to community size and measured on a 4-point scale.

[d]Measured on a 6-point scale.

[e]Variable scaled to measure from 0 to 1.

tionate number of such migrants found in leadership positions in Tatarstan. Similarly, the age variable loses most of its significance to the migrant variable. Being a communist loses its significance for support for nationalism as a result of a combination of social characteristic variables, particularly gender and education level. Finally, the Muslim and religious variables increase in significance because of their offsetting nature. In the bivariate regressions each variable is partially masked by the countervailing effects of the other. In the multivariate analysis the fact that these two variables have opposite effects on both dependent variables becomes obvious. Being a Muslim increases the likelihood of sup-

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TABLE 5
EFFECT OF LANGUAGE-USE VARIABLES ON SUPPORT FOR NATIONALISM IN TATARSTAN: LAITIN DATA[a]

Independent Variables	*Language Status Index*	*Regional Separatism Index*
Bivariate regressions		
Native-language education	.280 (.028)***	.152 (.027)***
Language-use homogeneity	.386 (.034)***	.136 (.032)***
Language fluency	.431 (.034)***	.201 (.032)***
Multivariate regressions		
Native-language education	.086 (.036)**	.068 (.035)**
Language-use homogeneity	.139 (.051)***	.143 (.050)***
Language fluency	.257 (.057)***	.038 (.055)
Constant	.238 (.021)***	.257 (.021)***
Adjusted R^2	.122	.037
N	1,259	1,259

***p <.01; **p <.05

[a]OLS coefficients. Standard errors are in parentheses.

port for cultural nationalism by 16.6 percent and for regional separatism by 17.6 percent, while a unit increase in the six-step measure of religiosity decreased support for cultural nationalism by 3.2 percent and for regional separatism by 3.4 percent. Thus, strong believers are actually less likely to support nationalism than respondents who do not identity themselves as Muslims at all. The significance of this finding is discussed below.

Overall, it appears that being an intellectual, being male, identifying as Muslim without being devoutly religious, and either living in a rural area or having migrated from a rural area to the city are the most important factors in predicting support for nationalism. At the same time, being an agricultural or industrial worker is correlated with a lower likelihood of support for nationalism.

Before addressing the extent to which these results corroborate the institutional political process model, we need to examine the role of language knowledge and use in predicting support for nationalism. Bivariate and combined regressions of the three language-use indexes on the language status and regional separatism indexes are presented in Table 5. Comparing the adjusted R^2 for the regressions in Tables 4 and 5 shows that the three language indexes together do a better job of explaining variation in support for cultural nationalism than occupation, social characteristics, and beliefs and are almost as good at explaining

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TABLE 6
EFFECT OF LANGUAGE-USE VARIABLES IN TATARSTAN: LAITIN DATA[a]

	Language Status Index		*Regional Separatism Index*	
Independent Variables	*w/o Language*	*with Language*	*w/o Language*	*with Language*
A. Occupational groups				
Intellectual[b]	.052 (.020)***	.047 (.019)**	.062 (.019)***	.058 (.019)***
Student[b]	.012 (.028)	.052 (.027)*	.051 (.026)**	.071 (.026)***
Leader[b]	.030 (.034)	.020 (.033)	.070 (.032)**	.065 (.032)**
Industrial worker[b]	−.037 (.025)	−.024 (.024)	−.016 (.024)	−.009 (.023)
B. Social characteristics				
Migrant[b]	.129 (.018)***	.019 (.021)	.093 (.017)***	.039 (.020)**
Education[c]	.007 (.009)	.028 (.009)***	.019 (.009)**	.031 (.009)***
Sex (1 = female)	−.011 (.018)	−.017 (.018)	−.032 (.017)*	−.035 (.017)**
Age[d]	.104 (.063)*	.004 (.061)	.043 (.059)	−.004 (.056)
C. Language factors				
Native-language education [d]	—	.059 (.038)	—	.020 (.037)
Language-use homogeneity[d]	—	.144 (.051)***	—	.149 (.049)***
Language fluency[d]	—	.303 (.058)***	—	.090 (.056)
Constant	.324 (.052)***	.085 (.055)	.205 (.049)***	.089 (.053)*
Adjusted R^2	.054	.140	.047	.073
N	1,259	1,259	1,259	1,259

***p <.01; **p <.05; *p <.10

[a]Multivariate analysis, OLS coefficients. Standard errors are in parentheses.

[b]Variable is dichotomous and equals 1 when respondent belongs to the group.

[c]Measured on a 6-point scale.

[d]Variable scaled to measure from 0 to 1.

support for regional separatism. All three variables are highly significant and have a strong positive relationship with support for both increased language status and regional separatism in the bivariate regressions. In the multivariate analysis all except language fluency remain significant in the regional separatism regression.

Table 6 adds the language factors to the model. Three differences become apparent in comparing the results with and without the language variables. Most importantly, whereas being a migrant is the most significant factor in the initial model, it becomes much less significant when language factors are added. In effect, these results show that the high level of support for nationalism among migrants is actually the result of migrants' higher propensity to know and use the Tatar language. Second, when language factors are added to the model, education level

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becomes highly correlated with support for nationalism at a high level of significance. For each unit increase in level of education, support for cultural nationalism increases by 2.8 percent while support for regional separatism increases by 3.1 percent. This occurs because the language factors are negatively correlated with educational level. Since they are not included in the initial model, respondents who score high on the language factors but are poorly educated mask the overall positive effect of education on support for nationalism. A similar process is responsible for the third difference between the two models, the increase in the significance of being a student for support for nationalism. In this model students are 5.2 percent more likely than otherwise similar nonstudents to support increases in language status and 7.1 percent more likely to support regional separatism.

The three language factors are not independent of each other. In fact, receiving a native-language education is the best predictor of both language-use homogeneity and language fluency. It alone explains over 30 percent of the variation in each of the other two indexes.[30] For this reason, even though the positive correlation between the index of native-language education and support for nationalism is not significant in the combined model (Table 6), native-language education nevertheless plays a dominant role in determining the extent of popular support for nationalism.

Although these statistical results do not directly identify the manner in which support for the nationalist movement spread through the Tatar population, they do shed light on this process. If we assume that those groups that expressed greater support for the nationalist movement in 1993 were the ones that were most deeply committed to the nationalist movement during its peak, we can show how the Tatar case fits the theory of how nationalist movements spread.

The Tatar nationalist movement, founded by Tatar intellectuals based at the Institute of Language, Literature, and History and at Kazan State University, directed its initial recruitment efforts at the urban population, particularly those living in Kazan and Naberezhnye Chelny, the two cities in which most of the organizers lived. They were particularly successful among two segments of this population. Members of the educated elite joined the movement because they believed that Tatar culture was in decline and that this decline could be reversed

[30] Other important factors that contribute to language use and fluency include the age of the respondent and growing up in a rural area. Education level and being a student are correlated negatively with these variables.

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through political action. Intellectuals constituted over half of the delegates at the first two congresses of the Tatar Public Center (TPC), the flagship organization of the nationalist movement. Other than academics, these intellectuals included members of the creative intelligentsia, teachers, and doctors.[31]

Migrants to urban areas also joined in large numbers because of their greater exposure to traditional Tatar culture in the rural areas. Migrants, in effect, were the ideal converts to the nationalist cause because they combined a strong belief that Tatar culture needed to be preserved with the experience of their children's assimilation in a Russian-dominated urban environment. The most radical supporters of Tatar nationalism came largely from the ranks of recent migrants from rural areas. The high proportion of such migrants in Naberezhnye Chelny helps to explain the strength and radical views of the nationalist movement there.[32]

Support in the villages was strongest among the rural intelligentsia, particularly village teachers and doctors. The teachers were frequently former students of the TPC leaders and represented the primary means by which the movement's message was disseminated in rural areas. The importance of these groups for the spread of nationalism in those areas is shown by the growth of their participation in TPC congresses between 1989 and 1991. Whereas members of these groups constituted 7 percent of the delegates at the 1989 congress, two years later 22 percent of the delegates were teachers and doctors.[33] Their ties to movement leaders in Kazan encouraged these members of the rural intelligentsia to support the nationalist movement.

Teachers and doctors were highly respected and influential among the less educated rural inhabitants and used their position as the intellectual elite to try to spread the message of the nationalist movement to the rest of the rural population. In fact, only through teachers and doctors could ideas that were not supported by the district administrators and collective farm chairmen have reached the rural population.[34] Their efforts were not very successful, however. Villagers who worked directly in agriculture were not more likely than the average Tatar to support

[31] Damir Iskhakov, "Neformalnye obedineniia v sovremennom Tatarskom obshchestve," in D. Iskhakov and R. Musina, eds., *Sovremennye Natsionalnye Protsessy v Respublike Tatarstan* (Kazan, 1992), 1:7–9.

[32] R. M. Gibadullin, *Tatarskoe Naselenie Naberezhnykh Chelnov v Tsifrakh Etnosotsiologii* (Naberezhnye Chelny, 1993).

[33] Iskhakov (fn. 31), 7–9.

[34] On the lack of support for Tatar nationalism among the rural administration, see Elise Giuliano, "Maintaining Russian Integrity: Nationalism and Social Transformation in Tatarstan" (Paper presented at the annual meeting of the American Political Science Association, Washington D. C., 1997).

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the nationalist movement's agenda. Kolzhoz workers, for example, were reluctant to support nationalism out of traditionalist sentiment and fear of reprisals by kolkhoz chairmen. Even those rural inhabitants who voiced support for nationalist views remained largely passive and did not take part in political activity in support of these views. Villagers in Tatarstan did not participate in protests and voted for officially approved candidates in local elections. Tatar activists quickly recognized their weakness in these areas and did not focus much of their recruitment effort in rural areas.

Although the statistical analysis shows that belonging to the Muslim religion is highly correlated with support for the nationalist movement, this result is tempered by the strong negative correlation between religiosity and support for nationalism. In comparison with non-Muslim Tatars, respondents who identify themselves as Muslim are strongly supportive of preferential treatment for the Tatar language and of regional separatism. However, this support decreases among the Muslim Tatars as level of religiosity increases, with highly religious Muslim Tatars being even less likely to support nationalism than non-Muslim Tatars. In effect, the data show that support for nationalism is high among those Tatars who consider themselves Muslims but do not actively practice their religion. It seems likely that nonreligious Tatars who declare themselves to be Muslim perceive belonging to Islam as part of their political, rather than their religious, identity. As such, identifying as a Muslim for nonreligious Tatars may be not a cause of increased support for nationalism but simply a statement of such support. The contradiction in support for nationalism between nonreligious and religious Muslims may thus reflect the existence of two separate subcategories within the Muslim population. This finding contradicts the usual Western view of Islam as a spur to radical political activity. While there are certainly some parts of the world where Muslim religious leaders encourage nationalist mobilization, the Tatar case shows that such a link can by no means be assumed to exist everywhere. Certainly there are parts of the world where religious leaders encourage their followers to avoid engaging in nationalist activities and to support the governing elites.

The statistical data confirm the importance of native-language education and facility in speaking Tatar for determining the extent of support for nationalism. As already stated, higher values of these language-use variables explain the greater propensity of migrants and older Tatars to support nationalist demands. As expected, extensive native-language use encourages the development of a strong sense of

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national identity. Those who knew Tatar and studied it in school are more likely to believe that the Tatar nation is threatened by assimilation and thus are more likely to advocate political action to ameliorate this threat.

The data show that not all groups that were expected to support nationalism do so. In particular, students and members of the governing elite are largely neutral toward the nationalist agenda. Although part of the Tatar student population became some of the most enthusiastic and radical supporters of the Tatar nationalist movement, their effect was offset by those students who had become essentially Russified, with little sense of a Tatar collective identity and few links to the part of the Tatar ethnic group that had a strong sense of ethnic identity. This latter group was primarily urban, educated in Russian-language schools, and living in an almost completely Russian-language environment. For many of these students the only interaction with Tatar culture came during summer visits to their grandparents in the village and during school field trips to the local history museum. By contrast, the students who supported the nationalist movement had grown up primarily in rural areas, so even though most were attending university programs taught in the Russian language, they had received their previous education in Tatar. Moreover, even those students who attended rural Russian-language high schools were more closely connected to their Tatar identity simply by virtue of having lived in the village, where they were surrounded by Tatar culture and where Tatar was the primary language of communication. This analysis is confirmed by the combined model in Table 6, which shows that students are more likely than average to support nationalism once language factors are controlled for.

The governing elite was ambivalent toward the nationalist movement. On the one hand, members of this elite had extensive interactions with members of other ethnic groups and functioned in an almost completely Russophone setting. On the other hand, some members of this elite recognized that the nationalist agenda could be used to secure their position in the context of the collapse of Soviet rule and even to increase their power vis-à-vis the central government. This explains the leaders' propensity to support regional separatism while remaining reluctant to embrace the drive for improvements in the status of the Tatar language. Despite this ambivalence, some members of the governing elite attended the TPC founding congress, where they made up 9 percent of the total number of delegates.[35] The leaders of the nationalist

[35] Iskhakov (fn. 31), 7.

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movement returned the elite's ambivalence. On the one hand, they blamed the elite for implementing the policies that had led to the decline of Tatar culture and the collapse of Tatar schooling. On the other hand, they recognized that members of this elite could be particularly helpful in implementing the nationalist agenda. For this reason, some of the movement's leaders eventually joined the Communist Party regional committee (obkom) and became deeply involved in plans to establish a separate Tatarstan Communist Party—plans that were thwarted by the August 1991 coup.[36]

In Tatarstan the nationalist movement began among the intellectual elite and then spread primarily to migrants, nonobservant Muslims, and a segment of the student population. At the same time the groups that the economic and cultural explanations of nationalist mobilization would expect to be most supportive of nationalist mobilization—the governing elite and rural and religious Tatars—gave little support to Tatar nationalists. These results show that the institutionalist model described in the first part of this article works to explain the spread of nationalism among the Tatar population.

Implications

The evidence presented in this article supports the institutionalist explanation for the spread of support for nationalism within an ethnic group. While support for the nationalist movement and its agenda was most apparent among those social groups that had maintained the strongest connections to their ethnic group's cultural traditions and native language, the strength of these connections depended on institutionally based ties among the social groups. In urban areas the groups that most strongly supported nationalism included intellectuals, many of whom worked in cultural fields that reinforced their sense of ethnic identity, and migrants from rural areas, many of whom had received a native-language education and/or had been brought up in an environment where the titular language was commonly used. University students who received a native-language education were also likely to support nationalism, while students who were educated in Russian-language schools usually avoided the movement. All of these groups were linked together through the republic's academic institutions, which provided a home base for the intellectuals who founded the

[36] Interview with Damir Iskhakov, November 1995. The relationship between the Tatarstan government and the nationalist movement is described in detail in Gorenburg (fn. 28).

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movement. These institutes and universities employed many migrants, giving the nationalist movements access to a tightly interconnected social group that provided many of their recruits. Since many of the movement founders were university professors, the recruitment of students also occurred in the academic setting. Both students and migrants had strong connections to the villages where they had grown up and were therefore able to spread the nationalist message beyond the urban environment. The spread of nationalism to rural areas was also facilitated by members of the rural intelligentsia, and particularly by teachers with ties to the urban academic institutions. Because of these links, rural inhabitants who were not employed by collective farms were likely to be supportive of the nationalist agenda. Although support among collective farm workers depended on the extent to which collective farm chairmen retained control over village life, it was made more likely because the native-language education system had been best preserved in rural areas. The strength of connections between social groups and the extent to which an ethnic group's language and culture were preserved among the population thus depended largely on the region's ethnic institutions.

This article has shown that nationalist sentiment among the members of a particular ethnic group cannot be assumed to be either constant or randomly distributed. Instead, it varies in accordance with the depth of an individual's feeling of connection to his or her ethnic group. This sense of ethnic identity is determined primarily by the networks and collective identities created by state institutions. These findings demonstrate the importance of institutional design for avoiding secessionism. While the institutionalization of ethnic identity may ameliorate existing ethnic conflict, the establishment of ethnic institutions in areas where such conflict is not occurring is likely to strengthen nationalist sentiment in the long run.

While it is beyond the scope of this article to show whether this model applies to other areas, I have shown in other work that a similar pattern of support for nationalism is found throughout the ethnic republics of the Russian Federation.[37] It seems likely that while a few aspects of the model may be context sensitive, support for nationalism would spread in similar ways in other former communist states that possessed significant minority populations and institutionalized ethnicity. Certainly, similar patterns are apparent in the nationalist mobiliza-

[37] Dmitry Gorenburg, "Nationalism for the Masses: Popular Support for Nationalism in Russia's Ethnic Republics," *Europe Asia Studies* 53 (January 2001).

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tion process that led to the disintegration of Yugoslavia. More intriguing still is the possibility that nationalism could spread from intellectuals to migrants to rural inhabitants among minority groups in China. Finally, the recent establishment of a separate parliament in Scotland provides an excellent opportunity to determine whether the creation of separate institutions for minority ethnic groups will lead to an increase in support for nationalism in West European countries and whether this support will spread in a manner similar to that found in the former communist states.

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Review Article

POST-POSTCOMMUNISM
Transition, Comparison, and the End of "Eastern Europe"

By CHARLES KING*

Valerie Bunce. *Subversive Institutions: The Design and Destruction of Socialism and the State.* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999, 206 pp.

Karen Dawisha and Bruce Parrott, eds. *Democratization and Authoritarianism in Postcommunist Societies*, 4 vols. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997. Vol. 1, *The Consolidation of Democracy in East-Central Europe*, 389 pp.; Vol. 2, *Politics, Power, and the Struggle for Democracy in South-East Europe*, 472 pp.; Vol. 3, *Democratic Changes and Authoritarian Reactions in Russia, Ukraine, Belarus, and Moldova*, 386 pp. ; Vol. 4, *Conflict, Cleavage, and Change in Central Asia and the Caucasus*, 423 pp.

Richard Sakwa. *Postcommunism.* Buckingham and Philadelphia: Open University Press, 1999, 153 pp.

Daniel S. Treisman. *After the Deluge: Regional Crises and Political Consolidation in Russia.* Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1999, 262 pp.

THERE are two ways to speculate about the future of Russia's ongoing transition. One is to know a great deal about the behavior of overpowerful executives and divided legislatures in environments where credible commitment is low, huge incentives for free riding exist, institutional anarchy encourages self-serving political and economic behavior, rent seeking and patronage networks among central and peripheral entrepreneurs prevent broad cooperation, and social cleavages along ascriptive lines such as ethnicity overshadow both ideology and class as a basis for political mobilization. The other is to know a lot about Russia.

The gap between these two ways of thinking about eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union was long considered a gulf between stu-

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dents of the region and their colleagues in other areas of political science. East European specialists worried about their estrangement from "mainstream" comparative research; comparativists denounced the area studies tradition for a host of sins, including failing to predict the end of Soviet-style socialism.[1] In the 1990s debates raged in area studies journals and the newsletters of professional associations, as regional scholars attempted to fend off assaults by colleagues calling on them to produce generalizable hypotheses rather than accounts stressing cultural uniqueness or historical contingency.[2] The monumental changes in the field were evident in the renaming of scholarly journals, a phenomenon that paralleled the rechristening of streets and squares across the former communist lands: *Soviet Studies* became *Europe-Asia Studies*; *Soviet Economy* became *Post-Soviet Affairs*; *Problems of Communism* ceased to existed, before being resurrected as, simply, *Problems of Post-Communism*.

The major question that long preoccupied students of the communist world was how to integrate theories from mainstream political science into the study of eastern Europe; that is, how might the theoretical or conceptual insights of comparative politics enrich the study of communism? The question was not easy to answer, since communist political systems seemed so utterly different from the west European liberal democracies that formed the basis for much of the existing comparative model building. A question that was less frequently asked was how the study of eastern Europe could contribute to comparative politics in general. Although regional specialists strove to fit their work into research programs generated by the field, it was rarer to find empirically grounded work on eastern Europe that influenced how those research programs were shaped. It is difficult to think of a single book on communism, in fact, that had a major impact outside the regional subfield.

Ten years after the end of Soviet-style socialism, the second question can now be answered. The once acrimonious debates between "area

[1] See the exchanges in Robert H. Bates, Chalmers Johnson, and Ian Lustick in "Controversy in the Discipline: Area Studies and Comparative Politics," *PS: Political Science and Politics* 30 (June 1997); Robert Bates, "Theory in Comparative Politics?" *APSA Comparative Politics Newsletter* 8 (Winter 1997), 1–3; Christopher Shea, "Political Scientists Clash over the Value of Area Studies," *Chronicle of Higher Education*, January 10, 1997, A13–A14.

[2] See the special issue of *Post-Soviet Affairs* 8, no. 3 (1992); Jack Snyder, "Science and Sovietology: Bridging the Methods Gap in Soviet Foreign Policy Studies," *World Politics* 40 (January 1988); Peter Zwick, "The Perestroika of Soviet Studies: Thinking and Teaching about the Soviet Union in Comparative Perspective," *PS: Political Science and Politics* 24 (September 1991); Martin Malia, "From under the Rubble, What?" *Problems of Communism* 41 (January–April 1992); Michael Cox, "The End of the USSR and the Collapse of Soviet Studies," *Coexistence* 31 (1994); Charles King, "Post-Sovietology: Area Studies or Social Science?" *International Affairs* 70, no. 2 (1994), 291–97.

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studies" and "the discipline" have largely subsided: area studies has become more rigorous, and comparative politics has turned toward reevaluating the role of contingency, midrange theorizing, and case-based narratives.[3] Comparativists have come to value the same scholarly attributes that area studies specialists have long prized, including sensitivity to problems of concept stretching and cross-regional model building.[4] Postcommunist Europe and Eurasia are fertile ground for testing theories that were developed in other geographical contexts—theories of democratization, institutional design, interest-group interaction, and identity politics. The reinvigorated study of the region has also produced new work that promises to enrich the general study of the political economy of reform, federalism, transitional justice, and nationalism and interethnic relations.[5] The one-lane dirt road that used to wend between area studies specialists and comparativists has, at last, become a multilane interstate.

This article focuses on one of the most significant areas of research to emerge for comparativists over the last ten years: accounting for variable outcomes in the systemic transitions across the region. Compared with the relative homogeneity of outcomes in earlier transitions in southern Europe and Latin America—extrication from previous regimes followed by long periods of consolidation—the record in the east looks profoundly more varied: a handful of successful transitions and easy consolidations, several incomplete transitions, a few transi-

[3] See, for example, Robert H. Bates et al., *Analytic Narratives* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1998).

[4] Marc Howard Ross, "Culture and Identity in Comparative Political Analysis," in Mark Irving Lichbach and Alan S. Zuckerman, eds., *Comparative Politics: Rationality, Culture, and Structure* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997); Ruth Lane, *The Art of Comparative Politics* (Boston: Allyn and Bacon, 1997), esp. chaps. 5, 6.

[5] Christopher Shea, "New Faces and New Methodologies Invigorate Russian Studies," *Chronicle of Higher Education*, February 20, 1998, A16–A18. On the political economy of postcommunism, see Steven Solnick, *Stealing the State: Control and Collapse in Soviet Institutions* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1998); Thane Gustafson, *Capitalism Russian-Style* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999); David M. Woodruff, *Money Unmade: Barter and the Fate of Russian Capitalism* (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1999); Andrei Shleifer and Daniel Treisman, *Without a Map: Political Tactics and Economic Reform in Russia* (Cambridge: MIT Press, 2000). On federalism, see Mary McAuley, *Russia's Politics of Uncertainty* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997); Kathryn Stoner-Weiss, *Local Heroes: The Political Economy of Russian Regional Governance* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1997). On transitional justice, see Kathryn Hendley, *Trying to Make Law Matter: Legal Reform and Labor Law in the Soviet Union* (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1996). On nationalism and interethnic relations, see David D. Laitin, *Identity in Formation: The Russian-Speaking Populations in the Near Abroad* (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1998); Tone Bringa, *Being Muslim the Bosnian Way: Identity and Community in a Central Bosnian Village* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1996); Anastasia N. Karakasidou, *Fields of Wheat, Hills of Blood: Passages to Nationhood in Greek Macedonia, 1870–1990* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1997); Marjorie Mandelstam Balzer, *The Tenacity of Ethnicity: A Siberian Saga in Global Perspective* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1999).

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tions followed by reversion to authoritarian politics, even some transitions that never really began at all. Why the extreme differences? And what light might the answer shed on systemic change in general?

Section I presents an overview of the study of communism and its development before the early 1990s. Understanding the development of the subfield is important to appreciating the new relationship between the east European cases and comparative analysis today. Section II reviews the shape of transition politics across the region since 1989 and underscores the variable progress that countries have made in implementing reform. Section III illustrates the ways in which intimate knowledge of particular cases has been coupled with serious theorizing about political problems of broad interest. Section IV hazards a few suggestions about where "post-postcommunist studies"—if there can be such a thing—might go in the early years of this century, as the countries of eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union become increasingly differentiated.

I. From Totalitarianism to Comparative Politics

In its earliest incarnation "communist studies" was not so much scholarly research as studious propagandizing. Sidney and Beatrice Webb's paean, *Soviet Communism: A New Civilisation?*, is the best known of these early works, but the Webbs' enthusiastic endorsement of the Soviet experiment was echoed in many other memoirs and travel books from the 1920s and 1930s.[6] These early on-the-spot narratives were produced by and large by Europeans, but the Second World War made the Soviet system—and its new avatars in Poland, Romania, Yugoslavia, and elsewhere—a matter of strategic concern to the United States. The new centers of teaching and research that sprang up within the American academy contributed two new features to the study of communist Europe: a focus on formal language training for nonnative speakers and the introduction of social scientific methods into the study of the region. Whereas previously the typical east European specialist was the leftist traveler or émigré historian, after the war a growing generation of American-born social scientists began to join the communist studies field.[7]

[6] Sidney and Beatrice Webb, *Soviet Communism: A New Civilisation?* (London: Gollancz, 1935). Some travelers, especially Panait Istrati and Nikos Kazantzakis, were far less enthusiastic about the Soviet experiment than many of their contemporaries. Istrati, *Russia Unveiled*, trans. R. J. S. Curtis (London: George Allen and Unwin, 1931); Kazantzakis, *Russia: A Chronicle of Three Journeys in the Aftermath of the Revolution* (Berkeley, Calif.: Creative Arts Book Company, 1989).

[7] The contribution of British scholars—especially Leonard Schapiro, Hugh Seton-Watson, Alec Nove, and later, Archie Brown, Stephen White, Mary McAuley, and others—was central. For an

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If the writings of the Webbs and their contemporaries were overly uncritical of Soviet socialism, early Sovietology was perhaps too tendentious in the opposite direction, characterized by denunciations of communist systems as rigid, totalitarian dictatorships ruled by the iron hand of the party. Interestingly, both groups tended to take communists at their word; they differed only in which words they chose to take seriously. The Webbs and others in their cohort believed the Soviet rhetoric of social justice and equality; postwar Sovietologists tended to believe the rhetoric of party discipline and the plan.[8] During the era of high Stalinism, from the war through the early 1950s, this latter vision of Soviet and even east European politics prevailed. However, the "totalitarian model" of communist politics was never really much of a model at all. It did not explain (nor, to be fair, did its adherents claim to explain) precisely how the system held together, since it was assumed that brute force was the key variable.[9] In the 1960s and 1970s a more complex vision of Soviet and east European politics began to emerge, a result both of changes in the region and of developments within academe. The communist bloc was hardly the monolith that some totalitarian theorists portrayed it to be, and even the Soviet Union itself clearly witnessed intraparty struggles and elite rivalries. In response, a variety of new conceptual tools and techniques—from an increasing concern with Soviet society (rather than just the state) and elite-level disputes—made their way into writing on Soviet and east European politics.[10] As Jerry Hough wrote in 1979, in his rewritten and renamed edition of Merle Fainsod's 1953 *How Russia Is Ruled*, "research and

impressive survey of British scholarship, see Archie Brown, "The Study of Totalitarianism and Authoritarianism," in Jack Hayward, Brian Barry, and Archie Brown, eds., *The British Study of Politics in the Twentieth Century* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999).

[8] For important examples of this scholarship, see Merle Fainsod, *How Russia Is Ruled* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1953); Carl J. Friedrich and Zbigniew Brzezinski, *Totalitarian Dictatorship and Autocracy* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1956). See also Carl J. Friedrich, ed., *Totalitarianism* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1954); Leonard Schapiro, *Totalitarianism* (London: Pall Mall, 1972). Schapiro was no less committed to straightforward institutional analysis, but his work did mark a shift toward trying to understand process as well as structure in the Soviet state; see Schapiro, *The Communist Party of the Soviet Union* (London: Eyre and Spottiswoode, 1960).

[9] For analyses of the role of the totalitarian model in shaping both academic debate and foreign policy, see Stephen F. Cohen, *Rethinking the Soviet Experience: Politics and History since 1917* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1985); Abbott Gleason, *Totalitarianism: The Inner History of the Cold War* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1995).

[10] For an overview of this literature, see Gabriel A. Almond and Laura Roselle, "Model Fitting in Communism Studies," in Frederic J. Fleron, Jr., and Erik P. Hoffman, eds., *Post-Communist Studies and Political Science* (Boulder, Colo.: Westview, 1993). For examples, see Archie Brown, *Soviet Politics and Political Science* (London: Macmillan, 1974); Archie Brown and Jack Gray, eds., *Political Culture and Political Change in Communist States* (London: Macmillan, 1977); Archie Brown, ed., *Political Culture and Communist Studies* (London: Macmillan, 1984); Susan Gross Solomon, ed., *Pluralism in the Soviet Union: Essays in Honour of H. Gordon Skilling* (London: Macmillan, 1983).

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writing about Western governments has centered on the policy process and the factors associated with responsiveness in political systems, and meaningful comparative political science requires that a conscious attempt be made to ask the same questions about the Soviet Union."[11] By the mid-1980s, when the rise of Mikhail Gorbachev remade the study of Soviet politics as much as Gorbachev's own perestroika would change the Soviet system, the study of Soviet-style communism had become a diverse field with competing visions of the key characteristics of the state. New writing on interest-group politics, patronage networks, leadership, generational change, ideology, and political culture transformed the understanding of communist politics.[12]

In retrospect, it is clear that many of the major debates in the field, from the 1960s forward, involved at base a kind of competitive naming. Was the Soviet system under Stalin "totalitarian" or just "authoritarian"? Did it become "pluralist" under Brezhnev? Was Gorbachev a "transformative" leader or merely a "reformist" one? It is difficult to know what difference the label might really have made in explaining how Soviet politics worked. But in a system in which real data were difficult to obtain, being clear on the framework of analysis was a crucial step. The labels were part of an ongoing conversation among Western academics about the degree to which communist systems could be studied with the same conceptual tools used to understand other systems, such as those of advanced liberal democracies or third world authoritarian regimes.

Given the extent of these conceptual and methodological debates, it is not just unfair but also simply wrong to assert that communist studies was wholly divorced from "mainstream" political science. The main criticisms of the field—that it was insular, that it reified geographical boundaries into analytical ones, that it was overly fixated on institutions, that it failed to consider serious disputes among rival interests within the party and state apparatus—are caricatures of what most folks were actually writing. At nearly every turn, from the 1940s through the 1980s, students of communism were, in general, solidly in

[11] Jerry F. Hough and Merle Fainsod, *How the Soviet Union Is Governed* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1979), *vii*.

[12] For important work, see Ronald J. Hill, *Soviet Politics, Political Science and Reform* (Oxford: Martin Robertson, 1980); T. H. Rigby and Bogdan Harasymiw, eds., *Leadership Selection and Patron-Client Relations in the USSR and Yugoslavia* (London: Allen and Unwin, 1983); Stephen White and Alex Pravda, eds., *Ideology and Soviet Politics* (London: Macmillan, 1988); Archie Brown, ed., *Political Leadership in the Soviet Union* (London: Macmillan, 1989); T. H. Rigby, *Political Elites in the USSR: Central Leaders and Local Cadres from Lenin to Gorbachev* (Aldershot: Edward Elgar, 1990); idem, *The Changing Soviet System: Mono-organisational Socialism from Its Origins to Gorbachev's Restructuring* (Aldershot: Edward Elgar, 1990).

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step with developments in the broader social sciences. The early totalitarian model was not a great deal more rigid than similar institutional analyses that dominated other areas of political science in the 1940s and early 1950s. Descriptive institutionalist treatments gave way to analyses that tried, as far as possible, to differentiate distinct interest groups within the Soviet and east European elite and to begin to see communist states—most of which had been largely peasant economies and backward societies before the advent of communism—as evolving, modernizing polities.[13] These in turn gave way to more sophisticated accounts of Soviet politics that, by the 1980s, analyzed contests within the party leadership, generational changes among party and state elites, emerging trends in Soviet society, and center-periphery struggles between Moscow and the republics.[14]

That is not a bad record for research on a political system in which survey data were nonexistent, archival access severely restricted, elite interviews either impossible or unreliable, preference falsification prevalent, and official dissimulation the norm. Plenty of criticisms can be leveled at Sovietology; for example, the first major scholarly work on the politics of interethnic relations did not appear until 1986.[15] But that Soviet studies concerned itself solely with interpreting the arcane rituals of party congresses and Politburo sessions is not one of them. It was, in fact, U.S. government analysts and journalists—not academic Sovi-

[13] The work of historians and economic historians was essential in the shift from the totalitarian model to elite-conflict and modernizationist models. See Theodore H. Von Laue, *Why Lenin? Why Stalin? A Reappraisal of the Russian Revolution, 1900–1930* (Philadelphia: J. B. Lippincott, 1964); Alec Nove, *Economic Rationality and Soviet Politics, or Was Stalin Really Necessary?* (New York: Praeger, 1964); Roger Pethybridge, *The Social Prelude to Stalinism* (London: Macmillan, 1974).

[14] For important interpretations of the early transition period from the perspective of the 1990s, see Philip G. Roeder, *Red Sunset: The Failure of Soviet Politics* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1993); M. Steven Fish, *Democracy from Scratch: Opposition and Regime in the New Russian Revolution* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1995); and Archie Brown, *The Gorbachev Factor* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996).

[15] The 1987 Ralph E. Bunche Award of the American Political Science Association was awarded to Rasma Karklins, for *Ethnic Relations in the USSR: The Perspective from Below* (Boston: Unwin Hyman, 1986). Karklins's work was followed by a flood of other books, as the ethnic dimensions of Soviet politics became increasingly evident. See Lubomyr Hajda and Mark Beissinger, eds., *The Nationalities Factor in Soviet Politics and Society* (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1990); Bohdan Nahaylo and Victor Swoboda, *Soviet Disunion: A History of the Nationalities Problem in the USSR* (London: Hamish Hamilton, 1990); Alexander J. Motyl, *Sovietology, Rationality, Nationality: Coming to Grips with Nationalism in the USSR* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1990); Graham Smith, ed., *The Nationalities Question in the Soviet Union* (London: Longman, 1990); Gail W. Lapidus and Victor Zaslavsky with Philip Goldman, eds., *From Union to Commonwealth: Nationalism and Separatism in the Soviet Republics* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992); Hélène Carrère d'Encausse, *The Great Challenge: Nationalities and the Bolshevik State, 1917–1930*, trans. Nancy Festinger (New York: Holmes and Meier, 1992); idem, *The End of the Soviet Empire: The Triumph of the Nations*, trans. Franklin Philip (New York: Basic Books, 1993); Ian Bremmer and Ray Taras, eds., *Nations and Politics in the Soviet Successor States* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993).

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etologists—who spent their time divining trends in communist politics from who stood next to whom on top of Lenin's mausoleum during May Day parades. Serious students of the Soviet Union and eastern Europe, especially those who recognized earlier than others the power of the "nationalities question" across the region, can be proud of their scholarly pasts.

Students of eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union are keenly aware of how their subfield was perceived by the wider discipline, and the transition to broad comparison has presented three challenges. The sudden opening of the states and societies themselves generated a flood of new empirical information. The last ten years produced an embarrassment of riches, as archives were flung open, surveys were carried out by local and Western researchers, and—crucially—younger east Europeans were educated in the United States and western Europe, individuals who have both the local knowledge and the formal methodological training to conduct truly pathbreaking research. These developments have revealed what may have been the chief irony of the old area studies: despite the repeated criticisms from colleagues outside the subfield about the naïveté of its modeling, the real deficiency of communist studies was often the paucity of its empirical evidence. According to Peter Rutland, of the eighty-seven doctoral dissertations on Soviet politics completed in American universities between 1976 and 1987, the authors of only seventeen had actually spent time conducting research in the Soviet Union.[16] A similar statistic would be unthinkable today.

Furthermore, students of postcommunism, even if they were inclined to insularity, cannot afford to be separated from the wider social science world. Grant-making bodies increasingly demand cross-regional comparative research. There is far less money available now than there was a decade ago to fund research aimed at elucidating politics in a single country or region. Even organizations that continue to fund yearlong research visits to individual countries—such as the Fulbright Commission, the Social Science Research Council, and the International Research and Exchanges Board (IREX)—have redefined exactly what "region" they cover. Fulbright now offers some multicountry research and teaching grants, such as the new Aegean Initiative in Greece and Turkey. IREX, once dedicated exclusively to Soviet and east European studies, now administers grants to Turkey and Iran.

[16] Rutland, "Sovietology: Notes for a Post-Mortem," *National Interest*, no. 31 (Spring 1993), 114–15.

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Perhaps most importantly, though, the collapse of communism and the disappearance of communist studies came at the same time as the ascendance of deductive theorizing, especially rational choice modeling, as one of the major paradigms in American political science (Bunce, 162–64). If not all political scientists have become rational choice theorists, they have at least been forced to become more rigorous in their research design and to think more carefully about problems of causation and hypothesis testing. One wonders, in fact, whether the shape of postcommunist studies and the sometimes acrimonious debates of the early 1990s might have been different had the Soviet system disappeared at some other time in the history of American social science.

All of this poses a unique challenge for students of postcommunism: to take advantage of the overwhelming wealth of new empirical information while presenting work in a way that will be meaningful to the wider field. As the books under review here demonstrate, this tension can be a creative one.

II. The Varieties of Postcommunist Experience

In the last decade European and Eurasian "transition countries"—all twenty-seven of them, from the Czech Republic to Kazakhstan (one might also include Mongolia)—have had highly variable success in the move away from one-party rule and planned economies. Some have rejected authoritarian governments, refashioned state institutions, and begun the process of integrating into Euro-Atlantic structures. Others have rejected authoritarian regimes without managing to build authoritative governments. Still others have done little more than exchange the mantras of international socialism for those of nationalist authoritarianism.[17] In central Europe, Poland, Hungary, the Czech Republic, Slovenia, and now perhaps Slovakia and Croatia seem squarely on their way to becoming solid members of the community of stable Euro-Atlantic democracies. The first three are already NATO allies, the fourth the leading candidate in the next round of enlargement, the fifth and sixth important contenders after sloughing off a megalomaniacal prime minister and president in 1998 and 1999. Along with the Baltic countries, most are among the leading candidates for EU membership, and if present trends continue, most will probably join the EU in the next five or six years.

[17] For an overview of postcommunist diversity, see Valerie Bunce, "The Political Economy of Postsocialism," *Slavic Review* 58 (Winter 1999).

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Not surprisingly, most comparative work on the collapse of communism and its aftermath has focused on these states. Romania, Bulgaria, and Albania still rarely figure in comparative discussions. Russia is most often treated as a country apart, more the focus of comparative-minded case studies than of genuinely cross-national research; likewise for most of the remnants of socialist Yugoslavia. Central Asia and the Caucasus are barely on the comparativists' map. The reason for the exclusion of these countries, it is often said, is that they have lagged behind others in terms of political and economic reform and are thus less propitious venues for testing theories of regime change, institutional design, and the political economy of transition. But these "laggards" in fact constitute the majority. The countries of the northern tier—roughly from Slovenia northeast toward the three Baltic countries—are the exceptions, not the norm, in postcommunist politics. More broadly, as Valerie Bunce argues, regime collapse that ends in long periods of difficult transition and even bloodshed, as in Yugoslavia, may be the more general historical norm, not just the regional one (p. 142).

Karen Dawisha and Bruce Parrott's rich four-book series is a notable exception to the excessive concentration on the small number of successes in the transition: it provides the best one-stop survey of the diverse and generally dismal politics of the postcommunist world, up to the mid-1990s. The four edited volumes treat each of the transition countries (except Mongolia) in detail, with each chapter written by one of the leading specialists on the country concerned on the basis of years of deep engagement with a specific place and culture. The contributions will continue to be mined by comparativists. The Dawisha and Parrott volumes may well be the last of their type, though, since the chapters assay a range of countries, from central Europe to central Asia, that are now highly differentiated on just about every possible dimension. The situation on the ground is changing rapidly. Is Croatian democracy now really as "embattled," as Lenard Cohen wrote, as it was in 1996? Is Azerbaijan really struggling toward democracy, as Audrey Altstadt wrote, rather than rushing back toward authoritarianism? The chapters must be supplemented by more recent reportage to arrive at an accurate picture of the fluid politics of the postcommunist world.

As each chapter makes clear, the differences across the region today are striking. According to the annual Freedom House surveys, some countries (Albania, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Ukraine) have actually regressed on the democratization scale since the early 1990s.[18] The story

[18] Freedom House, *Annual Survey of Freedom Country Scores, 1972–73 to 1998–99*, www.freedomhouse.org/ratings/ (accessed February 10, 2000).

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recounted by Kathleen Mihalisko in her chapter on Belarus (3:223–81)—of hesitant national revival, fitful liberalization, authoritarian backlash—now seems the typical path, at least in the former Soviet Union. Corruption and political cronyism have followed from these incomplete, or even retrograde, transitions. On Transparency International's Corruption Perceptions Index, a measure of corrupt business practices in ninety-nine countries, most transition states fall in the bottom half of the list (among the most corrupt) along with such countries as Colombia and Uganda. All the transition states of northern Europe (except, interestingly, Latvia) cluster in the top half.[19] In human rights, too, most of these countries are part of the "laggard" class. The annual surveys by Human Rights Watch, the United States Department of State, and Amnesty International catalog a range of abuses, from periodic violence against minorities to police torture and extrajudicial killing.[20]

The countries of postcommunist eastern Europe and Eurasia have indeed experienced a "return to diversity," as Joseph Rothschild's masterful history once put it—but perhaps in a rather different sense from what Rothschild anticipated.[21] There have been valiant attempts to pull out similar strands from this tangled skein and to characterize "postcommunism" in general. Leslie Holmes, in the first introductory survey to be published on the phenomenon, elaborated a "fourteen point model . . . that makes it possible to distinguish post-communist countries from others with which they might initially appear to have much in common."[22] (Holmes's points, however, are slippery, ranging from "moral confusion" to "temporality" to "unfortunate timing.") In a new textbook Richard Sakwa narrows the number to thirteen, from the "emergence of pluralistic societies" to "various facets of identity politics" (pp. 5–6)—and that, he says, is postcommunism "narrowly defined."

Sakwa's text is the most thoughtful and readable of the several introductory volumes on the postcommunist condition to have emerged in the last decade.[23] It has the supreme value of being short, about 150

[19] Transparency International, *1999 Corruption Perceptions Index*, www.transparency.de/documents/cpi/index.html (accessed February 11, 2000).

[20] Human Rights Watch, *Human Rights Watch World Report 2000*, available at www.hrw.org; and U.S. Department of State, *1999 Human Rights Report*, available at www.state.gov/www/global/human_rights/hrp_reports_mainhp.html; *Amnesty International 2000 Report* (London: Amnesty International, 2000). See also the comparative assessment of all OSCE member states in *Torture and Inhuman Treatment or Punishment in the OSCE Region* (Vienna: International Helsinki Federation for Human Rights, 2000).

[21] Joseph Rothschild and Nancy M. Wingfield, *Return to Diversity: A Political History of East Central Europe since World War II*, 3d ed. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999).

[22] Holmes, *Postcommunism: An Introduction* (Durham, N.C.: Duke University Press, 1997), 15.

[23] For comparison, see Holmes (fn. 22); Stephen White et al., *Communist and Postcommunist Political Systems: An Introduction*, 3d ed. (New York: St. Martin's, 1990); Michael Mandelbaum, ed.,

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pages, which, one hopes, will encourage wide use in the classroom. As in his work on Russia,[24] Sakwa here too has an eye for the multifarious nature of the transition, as well as a sensitivity to the philosophical meaning of the passing of communism. He is not alone in reflecting on the deeper significance of the end of "really existing" socialism for the future of the left in Western liberal democracies,[25] but he is one of the few writers who has done so without a predetermined political agenda, on either the left or the right.

Sakwa provides a helpful *tour d'horizon* of the intricacies of the transition. Yet the very complexity of the subject at points makes for a strange read. The book is included in the respected Open University Press series on "Concepts in the Social Sciences," along with Bernard Crick on socialism, Robert Nisbet on conservatism, and, curiously, Mark Smith on something called "ecologism." The Sakwa volume sits uneasily in this lot. There may be a national distinction here, however: British comparative politics courses are structured in the main to introduce students to politics as competing "isms," rather than to convey the neofunctionalist or problem-driven approaches of the most popular American texts. The problem is that postcommunism is, of course, not just one thing (as Sakwa himself demonstrates), much less an ideology, set of behaviors, or style of politics that can usefully be compared with, say, socialism or conservatism. Although Sakwa's book deserves wide use as an entrée into the challenges of postcommunist reform, its main function may well be to convince both students and professional academics of how genuinely useless the idea of "postcommunism" really is. The label, ten years into the transition, now seems bizarre as a moniker for governments, societies, and economies as vastly different as those of Poland and Tajikistan.

III. Comparison and Differential Outcomes

The chief task, then, is to explain in general terms the different forms of extrication from communism and the massive changes in the zone,

Postcommunism: Four Perspectives (New York: Council on Foreign Relations Press, 1996); Stephen White, Judy Batt, and Paul G. Lewis, eds., *Developments in Central and East European Politics* (Durham, N.C.: Duke University Press, 1998); Stephen White and Daniel N. Nelson, eds., *The Politics of the Postcommunist World: From Communist to Postcommunist Politics* (London: Ashgate Publishing, 2000).

[24] Sakwa, *Russian Politics and Society*, 2d ed. (London: Routledge, 1996).

[25] For perspectives from the left and the right, respectively, see Alex Callinicos, *The Revenge of History: Marxism and the East European Revolutions* (University Park: Pennsylvania State University Press, 1991); and Robert Skidelsky, *The Road from Serfdom: The Economic and Political Consequences of the End of Communism* (London: Allen Lane, 1996).

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not only in the rolling revolutions of 1989–91 but also in the relatively short period since. How, in other words, did similar systems become transformed in such radically different ways? Communist states were, of course, diverse entities. But there was something called the "communist system"—or, in Bunce's usage, the "socialist system" (p. 165, fn. 1)—and the countries normally included under this rubric did share a host of comparable institutions, economic relationships, and foreign policy orientations that make it worth asking why the divergence among them has been so astronomical in the last ten years.

The temptation, especially for scholars intimately familiar with particular cases in the former communist lands, is to attribute botched transitions and stagnant economies to the idiosyncrasies of the cases themselves: leadership, public commitment, external support, political culture. But things did not necessarily turn out the way one might have predicted based on these variables. The most politically liberal and economically open European socialist state—Yugoslavia—produced the bloodiest of all the transitions, spawning four (or more) full-scale wars. Some states that are broadly culturally homogeneous, such as Poland, have had a far easier time than more heterogeneous countries such as Romania. But other, equally homogeneous states, such as Albania and Armenia, have been among the least reformed and the most violent. No one would have expected the transitions to be exactly alike; after all, twenty-two of the transition countries are also new states, facing problems of state and nation building as well as regime change and systemic reform. However, unlike the transitions in southern Europe and Latin America, the postcommunist states did come from similar starting points—a common ideology (albeit with variants), state-controlled economies, single-party systems, and a sense of being part of an international movement—which throws into even sharper relief the differences today.

The books by Valerie Bunce and Daniel Treisman shed light on these issues in three senses. First, they engage with the problem of comparison itself, in particular, the degree to which the experience of southern Europe and Latin America has been useful in accounting for differences across eastern Europe and Eurasia. After ten years of discussing transitology, scholars can now offer a reasonable assessment of how well the transition models have adapted as they have traveled east. They address especially the problem of institutions—not simply the challenge of institutional design (which has been a focus of the transitology literature) but also the complex interaction among postcommunist institutions and the communist substrate on which they have been

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constructed. Second, they deal with the problem of stability and state power, the extent to which the formal institutional arrangements and informal political bargains struck in the early years of the transition have set in place particular incentives and habits of behavior that can either further or—more frequently—freeze genuine reform. Third, they wrestle with the problem of identity, an overstudied and undertheorized topic in the postcommunist literature, especially the origins of the so-called ethnic revival. As the authors demonstrate, it is essential to ground discussions of identity politics in far more nuanced interpretations of the real politics of postcommunism. On all these dimensions the works under review have significance far beyond the understanding of transition politics.

Comparison and the Record of Transitology

Valerie Bunce was perhaps the most important early skeptic of the wholesale migration of transitologists into the field of east European studies. In a series of spirited exchanges with Latin Americanists and other comparativists in several major journals, Bunce argued that good comparative studies were those that were not only sensitive to the surface similarities among cases but that also took account of the real differences among them.[26] Postcommunist systems did come from somewhere, and the particular legacies of the past might have some bearing on the nature of politics afterward. Some of these arguments are repeated in her new book; they are even more powerful now than in the past, given the experience of the last decade. How well have transitological models fared in that time? The short answer is not very well.

The transitions literature is highly varied, but as Bunce argues, one can distill from it several general lines of argument, if not firm conclusions (pp. 158–59). First, there is a stress on what she calls "proximate politics," that is, the form of extrication (pacts between old elites and the opposition, full-blown revolutions) and the design of new institutions (electoral systems, constitutions). Second, the newest wave of democratization—of which southern Europe, Latin America, and eastern Europe are all a part—is amenable to "crafting," in Giuseppe Di

[26] Valerie Bunce, "Can We Compare Democratization in the East versus the South?" *Journal of Democracy* 6 (July 1995); idem, "Should Transitologists Be Grounded?" *Slavic Review* 54 (Spring 1995); idem, "Paper Curtains and Paper Tigers," *Slavic Review* 54 (Winter 1995); idem, "Regional Differences in Democratization," *Post-Soviet Affairs* 17 (July 1998). See also Sarah Meiklejohn Terry, "Thinking about Post-Communist Transitions: How Different Are They?" *Slavic Review* 52 (Summer 1993), 333–37; Philippe C. Schmitter with Terry Lynn Karl, "The Conceptual Travels of Transitologists and Consolidologists: How Far East Should They Attempt to Go?" *Slavic Review* 53 (Spring 1994); Karl and Schmitter, "From an Iron Curtain to a Paper Curtain: Grounding Transitologists or Students of Postcommunism?" *Slavic Review* 54 (Winter 1995), 965–978.

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Palma's term.[27] There is a "best practice" in democracy building that can be applied across regions. Third, countries in transition are defined more by where they are headed—toward open societies and democratic governance—than by where they have come from. Drawing comparisons based on the future trajectories of these states is more useful than attributing their problems to inherited legacies.

Transitologists might fault Bunce for being unduly cavalier with their body of literature, since throughout the 1990s Latin Americanists have themselves come to question much of the older transitions writing from the 1980s.[28] (Bunce has herself gone into these issues in more depth elsewhere.)[29] Still, she is right to ask whether the early hegemony of transitology may have blinded scholars to key variables and taken them down explanatory cul-de-sacs. The eastward migration of comparative transition studies tended to ask what the experience of other regions could tell students of eastern Europe, rather than to ask how theories derived from other historical experiences could be enriched in the postcommunist context. They underestimated the difficulties of crafting new regimes in multiethnic contexts and overestimated the usefulness of civil society as an explanatory variable (especially in circumstances in which vibrant, deep-rooted, nonstate associations are decidedly uncivil). They focused on how the choice of institutions shaped political outcomes, rather than on why elites chose particular institutions in the first place.[30] And they were perhaps too ready, as recent work by Thomas Carothers and Janine Wedel has shown, to believe that Western assistance in institution building and party development could ensure the growth of stable democracies and sustainable civic orders.[31]

Bunce engages with these issues in a series of what she terms "cascading comparisons" (p. 129) centered around three research questions.

[27] Di Palma, *To Craft Democracies: An Essay on Democratic Transitions* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1990).

[28] See, for example, Deborah J. Yashar, "Democracy, Indigenous Movements, and the Postliberal Challenge in Latin America," *World Politics* 52 (October 1999); and Juan J. Linz and Alfred Stepan, *Problems of Democratic Transition and Consolidation: Southern Europe, Latin America, and Post-Communist Europe* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1996).

[29] For an analysis of the problems of transition modeling in a particular case, see Valerie Bunce and Maria Csanadi, "Uncertainty in the Transition: Post-Communism in Hungary," *East European Politics and Societies* 7 (Spring 1993).

[30] For an examination of this issue, see Gerald M. Easter, "Preference for Presidentialism: Postcommunist Regime Change in Russia and the NIS," *World Politics* 49 (January 1997); and Anna Seleny, "Old Political Rationalities and New Democracies: Compromise and Confrontation in Hungary and Poland," *World Politics* 51 (July 1999).

[31] Carothers, *Aiding Democracy Abroad: The Learning Curve* (Washington, D.C.: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1999); Wedel, *Collision and Collusion: The Strange Case of Western Aid to Eastern Europe, 1989–1998* (New York: St. Martin's, 1998).

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First, why did socialism end across the entire communist bloc? She proceeds by comparing socialist regimes with one another, as well as with other authoritarian bureaucratic systems. Second, what accounts for the divergent paths taken since the collapse of the regimes? The method here involves comparison across the transition states. Third, why did the three socialist federations—Czechoslovakia, the Soviet Union, and Yugoslavia—break up in such radically different ways, the first peacefully, the second less so, and the third in fratricidal war? Here the comparison involves a detailed look at the dynamics of center-periphery relations in each of the three states.

Put most broadly, Bunce's response to these questions is that starting points matter. Unlike some transitologists, who argued strongly that the obstacles to democratization "everywhere . . . are determined by a common destination, not by different points of departure,"[32] she holds that analysis of initial conditions is a crucial part of sorting out the vast variety of postcommunist outcomes. But initial conditions are not understood here as demographic factors, levels of economic development, traditions of democratic governance, or the other variables most often used to explain regime instability, reform, and collapse. Rather, Bunce focuses on the institutional structure of the communist state and the ways in which the reforms of the 1980s, working within the institutional constraints imposed by the system, provided new incentives and opportunities for both political actors and publics.

The communist system was institutionally rich but organizationally weak. The regimes constructed an elaborate network of state institutions that insinuated themselves into almost every aspect of society, from trade unions to chess clubs. In most instances, an array of multilevel party structures mirrored those of the state. The institutional density of communist systems was meant to serve as a mobilizational instrument, a surrogate for class, economic interest, religion, or other mobilizational stimuli that might be found in more open, pluralistic societies. Moreover, they were meant to work in a single direction, mobilizing economic, political, social, and even cultural resources to achieve the ends of state planning, not as channels for assessing the public mood and for enabling elites to make policy accordingly.

The totalitarian school of communist studies did pay attention to institutions, but what the early analysts missed was that the system, although organized as a hierarchy, became increasingly feudal over time.

[32] Adam Przeworski, *Democracy and the Market: Political and Economic Reforms in Eastern Europe and Latin America* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991), xii.

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Administering the various domains and levels within this institutional network depended not on central command and control (which would have been impossible as the systems aged and the societies became more diverse after the Second World War) but rather on the distribution of power and resources to institutional agents throughout the state. As time passed the central party and state apparatus displayed increasing "redistributive tendencies" (p. 32): buying off restive allies in the Soviet bloc by allowing some degree of autonomy in foreign policy; buying off regional bureaucrats by turning a blind eye to economic overreporting; buying off publics by producing cheap consumer goods. More than in other authoritarian states, communist elites thus had at their disposal a vast body of instruments, both coercive and redistributive, but rather few feedback mechanisms for assessing how well or poorly those institutions were functioning.

The problems that these institutions faced by the 1980s came from both internal and external forces. The institutional density and overlap created competing institutional interests; unlike the bureaucracies of pluralistic societies, however, there were no extrainstitutional forums in which these rivalries could be mediated. Elites became increasingly divided, often as a result of the passing from the scene of the first and second generations of post–Second World War bureaucrats who had consolidated the system. Publics became more autonomous and demanding. Efforts to reform the system from within merely opened up channels for the expression of discontent without simultaneously enabling the institutions to respond to demands from below. The result was a series of multilevel defections from the institutional arrangements that had defined the communist system for forty years or more. Opposition groups across the communist bloc created autonomous avenues of interest articulation and insisted that they be represented by the state. Regional elites in socialist federations claimed ever greater autonomy from central governments. National leaders in the Soviet Union's outer empire asserted full independence from Moscow. It was in this sense that the institutions were self-subversive. Although originally designed to ensure state control over wide swaths of territory and deep into society, the institutions of Soviet-style socialism "functioned over time to divide and weaken the powerful, homogenize and strengthen the weak, and undercut economic performance" (p. 131).

Bunce's story is a complicated one, but that, in fact, is part of the message of her book: that parsimony in explaining macrolevel historical change may come at the cost of cutting out precisely those variables that need attention. (To be fair, though, most theorists would not dis-

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agree. As Adam Przeworski and Henry Teune argued, parsimony and accuracy are usually incompatible; the quality one stresses depends on the research question being asked.)[33] The real value of her account is its concretizing exactly what the much-discussed "communist legacies" really are. Many scholars of eastern Europe have written, usually defensively, of the peculiarity of the region and the reasons that models of political change imported from abroad are unlikely to fit exactly. The reasons given usually have to do with social atomization, weak civil society, or (the favorite obstacle to reform cited by postcommunist politicians) residual communist "mentalities." Looking more closely at the design of the communist state, though, provides one key to understanding why some regimes went gently while others took the state with them.

Federalism and Stability

In *After the Deluge*, Daniel Treisman performs an immensely valuable service not only for the study of Russia but also for the study of federalism and ethnicity more broadly. Throughout the 1990s there was a tendency to focus on problems of identity and interethnic relations as the sole variables in accounting for the stability of multiethnic and ethnofederal states. The reciprocal grievances—historical, economic, psychological—of majorities and minorities have figured heavily in the literature. What is striking for its absence from many of these accounts, though, is politics: the activities of central and peripheral elites, their political interests, and the strategies of political survival that each pursues in relation to the other.[34]

Treisman is interested in explaining the relative stability of Russia's federal order, especially during the crisis period of the early 1990s. His overarching concern is to account for how the Russian Federation—faced as it was by an array of centrifugal forces at least as powerful as those that tore apart the Soviet Union, Czechoslovakia, and Yugoslavia—managed to remain intact at the height of center-periphery tensions. His answer, in brief, is that a policy of "selective fiscal appeasement" (p. 3) allowed the Yeltsin leadership to garner support from

[33] Przeworski and Teune, *The Logic of Comparative Social Inquiry* (New York: John Wiley, 1970), 22–23.

[34] For early exceptions, see Motyl (fn. 15); Philip G. Roeder, "Soviet Federalism and Ethnic Mobilization," *World Politics* 43 (January 1991); Robert Hayden, "Constitutional Nationalism in the Formerly Yugoslav Republics," *Slavic Review* 51 (Winter 1992); V. P. Gagnon, "Ethnic Nationalism and International Conflict: The Case of Serbia," *International Security* 19 (Winter 1994–95). Today, the pendulum has perhaps swung too far in the opposite direction, stressing the manipulative role of unscrupulous elites to the exclusion of social factors.

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the most restive republics and regions, thereby preventing bandwagoning against the center. Fiscal disbursements were targeted precisely at those regions most prone to disruptive protest actions, from strikes to voting against establishment candidates in national elections (p. 22).

Treisman is not concerned with democratization as such. (In fact, one of his major themes is the difficulty of building genuinely democratic structures in fragile ethnic federations.) But his work does touch on competing explanations for the shape of Russian reform, in particular, the relationship between center and regions. Why did Russia not go the way of other socialist federations? One might point to culture and ethnicity, but any putative commitment of Russia's citizens to a unifying "Great Russian" culture did not prevent major protest behavior and the growth of protosecessionist movements. Moreover, there was no clear correlation between republics, regions, or districts with the most homogeneous or cohesive ethnic mix and their opposition to the center's policies. The fear of the center's use of force was also not a powerful motivator. The October 1993 attack on the Russian parliament might have had a chilling effect on the demands of the regions, since the Yeltsin leadership showed itself willing to use brute force against opponents. But both before and after 1993 the Russian military came to depend more and more on regional elites, as the central budget was cut, and the armed forces could not be relied upon to implement the center's orders to clamp down on the regions. The first Chechen war (1994–96) also illustrated the impotence of the military to deal with committed separatists.

Treisman brings politics back into the picture, an especially noteworthy achievement in a field that often attributes differential political outcomes to cultural proclivities or long historical trajectories. Treisman argues that Russia's central and peripheral elites were locked into playing the same political game but for different stakes. Central elites needed to garner and maintain the loyalty of regional voters in order to win in national elections; regional governors needed constituent support to win in local races. Both sets of elites thus shared an interest in increased fiscal disbursements from central coffers. The former hoped that payment of wage arrears and entitlements would buy regional votes, while the latter hoped that a record of making the center pay up would translate into greater support in the next regional election. "Whether or not they shared philosophical convictions, personal sympathies, or political networks, Yeltsin and his governors shared an interest in nurturing support with which to face future elections. And voters, by apparently holding incumbents at both levels responsible for

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declining state services, made it difficult for one to achieve his aim without also assisting the other" (p. 119).

The argument is elegant, but there is a potential difficulty with the causal arrow. Treisman's main indicator for regional support for the Yeltsin leadership is the voting record of the regions in the April 1993 referendum on the constitution, the December 1993 parliamentary elections, the December 1995 parliamentary elections, and the 1996 presidential elections. However, it is difficult to know whether central appeasement produced desirable regional electoral outcomes because local voters responded to financial incentives, as Treisman wants to argue, or because the financial incentives caused regional bosses to "deliver" the vote for Yeltsin in each of these instances. Treisman clearly recognizes the potential problem, and in an appendix he analyzes the record of State Duma deputies and their votes for or against Yeltsin. "The delegates from regions where voters' approval of Yeltsin had recently increased were very significantly more likely to vote on the side supported by Yeltsin on roll-call votes in the Congress" (pp. 216–17). Treisman sees this outcome as "quite impressive evidence of democratic influences at work" (p. 217). Nevertheless, as he mentions in a footnote (p. 240), things could have worked in the opposite direction: the record of State Duma deputies may have been the cause of regional voting behavior, not the result.

This issue does not affect Treisman's overall contention that appeasing the most aggressive anticenter leaders can be an effective strategy in weak federations. It does matter, though, for the contrast that he draws with other cases. As he argues in his stimulating conclusion, the Russian case seems to offer a sharp contrast with other examples of imperial behavior. The Romans and Ottomans worked to bring potentially aggressive peripheral leaders into an imperial hierarchy of incentives—making bandits into bureaucrats, in Karen Barkey's suggestive formulation.[35] But Yeltsin seemed to succeed by co-opting not the regional elites but their constituencies, providing increased federal funds to pay wages and pensions in order to secure constituents' votes in national elections, and simultaneously to hedge against the ability of regional elites to mobilize those same constituents against the hands that fed (p. 167).

This view depends on the idea that the regional governors are at least minimally responsive to their electorates. That, though, may be a heroic

[35] Barkey, *Bandits and Bureaucrats: The Ottoman Route to State Centralization* (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1994).

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assumption. As Jeffrey Hahn notes (Dawisha and Parrott 3:162), electoral participation in many regions has been low, especially in the cities (precisely the area where the increased disbursements from the center would be expected to have the greatest effect). The early 1990s also witnessed the continued growth of regional executive authority over the power of local legislatures, the forums in which the voice of the electorate would be most readily heard. The center may have provided disbursements not so much to placate regional voters, as Treisman argues, as to provide rent-seeking regional elites with sufficient funds to deliver the votes themselves—whether through legitimate channels of increased social spending or less savory methods of electoral engineering. In the latter case, Russia's strategy of ensuring the compliance of peripheral elites looks far more similar to the Roman and Ottoman experience than Treisman perhaps would want to acknowledge.

Institutions and Identity Politics

Treisman includes a brief chapter comparing Russia with the Soviet Union, Czechoslovakia, and Yugoslavia. Why did the last three federal systems shatter whereas Russia, faced by peripheral challenges no less severe than the others, managed to hold together? The answer, for Treisman, lies in the political decisions taken at the height of federal crises. In the Russian case Yeltsin worked to redistribute resources to peripheral elites who, in turn, distributed resources to their own constituents, a form of cascading conciliation that enhanced public support for integration and discouraged cross-regional bandwagoning. The Soviet, Czech, and Yugoslav elites behaved differently. In the Soviet Union the Gorbachev leadership had a decreasing ability to enforce fiscal agreements and used fiscal resources as a stick rather than a carrot by meting out punishment to the most restive areas; even if the Soviet center had been willing to buy off regional leaders through disbursements, there would still have been little ability to appeal to the publics in the regions, since there were no truly representative institutions at the center. In Czechoslovakia the strong commitment to liberal reforms in Prague ruled out fiscal profligacy; the refusal of the Václav Klaus government to lessen the economic shock of reform in the less-developed Slovak half of the federation provided ample opportunity for populist mobilization there. In Yugoslavia an institutionally weak and resource-poor federal government sought to impose fiscal austerity throughout the federation. Rather than further empowering regional elites through budgetary payoffs, the Belgrade government sought to recentralize the federal system; it ignored the demands of the most

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likely secessionists and early on demonstrated its willingness to use force against the periphery. In all these cases the policies pursued by the center exacerbated the centrifugal forces in the federation and pushed the countries farther along toward dissolution.

Treisman notes that his comparative argument is meant only to be suggestive (others, such as Susan Woodward, have made the argument in greater detail).[36] But his account does provide an intriguing contrast with Bunce's. Bunce highlights the major institutional differences among the four cases. In both Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia central institutions were unusually weak; power had been significantly decentralized as early as the 1960s to a far greater degree than in the Soviet Union or post-Soviet Russia. The crucial differences in the Yugoslav case were structural. Yugoslavia was even more decentralized than the others. It had a politically weak republic (Serbia) at its center, a republic that took on the task of trying to keep the federal state together, eventually by force. That republic, moreover, came to control the one institution whose legitimacy and privileged position were predicated on the existence of a Yugoslav state: the Yugoslav National Army (p. 121). For Treisman, the key issue is the strategy pursued by political actors; for Bunce, it is the logic of institutional arrangements. (Bunce does give attention to the strategic games among central and peripheral elites [pp. 120–25], but her major concern is the institutional framework in which these games were played.)

The two accounts do share an important commonality, though: a focus on the institutions of communism and their impact on the politics of identity under postcommunism. Through the lens of the late 1980s, in which communism seemed more a brake on national development than its catalyst, it is easy to forget that the early Bolsheviks and their heirs elsewhere in Europe's east saw themselves and their mission as fundamentally modern. One of the basic elements of their modernizing project was the creation of self-conscious nations. Nationalism was not merely an unintended by-product of the Soviet system; it was central to the Bolshevik message. Communists were not always nationalists, but they were without exception nation builders. As Ronald Suny has noted in the case of the Soviet Union, the Bolsheviks' rhetorical commitment to the fading away of national affiliations notwithstanding, the Soviet Union was not a melting pot for old na-

[36] Woodward, *Socialist Unemployment: The Political Economy of Yugoslavia, 1945–1990* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1995), esp. chap. 10.

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tions but an incubator for new ones.[37] The irony is palpable: a state committed to creating a supraethnic "Soviet people," dominated by a party that saw classes rather than nations as the main motors of history, may well be remembered by future historians chiefly for its contribution to the growth of national consciousness across Eurasia. The same could be said for similar nation-building projects throughout eastern Europe, where communism came to be seen not so much as a break with a previous "bourgeois" national past but rather as its apotheosis.

The lesson for students of postcommunism and of interethnic relations more broadly is that they need to examine in greater detail the particular institutional incentives for the mobilization of ethnic issues. In the last several years growing research on interethnic conflict has reaffirmed the ways in which ethnic mobilization, far from being an atavistic resurgence of primordial identities, is often a rational response to a given set of incentives or a strategy consciously pursued by self-interested elites.[38] Philip Roeder has argued that national heterogeneity—multiple, self-conscious cultural groups living in the same state and usually tied to a particular piece of real estate—can be a serious impediment to democratization. As uncomfortable as it may be to admit, multiculturalism may be a luxury in established democracies but an obstacle in democratizing states.[39] One message of the work of Bunce and Treisman is that heterogeneity is only one piece of the puzzle. The institutional arrangements inherited from previous regimes and the decisions that policymakers take in the early years of systemic reform are crucial regardless of whether the state is culturally homogeneous or plural. Countries with more languages, more cultures, and more historical grievances obviously face a host of problems unknown in less diverse polities, but diversity itself need not impede democracy building.

There is, however, also a less optimistic dimension to Bunce's and Treisman's accounts. If the institutions and early decisions of political elites create a particular trajectory from which it is difficult to deviate

[37] Suny, *The Revenge of the Past: Nationalism, Revolution, and the Collapse of the Soviet Union* (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 1993), 87. On the history of nation making in the Soviet Union and eastern Europe, see also Rogers Brubaker, *Nationalism Reframed: Nationhood and the National Question in the New Europe* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), 23–54; and Yuri Slezkine, "The USSR as a Communal Apartment, or How a Socialist State Promoted Ethnic Particularism," *Slavic Review* 53 (Summer 1994).

[38] Woodward, *Balkan Tragedy: Chaos and Dissolution after the Cold War* (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution, 1995); Brubaker (fn. 37); Michael Hechter, *Containing Nationalism* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000).

[39] Roeder, "Peoples and States after 1989: The Political Costs of Incomplete National Revivals," *Slavic Review* 58 (Winter 1999).

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later on, then the politics of accommodation and appeasement may have an unwelcome outcome: rewarding ardent peripheral elites by recognizing their control. Such a strategy may lead to a decline in center-regional tensions and even a halt to armed conflict, as it did in Russia in the early 1990s and in several post-Soviet separatist disputes by 1994. However, the price in some cases has been to legitimize pockets of authoritarianism in return for professed loyalty to a single central government—the strategy of old empires now pursued within new and allegedly democratizing states. It is a dark bargain, but one that has been struck frequently across postcommunist Eurasia.

IV. Toward "Post-Postcommunist Studies"

The books under review represent some of the best examples of the work produced in the first postcommunist decade: empirically rich, theoretically engaged, and designed to bridge the divide between accurate accounts of real-world politics in exceptionally complex environments and general theorizing about the determinants of political behavior. The books do not claim to offer a view on how the study of eastern Europe and Eurasia should develop in the second decade after communism, although both Sakwa and Bunce, toward the end of their books, deal in passing with what it is that scholars of postcommunism should be studying. Still, the books implicitly raise several sets of issues about the nature of scholarship beyond the postcommunist horizon.

Theory Building and Snapshots

Bunce argues that treating institutions in a historically aware and detailed way means viewing them "as films, not snapshots," that is, "acknowledging that institutions can appear to have one set of consequences, but in practice and over time, quite different, if not opposing ones" (p. 143). The same might be said about the transition itself. In few areas of political research are dependent variables as skittish as in the study of postcommunism. The rapidity of change in eastern Europe and Eurasia has meant that speaking of "outcomes" is inherently slippery. What seems to be an unusual outcome in need of explanation one year can deliquesce into an uninterestingly commonplace one the next, and vice versa.

For example, Kyrgyzstan, Georgia, and Moldova have long been the hopeful cases in an otherwise disappointing Eurasian array. All three experienced devastating economic crises, and two were threatened by

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wholesale dissolution and separatist wars. Yet they were normally seen as relatively successful instances of democratization. Multiple elections were held with minimal irregularities, presidents won by less than unanimous votes, and new governments were peacefully formed after shifts in parliamentary representation. However, by 2000 none of the three looked nearly as positive as earlier enthusiastic assessments had held. Kyrgyzstan's 2000 parliamentary elections did not comply with democratic norms.[40] Research on Georgia had illustrated the degree to which the country's democratic governance was, at least in part, an illusion of Western governments and international nongovernmental organizations with a vested interest in perpetuating that image.[41] The view was confirmed in the April 2000 presidential elections, which were deemed unfair by international observers.[42] In Moldova a power-hungry president and his supporters in a fractious parliament threatened to rewrite the constitution and introduce a system that was strongly presidential and potentially authoritarian.[43]

What scholars need to explain, then, can depend on when they get around to explaining it. There is little sign that the dependent variables in this field will become any less mercurial as time passes—unless, unhappily, the "authoritarian reactions" that Dawisha and Parrott catalog in three of their four volumes become an even more solid end state along the southern tier. For theorists, this means that a certain degree of humility is still in order. East European and Eurasian studies is better than ever before at elaborating the ways in which systemic change across the region is consonant with and differs from similar phenomena in other parts of the world. However, the ability to predict the direction in which change is likely to go, solely from deductive theorizing rather than on the basis of intimate familiarity with the facts on the ground, is still as limited as in most other areas of political science. Even so, establishing the limits of the knowable, as Timur Kuran reminded scholars at the beginning of the east European transformations, is itself part of science.[44]

[40] OSCE Election Observation Mission to the Kyrgyz Republic Parliamentary Election, "Statement of Preliminary Findings and Conclusions," Bishkek, February 21, 2000.

[41] Stephen F. Jones, "Democracy from Below? Interest Groups in Georgian Society," *Slavic Review* 59 (Spring 2000).

[42] "Foreign Observers Criticize Lopsided Shevardnadze Vote," *New York Times*, April 11, 2000, A12.

[43] Charles King, *The Moldovans: Romania, Russia, and the Politics of Culture* (Stanford, Calif.: Hoover Institution Press, 2000), 161.

[44] Timur Kuran, "Now out of Never: The Element of Surprise in the East European Revolution of 1989," *World Politics* 44 (October 1991), 47.

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New Area Studies

There was a time when experts on eastern Europe and Eurasia—all of it—might have existed. But today, as the individual countries move in different directions, consolidating forms of government ranging from prosperous social democracies to sultanistic or even dynastic regimes, there is little utility in continuing to treat all twenty-seven (or more) transition countries as a natural set. Pace Sakwa, we have probably already reached the half-life of this particular method. Postcommunist studies, if it continues to keep within the same geographical boundaries as its predecessor, cannot last.

There are different ways of dividing up the transition world, and these divisions may make more sense in the future. As Bunce notes, "The impact of region, far from being fixed, depends on the research question being asked" (p. 163). Poland and most of the northern-tier states can now be properly considered nearly consolidated democracies; the study of policy-making, electoral systems, public administration, legislative politics, transnational integration, and other subjects that occupy students of western Europe can now properly apply there as well. Will we really want to think of Poland and Estonia as uniquely "postcommunist"—and, therefore, meaningfully distinct from Greece, Portugal, and other economically comparable, formerly authoritarian EU members—a few years hence?

Some research questions that are meaningful in the north make little sense farther south and east. There seems little reason to include Azerbaijan, with its rigged elections, in a study of comparative voting behavior. Students of center-periphery relations are unlikely to be enlightened by a study of Albania, where the center does not hold. Models of democratic consolidation may have little to gain from Turkmenistan, which has transited only from one form of authoritarianism to another. Instead, depending on the research focus, there might be fruitful comparisons to be drawn with neighboring countries that come from quasi-Leninist, but not communist, traditions. Turkey and Iran might be brought into discussions about politics in the Balkans, the Caucasus, and Central Asia, not simply in the foreign policy arena (where their influence is clear) but also in domestic politics. Students of the Balkans and the Caucasus, for example, will be struck by the similarities between identity politics, patronage networks, and state-sponsored violence in Turkey and some of its neighbors to the north. Likewise, countries that have experienced state crises, violent territorial separatism, and collapsing central institutions might be more usefully

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compared with similar cases in Africa than with other postcommunist states that have not experienced such crises.[45] Comparison is crucial, but students of the former communist world should consider the possibility that the sets they compare today may be less useful than they were a decade ago. Professional journals, regional studies associations, and graduate education programs still do not fully appreciate the impact of the last decade's changes on how they go about their tasks. In large part, research is still oriented along the same geographical lines, conducted in the same languages, and published in the same kinds of journals as during the cold war. At least in political science, those divisions surely cannot long endure.

There is no need to throw out regional peculiarities altogether. Very few researchers have really taken up Adam Przeworski's admonition to "forget geography"[46]—if for no other reason than that the silent majority of comparativists still value foreign languages, enjoy getting their hands dirty in empirical research, and think both are important to understanding political life. The real challenge is to recast what counts as the geographic area (or, more likely, areas) that post-postcommunist studies will aim to cover. Today, "Eastern Europe," with two capital E's, is really no longer serviceable, except as anything more than a quick tag for all points east of the Oder River. Even "Eurasia" will be meaningful in the future only if it seriously admits Turkey, Iran, and perhaps Pakistan and Afghanistan into the mix. The "area" in the new area studies need not disappear, but it cannot be the same as it was a decade ago.

The Meaning of "Method"

After the late 1980s there developed a strong consensus among political scientists about the need to bring methods from the study of American and west European politics into the study of postcommunist Europe and Eurasia. Even scholars skeptical about the migration of transitologists eastward stressed the need to be more comparatively minded and methodologically sophisticated, which normally meant being versed in the techniques used to study the politics of Western liberal democracies. Just as a focus on where transition countries are headed has determined which kinds of comparisons are thought to be most valid, the same idea has tended to govern which methods are seen to be most useful for comparativists interested in postcommunism.

[45] A valuable contribution to this sort of comparison is made by Mark Beissinger and M. Crawford Young, eds., "The Quest for the Efficacious State in Africa and Eurasia" (Book manuscript, 2000).

[46] Przeworski (fn. 32), 161.

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The broader exposure of postcommunist studies to rigorous methods has been an unequivocally positive development. But given the real character of politics in most parts of the former communist world, defining "research methodology" in overly narrow terms—as the ability to run regressions, say—can actually diminish the quality of research and graduate education rather than improve it. Today, most of the states that east Europeanists and Eurasianists study are still poor, weak, and relatively unfree. Some have central governments whose writ does not run far outside the capital's city limits. Almost all are multinational, not just multiethnic, with distinct cultural groups now exercising considerable control over their own affairs in the absence of effective state power. Several have become the unwilling hosts of de facto independent but unrecognized states on their own territory. To explain political outcomes in these contexts, researchers need a whole battery of methodological skills that are probably not captured in traditional definitions of what constitutes "good methodology."

The issue is not one of qualitative versus quantitative research but rather concerns the kind of expertise that researchers need to hone in order to answer interesting and important questions about political behavior. In eastern Europe and Eurasia, facility in (several) foreign languages is often required, as is a sensitivity to the ways in which the results of surveys and interviews can change depending on the language in which questions are asked. In edgily multicultural states as much as in totalitarian ones, dissimulation and preference falsification can still be the norm. Researchers need to know where to find and how to judge archival sources, official statistics, and indigenous scholarship. They still need to root out short-run newspapers or underground publications and to cart back in overloaded suitcases invaluable work by local scholars that can be found only in streetside kiosks. These are, of course, the same skills that characterized the communist period—learning to read between the lines and squeeze the most out of a limited and often skewed array of numbers, documents, and personal testimonies. For most of the postcommmunist region, outside the small coterie of democratic and prosperous states in the northern tier, they will continue to be essential for some time to come. How other scholars deal with these methodological problems in similarly underdeveloped countries and semiauthoritarian polities ought to be a more valued component of graduate education than a focus on the American and west European experience has so far allowed.

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The Ethics of Research

The old area studies was particularly attuned to the ways in which cultural diversity and historical trajectories can make a difference in political life, an approach that is now clearly represented in the mainstream political science literature, in both its more historically grounded and its more deductive strains. This was not, however, just a methodological peculiarity of interdisciplinary research. It had two ethical dimensions as well.

First, interaction with individuals, in their own languages and often around their own kitchen tables, predisposed scholars to consider how woolly things such as identity, history, and personality could condition political behavior. Explanations for why individuals behaved the way they did had to take seriously their own accounts and understandings of their actions. Second, interacting with local scholars and everyday citizens on their own turf—what is called, condescendingly, research in "the field"—encouraged scholars to package the results of their work in such a way that they would be intelligible to those whose actions the research was supposed to explain. The attention given to the ethics of scholarship, either implicitly in the way it was conducted or explicitly in the discussions that took place within area studies associations, was at times profound.[47]

Of course, no one any longer suggests that savoring a glass of rakija in a Belgrade apartment or a bowl of fermented mare's milk on the steppe is crucial to "really understanding" east European and Eurasian politics. But the old area studies' consideration for the ethics of research design and presentation has been one of the unfortunate casualties of the field's demise. People, especially in the extreme situations in which they find themselves across the postcommunist zone, are more than data generators. The unspeakably brutal wars, the crushing poverty, and the human rights abuses that many men and women continue to face are the stuff of what political scientists study. They are not just propitious social scientific testing grounds or "natural experiments," as more than one writer has averred over the last ten years. Especially in the dire straits in which most east Europeans and Eurasians find themselves, it is perverse to see them as primarily test cases for broad theories of political behavior and only secondarily as purposive, suffering agents.

[47] For discussions of the ethical dimensions of post-Soviet studies, see Robert T. Huber and Susan Bronson, "The August Revolution and Soviet Studies," in Frederic J. Fleron, Jr., and Erik P. Hoffman, eds., *Post-Communist Studies and Political Science* (Boulder, Colo.: Westview, 1993); and the discussion of the "commercialization of scholarship" in *Slavic Review* 52 (Spring 1993).

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They are equally both. Given the gaping lacuna in professional debates and graduate education concerning the ethics of data collection and analysis,[48] the old communist studies and its post-postcommunist progeny may find yet another way to contribute to the comparative study of politics in general: bringing issues of responsibility and sensitivity out from the shadows and raising questions about what makes the social sciences an inherently social activity.

[48] The most widely used text in the methodology of qualitative comparative research makes no mention of this issue. See Gary King, Robert O. Keohane, and Sidney Verba, *Designing Social Inquiry: Scientific Inference in Qualitative Research* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1994).

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

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







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

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

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

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

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